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Why is there apparent inconsistency in U.S. presidential military intervention 
decisions when cases exhibit similar characteristics that other scholars have argued 
should be determinant, such as the magnitude of the conflict, economic ties, or domestic 
political support?  For instance, President Clinton committed troops in Haiti (1994) but 
not in Rwanda (1994); and likewise, President George H.W. Bush intervened in Somalia 
(1992) but not in Bosnia (1992).  Previous studies have held an implicit assumption: if 
the demand for action is high enough, an intervention will occur.  This study moves the 
operative element of the decision calculus from demand to feasibility, attempting to 
answer the primary research question: what impact does operational feasibility have on 
U.S. presidential military intervention decisions?      
This research identifies what I call “feasibility factors,” which are based on 
military planning considerations and provide observable measures for the expectation of 
intervention success.  Successful interventions are those that achieve the intervention 
mission within a short time horizon at acceptable costs.  Using a mixed methods design 
incorporating both Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and an examination of 
National Security Council and presidential meeting archives, the study finds that the 
seemingly inconsistent behavior disappears when feasibility is included.  Demand for 
intervention is necessary, but insufficient; only when there is enough demand and the 
operational feasibility factors are positively aligned do presidents intervene.   
This study provides three main contributions.  First, it argues for feasibility’s 
inclusion in future intervention-focused studies.  Second, this work elucidates the most 
prominent feasibility concerns for the policy community: the conflict type, whether there 
is a regime to intervene on behalf of, the enemy’s organization, and the logistical 
accessibility of the crisis region.  Finally, this work provides an alternative logic for why 
presidents choose inaction despite overwhelming demand for intervention.
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GLOSSARY 
 
Bush 41  President George H.W. Bush, the 41st president of the 
United States. 
 
Consistency Measure in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
that “gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a 
given combination of conditions agree in displaying the 
outcome in question” (Ragin 2008, 44).  Similar to 
“significance” in regression analysis. 
 
Coverage Measure in QCA that “assesses the degree to which a 
cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an 
outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44).  Similar to “correlation 
coefficients and total variance explained” in regression 
analysis (Bara 2014, 4).   
 
Intervention “An overt, short-term deployment of at least one 
thousand combat-ready ground troops across 
international boundaries to influence an outcome in 
another state or an interstate dispute; it may or may not 
interfere in another state’s domestic institutions” 
Elizabeth Saunders (2011, 21).  Interventions occur in 
response to crises ranging from civil wars to supporting 
humanitarian goals. 
 
Precision Measure in QCA that accounts for false positives in 
predictive analysis and reports the percentage of 
predictions that are correct.  
        
Sensitivity  Measure in QCA that is the percentage of cases that the 
solution correctly predicted.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation focuses on recent military intervention decisions made my U.S. 
presidents.  Specifically, why is there apparent inconsistency in decisions to get involved 
in some foreign crises but not others when they exhibit similar characteristics that 
scholars have argued should be determinant, such as the magnitude of the conflict, 
economic ties, or domestic political support?  As this work will demonstrate, most 
studies that attempt to explain intervention behavior hold an implicit assumption in 
common: if the demand for action is high enough, an intervention will occur.  I present a 
different theory that moves the operative element of the decision calculus from demand 
to feasibility.  Based on military planning considerations, I develop what I call feasibility 
factors.  These factors measure “expectations of success,” or what others have discussed 
as accomplishing the mission within short time horizons and at acceptable costs (Regan 
2002, 5).  Using a mixed methods design incorporating both Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) and a detailed examination of presidential archival records of National 
Security Council (NSC) and presidential meetings, this study seeks to answer the primary 
research question:  what impact does operational feasibility have on U.S. presidential 
military intervention decisions?  Ultimately, the study finds that when feasibility 
concerns are included in the analyses, the seemingly inconsistent behavior disappears.  
Only when there is enough demand and the operational feasibility factors are positively 
aligned do we see presidents commit troops. 
This opening chapter has four parts.  First, I frame the research by providing an 
overview of the research problem and explanation of the key terms.  Second is a 
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description of the methodology used to answer the research question.  Third, I present 
the findings and their implications.  Finally, I lay out the organization for the remainder 
of the dissertation.   
Research Overview and Key Terms 
Scholars have long sought to understand the selective use of force by U.S. 
presidents in international crises, or as Rosenau (1967) termed it, “intervention” (p. 168).  
In this study, I use Elizabeth Saunders’ (2011, 21) definition: “an overt, short-term 
deployment of at least one thousand combat-ready ground troops across international 
boundaries to influence an outcome in another state or an interstate dispute; it may or 
may not interfere in another state’s domestic institutions.”  This definition rules out 
covert operations and missions such as train or assist operations that run a low risk of 
resulting in combat.  This approach adds a level of consistency to the risk being weighed 
by presidents when undertaking these decisions.  Multiple explanations have emerged to 
explain intervention decisions that call on a wide range of factors, and yet even a cursory 
examination of cases reveals apparent inconsistencies in how these variables influence 
whether presidents intervene.  For examples, consider a few recent events.   
A sarin gas attack on August 21, 2013, outside of Damascus, Syria, claimed the 
lives of over 1,400 people in one of the most egregious acts in recent memory.  The 
culpability for this event rested upon Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as he prosecuted a 
campaign to retain power amid intense intrastate unrest.  At the time, this occurrence 
was seen by many to have "crossed a red line" that would trigger an American or 
multinational response, presumably including a military option (Good 2013).  Yet, 
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Obama did not initiate a punitive attack or forcibly remove al-Assad as some predicted.  
Contrast this with just over a year later when Obama chose to recommit 1,500 troops to 
neighboring Iraq to fight ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) (Collinson 2014). 
Did President Obama decide not to intervene in Syria because significant 
majorities of Americans polled were against involvement in yet another military action in 
the Middle East (Sullivan 2013)?  That is a difficult case to make because U.S. views 
regarding intervention were low for both – 25% for Syria and 39% for counter-ISIS 
operations in Iraq during the decision window for each (Pew Research Poll cited in 
Gewurz 2012; Pew Research 2014).  Alternatively, could the inaction in Syria be 
attributable to confounding geopolitical arrangements within the region, upsetting 
delicate power arrangements among Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and others?  After 
all, scholars have often viewed international politics and security considerations as 
determinants of conflict behavior (Moore and Lanoue 2003).  Likely not, since the 
would-be areas of operation are overlapping.  Maybe President Obama did not intervene 
because the United States was still at war in Afghanistan.  War weariness has also been 
determined to be a key indicator for inactivity given intervention opportunities (Levy and 
Morgan 1986).  Yet, both the decision to reinsert troops back into Iraq to counter ISIS 
and the decision not to intervene to depose al-Assad in Syria occurred while the U.S. was 
significantly engaged in Afghanistan.  President Obama's administration is not an outlier 
in this apparently inconsistent behavior.  Observers could draw similar conclusions for 
President Clinton, who intervened in Haiti (1994) but not in Rwanda (1994); and for 
President George H.W. Bush who intervened in Somalia (1992), but not in Bosnia 
(1992). 
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Scholars in this field have argued in favor of determinants such as those above, 
rooted in both domestic or international systemic concerns, with mixed results.  Why the 
apparent inconsistency?  I argue that these studies base too much of their analysis on the 
origins and strength of the demand signal for intervention, and too little on the part of the 
decision based on expected efficacy.  To remedy this, I propose a shift from the demand-
based explanation to one that incorporates feasibility through a three-part causal chain: 1) 
recognize an opportunity to intervene based on significant demand, 2) assess the 
likelihood of success for the use of force given the constraints of the crisis environment, 
and finally 3) given the anticipated costs associated with employing that force, determine 
whether an intervention is still advisable.  The question becomes, what are the most 
important aspects of the situation to help assess part two of the mechanism – the 
likelihood of success?  
Although feasibility appears to be a logical factor to include in any study of the 
use of force, it is surprisingly absent from studies attempting to explain the motivations 
or dissuasions for U.S. military intervention.  Authors have not completely overlooked 
the tactical and operational levels of military involvement, with authors such as Stephen 
Biddle (2004) calling attention to the importance of force employment in determining 
outcomes of armed conflict.  Yet, these considerations have not been included in the 
debate that addresses the decision space preceding the intervention.   
This study takes a stride in that direction by operationalizing expectations of 
success through feasibility factors that indicate whether the use of force can achieve the 
policy aims within a short time horizon and at acceptable costs.   Derived from the 
planning processes used to develop military options within the U.S. national security 
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apparatus, feasibility factors pose the key considerations that determine if the intervention 
is likely to be long and costly, or if a reasonably quick win could be expected.  
The four feasibility factors below were the most useful of those considered in this 
dissertation1: 
1. CONFLICT - What type of conflict is it?  If the conflict is based on ethnic or 
religious divides it is likely more intractable and will contribute to persistent 
instability.  
2. REGIME - Does the U.S. have a clear regime to support or install, or will it intervene 
as a neutral party between warring factions? 
3. ENEMY - How is the enemy/adversary organized?  Is the structure hierarchical and 
susceptible to strike, or diffuse and difficult to target?   
4. ACCESS - How accessible is the crisis environment?  Are there enough viable ports 
and transportation networks available to sustain the intervention logistically?   
Methodology 
 This study uses a three phase, explanatory sequential mixed methods research 
design (Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006; Creswell and Clark 2017).  Phase I employs 
a configurational comparative method – QCA – to analyze 19 intervention opportunities 
and identify the unique combinations of feasibility factors and demand signals from both 
                                                          
1 The study considers another feasibility factor associated with the population density of the crisis location: 
POPULATION.  The following chapter discusses the theoretical origins of this consideration and the QCA 
chapter uses it as part of the analysis.  However, it is omitted here and from the broader findings because it 
did not prove as helpful in explaining intervention decision behavior compared with the other four 
feasibility factors. 
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domestic and international systemic sources that are associated with intervention and 
nonintervention outcomes.  From there, I build on the QCA findings in the next two 
qualitative phases where I use the QCA outputs to guide the inquiry. 
Phase II is a comparative historical analysis of two near simultaneous intervention 
opportunities under the George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) administration: the famine and civil 
war in Somalia and the breakup of Yugoslavia.  Using primary resources from the 
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, I evaluate the extent to which the demands for 
action and the concerns over feasibility were explicitly discussed by those involved in the 
decision-making process.  This involves the detailed analysis of the minutes from NSC 
Deputies and Principals Committees, as well as presidential small group meetings.  The 
aim is to determine whether feasibility concerns are an observable part of the decisional 
dialogues, or if they are just implicit, and therefore of lesser analytic concern?   
Finally, in Phase III, I conduct another comparative historical analysis of the 
handling of the same crises by the subsequent William J. Clinton administration.  
Clinton reverses both Bush 41 intervention decisions, withdrawing from Somalia and 
committing ground troops to the NATO intervention in Bosnia.  This presents an 
opportunity to extend the application of the theory, looking at what happens when the 
feasibility factors switch from favoring intervention to nonintervention, and vice versa.  
Here again, I draw on primary sources from the Clinton Presidential Library to process 
trace how the Clinton national security team adjusted to changing information and arrived 
at their decisions. 
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Findings 
The analysis supports the contention that operational feasibility significantly 
impacts intervention decisions.  The QCA solutions in Phase I demonstrate that 
feasibility figures prominently in both intervention and nonintervention outcomes.  A 
supportable regime and logistically accessible crisis environment were present in 88% of 
the intervention cases.  A hierarchical enemy structure was also present in every 
intervention and absent in two-thirds of the nonintervention cases, adding weight to its 
inclusion as a key consideration.  Regarding noninterventions, the combination of an 
ethnically- or religiously-based conflict with no regime to support accounted for 83% of 
the cases, providing evidence that not only are these factors individually important, but 
they may also have an additive dissuasive quality when negative attributes are combined.   
More traditional determinants for intervention decisions also emerged in the QCA 
outputs, including presidential approval levels, trade ties, and the magnitude of the 
conflict.  This reinforces the arguments made by previous scholars that both international 
systemic and domestic factors hold sway.  However, none were present on their own in 
the QCA solutions, requiring the pairing of a positive feasibility factor to produce an 
intervention.  This finding bolsters the argument for the three-part causal chain hinging 
on feasibility that this work advances. 
The paired case comparison of the Bush 41 intervention opportunities for Somalia 
and Yugoslavia/Bosnia in Phase II strengthens the QCA findings.  Bosnia demonstrated 
a stronger demand signal from the determinants previous scholars have argued in favor of 
(e.g., media coverage or economic and political ties to allies), yet Bush chose to intervene 
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in Somalia.  The key differences between the cases is in their respective feasibility 
assessments.  Bush’s team saw Bosnia as a complex, ethnic civil war where the 
intervening party would have to remain neutral between multiple warring factions.  The 
anticipated enemy forces were decentralized and likely to oppose entry into a region that 
was already restricted in its accessibility.  Compare this to Somalia where the projected 
mission was limited to the delivery of aid, with little to no anticipated opposition, and 
expected completion within 30 days (NSC 0065, 3-5).   
The process tracing of the Bush 41 decision regarding Somalia yielded another 
useful insight that underscores the importance of feasibility.  The supposed mission that 
a U.S. intervention would undertake in Somalia changed over time, going through a 
series of transitions.  Each mission transition carried a corresponding change in its 
perceived feasibility.  Only when the mission was scoped to create a short time horizon 
with minimal risk did Bush decide to act.  This realization fed directly into the final 
phase of the analysis. 
This Clinton administration case study in Phase III also found that the feasibility 
factors were aligned with the outcomes as theoretically predicted.   Here, the primary 
source materials that supported the NSC deliberations were able to identify how the 
feasibility factor assessments changed under Clinton as he dealt with the same crises, 
influencing the decision to withdraw from Somalia and intervene in Bosnia (Clinton 
Library 1993b and 1993c).  The Clinton administration adopted more expansive nation-
building aims in Somalia than Bush 41 had proposed, necessitating revised feasibility 
assessments to account for new mission requirements and their concomitant adversarial 
responses (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 81-99; Clinton 1994).  Faced with greater than 
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expected resistance against diffusely organized militias, with no regime to support, and 
increasing costs over a longer time horizon, Clinton chose withdrawal.  Conversely, with 
the signing of the Dayton Accords, the situation in Bosnia changed substantially.   
While still intervening in an ethnically-based conflict, the agreed upon cease fire 
separated the combatants, reduced opposition, and provided access to the airports and 
road networks.  This, too, resulted in a decision reversal, with the U.S. taking part in the 
NATO Bosnian intervention.  
Contributions 
 This dissertation contributes to improved understanding of intervention decisions 
for the scholarly community, for the policy realm, as well as for the general public.  First 
and foremost, the theory and the feasibility factors used to test it operationalize the 
“expectations of success” concept that others have argued is an important consideration, 
but had not fully developed (e.g., Baum 2004; Regan 1998 and 2002; Seybolt 2007).  By 
providing an alternative theoretical framework that incorporates meaningful measures of 
feasibility, we can better explain what had previously appeared as inconsistent 
intervention behavior.  Beyond that, the three-part causal chain is a useful way for 
scholars to think about the decisional process, understanding how demand signals interact 
with feasibility assessments to arrive at a prudent decision.  Therefore, for academia, the 
findings indicate that feasibility factors should be included and potentially expanded 
upon in future studies.     
 For the policy community, the idea that feasibility influences decisions is not 
novel.  Those that develop military options or present them for consideration are aware 
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of the myriad challenges that pose risks to a potential operation.  However, through the 
systematic analysis of 19 intervention opportunities and two paired comparison case 
studies covering previously classified discussions, this study elucidates the most 
prominent feasibility concerns.   Knowing that presidents have incorporated these 
concerns heavily in the past, this study informs those framing decisions by identifying 
elements of their analysis that may be of greater interest to decision makers.  This study 
also validates the value of their work, demonstrating the decision to intervene or not is 
much more contingent on the existence of feasible options rather than political whims.  
More specifically, if the president chooses to intervene in instances where these factors 
are aligned against success, the policy community should monitor progress carefully and 
be ready to expose a failing strategy if, in fact, the intervention proves ineffective, as 
these indicators might suggest.     
 Lastly, the general public benefits from a more nuanced view of what presidents 
must consider when making these weighty decisions.  Often, presidents are rebuked in 
the media or on the world stage for failing to act (e.g., Rwanda coverage in New York 
Times 1994).  When this happens, the public, much like the scholarly community 
discussed above, is using a demand-based argument, devoid of any deliberation of 
whether feasible options exist.  By presenting an alternative rationale for why a president 
might fail to intervene, we open more space in the debate that surrounds these issues, 
making room for matters that impinge on the potential mission success or failure and 
what costs they might incur. 
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Organization 
 The next five chapters are structured to systematically determine the impact that 
operational feasibility has on U.S. presidential military intervention decisions.  Chapter 2 
reviews the literature and proposes a new theory for understanding intervention decisions 
based on the three-part causal chain.  To open, I first explore the intervention literature 
and identify a gap in operationalizing the idea of an “expectation of success.”  In 
response to this gap, I articulate the theoretical framework upon which the subsequent 
analyses are built.  Extant literature uses a demand-based logic as theoretical 
underpinning; I propose a shift to a threshold for intervention based on feasibility factors.   
 Chapter 3 provides the research design and conducts the first empirical tests of the 
eight hypotheses relating to feasibility using QCA.  I explain the rationale for using a 
mixed methods approach and introduce the various conditions used in the QCA, 
including both those that other scholars have argued as determinant and the feasibility 
factors I propose.  After providing an overview of the QCA process, I conduct the 
analysis and identify the unique combinations of conditions that best explain intervention 
and nonintervention.  Using those solutions, I then conduct an out-of-sample test to 
evaluate the predictive power of the causal recipes. 
Chapter 4 is a comparative historical analysis of contemporaneous crises under 
Bush 41: Bosnia and Somalia in 1992.  The analysis builds on the findings from the 
QCA in the preceding chapter by examining the role that the feasibility concerns 
identified in Chapter 3 play on Bush’s deliberations.  This is accomplished primarily 
through the analysis of previously classified primary source documents from the George 
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H.W. Bush Presidential Library, as well as supporting secondary sources.  The material 
includes the minutes from NSC meetings, small group discussions, and communications 
between senior government officials involved in the decision-making process.  The 
purpose of the chapter is to understand why the Bush 41 administration chose to 
intervene in Somalia but not in Bosnia and if the feasibility factors identified in the QCA 
were present in the historical record of the decisional dialogues. 
Chapter 5, drawing on primary sources from the Clinton Presidential Library, uses 
the same method as Chapter 4 but compares the Clinton decisions to withdraw from 
Somalia and intervene in Bosnia.  The previous two chapters emphasized conditions near 
crisis onset.  Looking beyond the initial decision window and process tracing how the 
Somalia and Bosnia situations change, I expand on the theoretical application of 
feasibility factor analysis by demonstrating that Clinton’s decisions reverse when the 
feasibility assessments change from positive to negative, and vice versa.   
Chapter 6 concludes.  In it I provide an overview of the central argument, a 
summation of the empirical findings, and further expand on the implications.  In closing 
I discuss the limitations of this study outline some recommendations for future research.   
Summary 
 This dissertation explores why U.S. presidents have decided to intervene 
militarily in some foreign crises but not others in recent decades.  By incorporating 
feasibility into the theory behind intervention decisions where previously only concern 
for demand existed, this work sheds light on a powerful set of factors that help explain 
both action and inaction.  As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, a crisis may emit 
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a strong demand signal with many clamoring that something ought to be done; but 
without feasible alternatives, U.S. presidents of the modern era have been reluctant to 
send in ground troops.  Therefore, to best understand and evaluate intervention 
decisions, one must account for the role that feasibility plays in determining the final 
outcome. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
 This chapter serves two purposes.  First, it situates this work within the existing 
body of literature.  Second, based on a gap identified within the extant literature in 
explaining what about the crisis environment makes a military intervention feasible, this 
chapter articulates the theoretical framework upon which the subsequent analyses are 
built.  Previous intervention scholars had implicitly or explicitly hypothesized a 
threshold for action, usually based on the accumulation of demand signals from both 
international and domestic political sources.  I reformulate that approach and argue that 
the demands they describe create an opportunity for action, but that the decision threshold 
is tied directly to the feasibility of a military intervention being able to achieve the policy 
goals.     
Literature Review 
The following literature review looks at how scholars have analyzed military 
intervention decisions and provides an understanding of where this work contributes to 
the existing body of knowledge.  In particular, it highlights the growth of a nascent 
consideration often treated in the background as an assumption or precursor issue when 
evaluating intervention decisions: the feasibility of military intervention given salient 
aspects of the crisis environment.  As I demonstrate in the following chapters, this 
previously underrepresented factor proves useful in explaining the apparent 
inconsistencies in U.S. presidential decisions regarding the commitment of U.S. forces to 
resolve foreign crises.   
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Attempts to understand the selective use of force by presidents, or what was 
similarly termed "intervention" by Rosenau (1967, 168) have assumed a variety of 
theoretical approaches.  A recent review of research by Aubone (2013), provided a 
useful typology for the literature, grouping the work into two different categories: 
research centered on either external or internal determinants for the decision to intervene 
(pp. 281-298).  I follow her lead in this regard for two reasons: first, because I believe 
her model appropriately portrays the development of the literature in concise fashion; and 
second, it does so in a way that illuminates the limitations these determinants have in 
fully understanding decisions to intervene.  “External” and “internal” determinants refer 
to the origin of the demand signal for an intervention.  Discussed in greater detail below, 
external refers for demands generated by forces and concerns rooted in the international 
arena whereas internal refers to those stemming from domestic matters.2  The literature 
supporting both sets of determinants ascribe to the same logic, that the cumulative weight 
of the demand is what triggers a decision to intervene.   
The graphical depiction below (Figure 2.1) portrays the common cumulative 
demand explanation for interventions emphasizing the two demand source categories 
(internal and external determinants) that exert pressure on the presidential decision space.  
These sources capture everything from demands stemming from economic ties to allies, 
                                                          
2 This study acknowledges that there is another body of literature addressing presidential decision-making 
that is situated on the leader and their personal or chosen organizational attributes.  These include 
significant works such as Horowitz and Stam (2014), Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam (2005), Preston 
(2001), and Vertzberger (1990), among others.  However, because the focus of this research is on the 
feasibility of military operations for the U.S., it necessarily must be temporally delimited to produce 
consistency in the challenges faced and the types and capabilities of military tools at the presidents’ 
disposal.  This necessarily results in a small N problem, making it impossible to draw significant 
conclusions from differences in characteristics such as age, military service, or organizational models.  
Beyond that, my contribution to this body of literature is not in the decision-making model itself, as most of 
these studies propose, but instead in the content to be considered in the models.  Namely, this study 
recommends the inclusion of feasibility factors in whatever decision-making model is being evaluated. 
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to geopolitical security interests, to congressional or public pressures at home.  In all of 
these views what matters is the rationale for action and whether there is enough pressure 
exerted to trigger an intervention.  Implied in these theories is that at some point a 
threshold tied to the amount or type of demand signal is crossed whereby the benefits of 
the intervention outweigh the costs and risks associated with failure.  Where the studies 
vary is in the types of demand that are said to elicit the greater response.  What is not 
commonly identified is what factors are tied to the placement of that threshold in the 
decision space.  Ostrom and Job (1986) argue that the threshold is tied to an appreciation 
of the crisis situation as a whole as either conducive to a major use of force or not.  I 
agree.  However, no one has adequately operationalized what separates an environment 
conducive to intervention vice one that is not.  I argue that understanding key feasibility 
factors can help us know where that threshold lies.  The omission of what influences the 
placement of that notional decision threshold is central to understanding the gap in the 
intervention literature.  The following two sections expose this gap by elaborating on the 
internal and external determinant categories that scholars argue influence intervention 
decisions. 
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Figure 2.1 Cumulative Demand Explanation for Intervention Decisions 
 
External Determinants 
Of these two categories, the external determinants are the more traditional form, 
with their roots reaching back to the realist scholars who attribute the actions of state 
leaders to issues of power, security, and state interests relative to other states within the 
global system (Waltz 1959 and 1979; Morgenthau 1948; Walt 1987; Mearsheimer 2001).  
This category also includes those that recognized the interdependencies (e.g., economic 
and social) among states as exerting pressure on leaders and the formulation of their 
foreign policy decisions (Keohane and Nye 1977).  The externalist position views the 
president as responsive to an external stimulus, such as a crisis abroad.  This approach 
served as the dominant paradigm throughout the majority of the Cold War, explaining 
interactions in a bipolar and contested world.   
Studies within the external determinants have also included more nuanced 
approaches to alliance relationships (Smith 1996) and explored the role of global 
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economic influences on state interaction as well (Fordham 2008).  For instance, 
Fordham demonstrates empirically that alliances are important, but that exports appear to 
have an indirect effect on intervention decisions.  More recently, a more constructivist 
approach has lent its weight to the externalist position.  Numerous scholars, especially 
those considering the use of force for humanitarian purposes, have assessed the impact of 
international norms on these decisions and found them to hold sway (Finnemore 2004; 
Talentino 2005; Choi 2013; Wheeler 2000).  Walling (2013) specifically calls out the 
roles that argumentation and narrative play at the United Nations Security Council in 
leading to intervention decisions.  These works move away from the materialist 
principles of their externalist forbears and identify the role of intersubjective effects on 
states through their interaction and involvement within a more cooperative international 
order.  The hallmark of this category, for both the rationalist and the constructivist 
approaches, is the position that domestic politics do not impinge, at least not to an 
overriding extent, on decisions within international affairs.  Various sources of these 
determinants can be seen in Figure 2.1 above.   
External determinant studies point to a number of relevant factors contributing to 
decisions to use force within the international environment.  However, at the core of this 
perspective is the assumption that international systemic factors can and should be 
isolated from the problematic whole, including the domestic influences on that decision 
(Waltz [1979] 2010).  This bifurcation results in these studies tending to look at 
decisional stimuli as a matter of urgency, whether that urgency traces its roots from state 
interests or international norms.  It could be a threat to an ally, a disruption to 
international trade, or a call to stop a genocide, but the research focused on external 
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determinants is primarily concerned with the imperative for intervention – whether an 
action should be pursued.  These studies seldom emphasize the part of the decision 
assessing whether the action can be effectively carried out with the means available given 
the constraints of the situation.  An apt example is Yoon (1997) who identifies a number 
of factors as statistically significant in contributing to U.S. interventions into third world 
civil wars between 1945 and 1989.  These influences include whether the Soviet Union 
or one of their allies were involved and if the target of the intervention was communist, 
of strategic importance, and in geographic proximity to the U.S. (Yoon 1997, 582).  Note 
that these considerations are those that make an argument for intervention, providing a 
rationale as to why an intervention may be considered; absent are concerns that would 
squelch involvement.  
 Studies from the external determinant group that do attempt to capture some of 
decisional concerns not associated with the “demand,” but instead with the pragmatics of 
carrying out the operation, involve the notion of expectations of success.  When 
incorporated, this is frequently done in a relatively limited fashion with proxies designed 
for the conflicts most prominent in the study.  For instance, studies covering interstate 
wars emphasize relative power between adversaries in dyadic relationships as a predictor 
for expected outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 107; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
1992, 294-297).  These design decisions are often due to efforts to strive for parsimony 
in formal modelling or statistical inquiry, serving these studies well in many ways.  
However, calculations such as these are of little help when trying to understand the utility 
of force in more nuanced applications such as stopping a civil war as a neutral party or 
attempting to quell an insurgency.   
20 
 
 
Critiques of overly-simplified analyses of decision-making processes are not new, 
with many scholars incorporating a variety of considerations into their analytic 
techniques including a range of considerations from the domestic political sphere as well 
(George 1980; Ostrom and Job 1986).  These studies acknowledged that the decision 
space was complicated and that more than external factors bore on the decision.  As 
Allison (1971) observed, "[s]pectacles magnify one set of factors rather than another and 
thus not only lead analysts to produce different explanations of problems that appear, but 
also...what he takes to be an explanation" (p. 251).  In other words, the answers to the 
questions we ask are limited to the possible answers we consider.   
 
Internal Determinants 
Juxtaposed to the externalist perspective is the view that internal determinants, 
those influences stemming from domestic factors, contribute significantly to presidential 
decisions to use force.  This perspective does not view presidential intervention 
decisions as solely responsive to stimuli external to the state, but rather responsive to 
domestically-oriented concerns.  Scholarship following this premise has explored the 
impact of public opinion on decisions to intervene (Baum 2004; Entman 2004), as well as 
the "diversionary use of force" to manipulate that opinion for political gain (see Levy 
1989 for expansive critique on this contention).  Other scholars have contrasted the 
external influences with domestic economic conditions, finding linkages between the 
state of the economy and decisions to use force (DeRouen 1995).  Still others have 
assessed the role of political institutions and electoral cycles to find explanations for 
intervention behavior (Feaver and Gelpi 2012; Hildebrandt, Hillebrecht, Holm, and 
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Pevehouse 2013; Howell and Pevehouse 2007).   
As these arguments developed, internal and external determinant advocates have 
attempted to pair domestic variables against international systemic considerations to 
determine which holds more explanatory power and in what circumstances.  Howell and 
Pevehouse (2007) investigated the role of internal determinants including congressional 
composition and the power of the president's party, pitting these factors against 
traditional external determinants such as power, capabilities, and trade levels with the 
U.S. for comparison (p. 94).  They found that partisan composition does indeed have a 
significant effect on decisions to use force (Ibid., 222).  This subject area, as seen 
through this sampling, reinforces Aubone's organization (see Figure 2.1) for two main 
groups of determinants influencing presidential decisions.   
The internal determinants scholarship pulls the field in a different direction from 
the externalist position, finding statistically significant relationships between domestic 
influences and military intervention.  However, by emphasizing internal pressures at the 
expense of other potential determinants, this approach, like the previous, makes an 
argument for a singular determinant as the principle arbiter in choices to use force.  An 
example within this category is a study of public opinion's role in shaping foreign policy.  
Matthew Baum (2004) finds that public opinion can be a constraint on the president's 
decision to use force based on a study of United States' actions with Somalia over the 
George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations from 1992 to 1994.  Baum (2004) 
hypothesizes that "unless the president is highly confident of success, as public 
attentiveness increases, the president will be less willing to escalate or use force" (p. 
196).  He goes on to point out that in Somalia the expectation of success was high and 
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the strategic stakes were low, and posits that it was the change in public opinion during 
the conduct of the operations that caused the Clinton administration to withdraw forces 
(Baum 2004, 199).  However, this view again highlights the prominent issue within this 
literature: attributing greater causality to the determinant of focus, in this case a domestic 
political factor, while overlooking alternative hypotheses unrelated to intervention 
demands.   
Baum's is one of the few studies within the literature to attempt to integrate the 
“expectation of success” as part of the research model, attempting to address some of the 
operational aspects of the problem.  However, Baum treats the portion of his hypothesis 
dealing with the president's expectations of success as static, fixed from the outset; at the 
same time, he allows for changing public sentiment over the course of the operation to 
influence his analysis.  This creates a noteworthy inconsistency.  It is just as plausible 
that the deteriorating operational situation in Somalia in 1993 altered what President 
Clinton considered possible.   
The availability of evidence supporting competing hypotheses from both camps 
within the literature makes one wonder whether the incorporation of this consistently 
underrepresented aspect of these situations – expectations of success – may improve our 
understanding of presidential behavior.    
 
Expectation of Success 
Some scholars have chosen to build off an old idea – the importance of an 
expectation of success.  This factor was one of the chief concerns in Morgenthau's 
principle of "selectivity," which advocates for a dual focus on the decision to intervene: 
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one eye aimed at the goal and the other to the feasibility to achieve it (Morgenthau 1967, 
436).  However, over time, the question of efficacy faded into the backdrop.  Scholars 
such as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) used probabilities of success as part of 
their formal models.  For the sake of parsimony and due to the dominant characteristics 
of the international environment at the time, the variables largely reflected relative power 
comparisons between would-be opponents (Buena de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 294-
295).  This treatment, while proving prescient in a number of analyses, is largely limited 
in its application to interstate wars based on the manner in which likely success is 
measured.  The types of simplification that became common practice because of their 
utility in the bipolar Cold War served to obscure the feasibility factor, sheltering it within 
the “security” rubric of the external determinants as the field emerged from the era.  
Scholars have recently begun to expose feasibility to the analytical light.   
An example of this recent shift is Patrick Regan, who laid the conceptual 
groundwork for addressing this omission in the scholarship through his works discussing 
interventions in civil wars (Regan 1998 and 2002).  He adopts a synthetic approach, 
factoring in both international and domestic factors, as well as an appreciation of the 
situation itself.  When evaluating the decision maker's use of force, Regan sees a 
"reasonable expectation of success," a short "projected time horizon," and the necessity 
for "domestic support" as three conditions necessary to commit to intervention (Regan 
1998, 757-758).  Although Regan is primarily interested in the efficacy of different 
strategies, the introduction of these elements begins to bridge the divide in the 
scholarship and hint at how the inconsistent conclusions drawn between internal and 
external determinants can be reconciled.  This may hold the potential to expose 
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relationships between variables that heretofore have been unobservable.  However, 
Regan's operationalization of this concept poses some issues in overcoming the type of 
puzzles referenced earlier.  The variables he includes as part of his expectations of 
success are limited to the following: "contiguity," looking at how close a potential 
intervener is to the conflict in distance; "conflict intensity," assessing the amount of 
casualties; and "refugee crisis" and "cold war" as dichotomous variables either occurring 
or not (Regan 2002, 56).  While Regan captured some important aspects that provide 
greater sensitivity to the problem itself, I believe these have only limited utility in 
determining whether the use of force is likely to produce the desired outcome, especially 
when considering uses of force that go outside his civil war intervention focus area.    
Gauging potential success as part of the decision-making process has become a 
more consistent theme in humanitarian literature as well, although like Regan's efforts, 
operationalizing the concept has varied in emphasis and approach.  Taylor Seybolt 
(2007) identifies a number of principles to aid policy makers in their decisions, one of 
which is the concern for a "reasonable chance of success" (267-268).  Central to 
Seybolt’s point is the impact of inadvertent consequences, which is a significant issue for 
the use of ground forces because of their concomitant effects on the crisis environment, 
both intended and unintended.  As Seybolt argues, we must face the issue of whether the 
intervention is likely to cause more harm than good (Ibid, 269).  However, like the 
scholars discussed previously, Seybolt does not operationalize the concept, leaving it as a 
subjective matter wherein the important consideration is the aim of the intervention.  As 
he states, "the question of how to intervene with a reasonable prospect of success is 
essentially a question of strategy" (Seybolt 2007, 269).  Therefore, according to this 
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tautological reasoning, as long as the president chooses the correct strategy, success is 
possible regardless of the crisis environment.  This seems to contravene the point made 
above, that conditions could be such that an effective strategy may not be devisable.   
 
The Impact of Feasibility on Expectations of Success 
What types of concerns must we account for when thinking of feasibility and how 
it influences a president's expectation of success?  The subset of literature dealing with 
civil war interventions again proves lucrative.  Aydin (2010), much like Regan before, 
highlights important features of the conflict itself, specifically the role of uncertainty in 
the decision to intervene.  Of note, Aydin finds that states are more hesitant to intervene 
the longer a conflict goes on and with the greater resiliency displayed by the potential 
adversary (Aydin 2010, 47-48).  Although his study does not employ variables aimed at 
the expectation of success, it does illuminate an extraordinarily important aspect: leader 
behavior in response to a dynamic environment.  Aydin exposes this feature by 
identifying the points when states choose to enter the fray.  By revealing the halting 
trend exhibited by leaders in the face of the previous failures of other actors, the emphasis 
of the inquiry moves from the cumulative demand signal emitted from particular 
determinants (e.g., horrible atrocity or ethnic ties to afflicted state), to caution emanating 
from the problematic characteristics of the crisis (e.g., failure seems likely).  Aydin does 
not provide a clear grasp of what features should comprise a determinant category for 
generating confidence in achieving the intervention outcome but does demonstrate the 
meaningful effect that the challenging aspects of a crisis are likely to produce, namely, 
decreased expectations for success.    
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Ostrom and Job (1986) employed a "cybernetic decision making" model in their 
study on presidential uses of force to capture the complexity posed by these situations 
(pp. 543-544).  They recognized the need to reevaluate the way presidents process the 
information presented to them.  However, like most scholars in this field, they 
emphasized demand over all else when explaining decision outcomes.  Unlike others 
though, Ostrom and Job (1986) explicitly hypothesized the existence of a threshold 
representing a “composite environmental evaluation,” identifying the point at which the 
environmental context is conducive to major uses of force” (p. 551).  If the cumulative 
demand moves beyond this threshold then the result is a decision to intervene (see Figure 
2.1).  What they do not account for is what factors of the environment influence the 
placement of that threshold.  
What if the threshold for action was influenced by more than demand?  What if it 
had more to do with the expected ease of the intervention?  The characteristics of the 
crisis environment, if confounding, may be seen to reduce perceptions of the probability 
of success.  Alternatively, absent such characteristics, the situation may present 
advantageous conditions that heighten perceived feasibility.   
The preceding discussion, viewed holistically, indicates that perhaps the best way 
to explain intervention behavior lies in the nexus between the demand signals for action 
from the internal and/or external determinants and the feasibility assessment of the 
operational characteristics of the situation.  The next section addresses how these 
elements interact to produce a presidential decision to either use force or sit on the 
sidelines.   
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Theory 
One must begin with an assessment of whether intervention is desirable, then 
address its feasibility, and then return to the question of desirability.  
Intervening must pass muster both on its own terms and compared to the 
alternatives. 
- Richard Haass, former Special Assistant to 
President George H.W. Bush (1999, 156) 
 
Previous efforts to explore intervention behavior, as we have seen, have centered 
on the desirability aspect of the decision-making process.  What motivates the decision?  
This approach does a good job of identifying the various demands for action.  But what 
happens when cases of nonintervention are queried as to why leaders failed to respond?  
The motivational factors that gave rise to a positive decision are the only ones available 
to provide an alternative explanation.  Consequently, we have trouble understanding why 
cases like the 1994 Rwandan genocide did not instigate a military intervention to stop 
such a horrendous tragedy.   
What I intend to do is reformulate the assessment of U.S. presidential decisions 
around an alternative view that incorporates operational feasibility into the decision 
process, introducing an important element that has either been presumed to be constant 
across intervention decisions, or – in the case of Regan or others – has not been measured 
with a very high degree of precision.  The aim is to see if this new category of 
considerations, underrepresented in the extant literature, can explain some of the 
contradictory findings in U.S. military intervention behavior.   
The point made above by former presidential advisor, Richard Haass, is a concise 
way of stating the underlying premise for the following theory.  I maintain that 
presidents go through a process whereby they respond to the demand signals for action 
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but temper that response through a judicious appreciation of the potential efficacy of 
military force given the situational circumstances.  The causal chain for intervention 
decisions is comprised of three parts: 1) recognizing an opportunity to intervene based 
on significant demand, 2) assessing the likelihood of success for the use of force given the 
constraints of the crisis environment, and finally 3) given the anticipated costs associated 
with employing that force, determining whether an intervention is still advisable.  
This causal chain does not necessarily proceed in such a lock-step fashion in 
reality; instead, it proceeds through multiple recursive iterations between assessing 
demands along with the feasibility of potential options.  Thus, the mechanism described 
above is a simplification, but one that is useful for working through the central pieces of 
the intervention decision process.  It is rooted in real-world examples for how presidents 
have sought and processed the advice of their military and security advisors. 
Take the handling of the Syrian Civil War for an exemplar of how the strategic 
assessment process works.  Since the war began in 2011, more than 400,000 have lost 
their lives, with violence causing over 5 million refugees and 6 million internally 
displaced persons to flee their homes, creating a significant intervention opportunity 
(Human Rights Watch 2018).  Yet, no U.S. military intervention has been launched to 
take on the Assad regime and end the crisis by either the Obama or Trump 
administrations.  This reluctance to engage began under Obama’s tenure when the 
supposed “red line” was crossed by Assad when he used chemical weapons on his 
people, creating the first real impetus for action.  Obama directed Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey 
to develop military options to deal with the crisis.  The Joint Staff developed a range of 
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options from training opposition fighters, to imposing a no-fly zone, to conducting air 
strikes (Haber 2013).  What the Pentagon did not recommend was a military intervention 
to end the conflict.  This reluctance was met with significant opposition by those, such as 
Senator John McCain, who believed that something should be done despite Panetta’s 
expressed concerns over identification of an achievable mission at acceptable costs (see 
Figure 2.2 below) (United States Senate 2012, 15).   
 
 
Figure 2.2 Excerpt from Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: The Situation in 
Syria (March 7, 2012) 
 
Through the Syria example we see the causal chain on display: there is a demand 
signal for action, followed by a feasibility assessment, with a subsequent judgment as to 
whether what can be gained warrants the anticipated costs.  Both Obama and then Trump 
chose to forego the military intervention option.  In addition, Secretary Panetta’s 
commentary in the excerpt above highlights some of the considerations that go into that 
assessment, strengthening the central contention of this work – that the feasibility factors 
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advanced in this theory are critical to developing that assessment and sway the 
intervention decision in significant measure.  What we see from examples such as this is 
that the cost of potential failure often trumps the costs associated with not intervening – 
e.g., the domestic or international audience costs, or in the potential for greater 
deterioration of the situation over time.   
After identifying the key assumptions upon which the theory rests, the remainder 
of the theoretical section proceeds in accordance with Haass's characterization of the 
three-part causal chain.  First, we identify whether an intervention is desirable - does it 
present an "opportunity" for intervention and is there sufficient demand?  Second, we 
determine whether the environment is conducive to intervention using feasibility factors 
to gain an understanding of what makes a crisis environment more or less complex.  
Finally, once feasibility has been incorporated, we return to desirability by introducing an 
expected utility formula as a heuristic to demonstrate the interaction between the 
demands placed on the president by the internal/external determinants and the feasibility 
factors assessment.  
 
Assumptions 
This theory is predicated on four assumptions. First, I assume that U.S.  
presidents are the key decider in decisions to intervene militarily (Bueno de Mesquita 
1981, 20).  While it can be argued that each administration's decision apparatus can 
significantly influence decision (Allison 1971), the personal nature of the act is highly 
consistent with U.S. presidential responsibilities as Commander in Chief.  As evidenced 
in the case studies in subsequent chapters, there are many voices that take part in the 
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national security decision-making process in the United States, but the decision 
ultimately falls to the president.  This maintains the agency for the action or inaction 
with the president.  Others might argue that the adversary may have a role in 
determining the outcome.  For instance, it is possible that a potential enemy may adopt 
an organizational structure or purposefully cut off logistical accessibility to the conflict 
region for the purposes of thwarting U.S. interference.  However, this study is about 
understanding why presidents act, given the conditions they face.  The possible 
implications for would-be adversaries will be addressed in the implications of the study. 
The second assumption, related directly to the first, is that a decision not to 
intervene is a decision nonetheless, not an example of indecision.  Passing on an 
intervention opportunity in this view is a purposive act.  That purpose is derived from 
some rationale, the contents of which this study seeks, in part, to provide.  I maintain 
that, whether explicitly recognized or stated openly, the president is cognizant of the 
feasibility factors addressed herein along with their implications.  The factors this study 
uses for analysis are gathered from “open source” resources.  The president, with access 
to the resources of the intelligence community and with planning conducting within the 
Department of Defense, is at least be aware of the types of considerations noted here.  
This assumption maintains agency with the president instead of granting it to the situation 
itself.   
A third assumption, common among the literature, is that presidents are "rational, 
expected-utility maximizers" (Bennett and Stam 1996; Bueno de Mesquita 1981).  This 
assumption holds that presidents undertake a calculative effort, weighing costs and 
benefits of potential outcomes along with the risk and uncertainty inherent to the task.  
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The president can therefore be expected to make policy choices that they expect, at the 
time of decision, to accrue greater political benefits than the costs they expect to incur.  
Central to the president’s calculation is the expectation of success or failure – the value 
placed on p and q in their notional formula.  Where expectations of success have been 
addressed in the scholarship prior to this it has usually been associated with some 
variation on relative capabilities between actors, in levels of risk acceptance (Bueno de 
Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), or in the magnitude of the crisis 
(Regan 2002).  This study adopts a different way of determining the odds of success or 
failure in the decision calculus.  I focus on the aspects of the situation that run counter to 
the expectations of success addressed by previous authors who dealt with civil wars and 
humanitarian interventions.  If success means accomplishing military objectives within a 
short time horizon without unreasonable exertion, then there are clearly situations whose 
characteristics run counter to those expectations.  The feasibility factors this study 
presents address some of the key aspects of the operational environment that sew doubt in 
the president’s mind when they are present.  The more those problematic factors are 
present, the less feasible military options appear, significantly altering the expected utility 
calculation.     
The fourth assumption is that presidents seek to retain power.  Thus, the reason 
for the word "political" to be associated with costs and benefits in the previous 
assumption.  This is commonly stated as a leader's preference to "stay in power" (Miller 
1995, 764).  In this interpretation though, presidential power goals are aimed at retaining 
or gaining power and not merely staying in office. This stands to reason since a president 
seeks the ability to govern effectively according to their policy preferences.  Losses in 
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the foreign policy realm (e.g., ill-conceived intervention decisions) can detract from 
presidential power.  Exercising what is seen as poor judgment lessens the persuasive 
power of the office (Neustadt 1991, chapter 3). This is likely to cost the president's party 
at the polls and their ability to govern from a preferred agenda due to the contested nature 
of the U.S. political environment (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).    
 
Desirability: Identifying Valid Opportunities 
The first step in the causal chain is determining whether an intervention is 
desirable, using Haass's word.  This is about identifying valid intervention opportunities 
for presidential decision.  As the review of the literature has demonstrated, there are 
sound arguments to be made for both types of determinants, internal and external.  Since 
that is demonstrable, it seems that what is considered an opportunity should incorporate 
both types of drivers in its derivation.  This study follows Blechman and Kaplan (1978), 
Zelikow (1986), Meernik (1994; 2004), and Howell and Pevehouse (2007) in tethering 
the decisions to the crises themselves and evaluating the unique situations they present.  
This should enable clearer distinctions to be made between them.   
Opportunities are classified here based on the strength of demand they represent 
to the president, aggregating the overall effect on a single scale.  These demands can 
hold both positive and negative values.  In some cases, the external influences may be 
clamoring for action while the domestic audiences argue for U.S. troops to stay home.  
This treatment ensures that both are factored in when weighing the overall demand 
signal.  The premise for this formula is drawn from the initial theoretical portion of 
Ostrom and Job (1986, 551) and may be formalized in the following way: 
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where Dₒ is the composite demand represented by the intervention opportunity, Eₒ and Iₒ 
are the specific demand signals from external and internal determinants, respectively, and 
eₒ recognizes that there are demands from other sources that unsystematically influence 
the decision.  If the net output of that signal is at least positive, the crisis in question may 
be viewed as a viable intervention opportunity (see Figure 2.3).  It is illogical to believe 
that the president would choose to intervene in a situation where there is not a positive 
demand signal emitted.  The figure below notes that the crisis can be viewed from either 
or both of these lenses and that they interact to produce an opportunity when the demands 
for action outweigh those for inaction.     
 
Figure 2.3 Opportunity Identification 
This study, in line with the reviewed literature, expects that if the probability of 
intervention is linked to the strength of the demand signal, both will increase in parallel, 
ceteris paribus.  The next step is to incorporate the potential impact of feasibility into the 
president's calculation to see how it may potentially influence observed outcomes.  
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Feasibility: Identifying the Operational Feasibility Factors 
The scholarship on intervention may not address the idea of feasibility, but the 
executive branch and the military assess feasibility regularly, holding a prominent place 
in the decision calculus.  This is evident in the accounts of key advisors that have been 
involved in the decision process (Haass 1999).  Feasibility is one of the five "validity 
criteria" considered during course of action development within the Joint Operation 
Planning Process (Joint Staff 2017).  This is important to note, since the intervention 
options presented for decision through the National Security Council often assume a 
doctrinaire form; this is because the military develops them, typically the headquarters 
that expects to carry out the mission (Hoar 1993).     
Given a crisis, military planners are trained to evaluate the situation as part of 
their mission analysis using what are called "Operational Variables" (Army Doctrine 
2012, 1-7).  These variables address everything that could impact the environment where 
the potential mission could take place ranging from the political or economic conditions 
of the state in crisis, to the state’s geographical characteristics and infrastructure.  These 
considerations are used by military planners to develop proposals used within the U.S. 
national security apparatus.3  Based on this, I reason that presidents receive strategic 
options for remedying these problems within a construct that incorporates these 
considerations.  The five feasibility factors used in this study to determine anticipated 
expectations of success are rooted in the principles of these military processes and are 
essential components of strategic assessment.  These factors “are fundamental to 
                                                          
3 The author took part in developing these military options for numerous crises in Africa and participated 
in planning forums for those in separate areas of responsibility, for consideration by the National Security 
Council between 2015 to 2018. 
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developing a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment” (Army 
Doctrine 2012, 1-7).  I develop observable measure for each of them here to capture 
important attributes of a crisis that influence notions of feasibility.   
The first feasibility factor is the type of conflict; it accounts for the “cultural, 
religious, and ethnic makeup” within the problem situation (Army Doctrine 2012, 1-7).  
Is the conflict based on either ethnic or religious differences which are commonly 
intractable, or on ideological or material concerns?  If it is the former, the situation is 
thought to be less feasible, requiring longer and more costly commitments to resolve, and 
vice versa if the latter (see Wimmer et al. 2009).  Moreover, military interventions aimed 
at resolving religious or ethnic disputes have a poor record of accomplishment (Regan 
2002, 30). 
The second feasibility factor concerns the existence of a supportable regime.  
Does the U.S. have a clear leader or regime to support in the conflict or are they expected 
to intervene as a neutral party with belligerents on both sides?  This concern is consistent 
with scholarly findings on the success of interventions being associated with support for 
one side or the other rather than assuming a neutral posture (Regan 2002).  A 
supportable regime would include an agreed upon ceasefire agreement where both/all 
sides agree not to counter the intervening parties. 
The third factor addresses the anticipated enemy’s structure, a departure from 
previous studies that relied principally on capabilities.  Instead, it is an assessment of 
how the adversary is organized.  Diffuse and networked militaries add greater 
complexity to the situation than do hierarchical ones.  Hierarchical organizations are 
easier to target and to predict the outcome of strikes (King 2014).  Alternatively, 
37 
 
 
decentralized organizations must be countered in a coordinated way on multiple levels of 
scale, increasing the complexity of the situation and the difficulty in predicting outcomes 
(Bar-Yam 2004, 100).  If the forces opposing the U.S. military are hierarchically 
organized and tightly networked, this makes them susceptible to strike and opens the 
possibility for a quick win.  On the other hand, if the enemy is diffuse and loosely 
networked, they are more difficult to target.  Here again, the latter enemy type often 
requires more resources and longer time frames to contend with.  This can be 
demonstrated through the simple comparison of the 1991 Gulf War with Saddam Hussein 
in power lasting 100 hours versus the Second Persian Gulf War focused on quelling 
secular civil war among militia groups that went on from 2003 to 2011, with arguably 
negligible results. 
The fourth feasibility factor covers accessibility, capturing the infrastructure and 
logistics considerations for the operation.  How logistically feasible is it to deploy and 
sustain forces in the crisis environment?  Limitations associated with the availability of 
key nodes, the depth of sea ports, and the length and composition of runways directly 
impact what U.S. forces can deploy.  Logistics challenges have always presented 
formidable obstacles, particularly as they pertain to interventions that require “opening” 
overseas theaters of operations, meeting intra-theater transportation needs, and supporting 
contingency operations where little infrastructure exists initially (Magruder 1994).    
Finally, the last feasibility concern has to do with population density.4  Here, I 
address “terrain complexity” (Army Doctrine 2012, 1-8).  Will the intervention occur in 
                                                          
4 As noted in Chapter 1, this feasibility factor did not prove as useful as the previous four in the study, but 
it was included in the analyses and is therefore retained here.     
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a primarily urban or rural setting?  The former complicates the situation for ground 
forces, making discernment of friend and foe difficult and collateral damage more likely 
when applying force.  Highly populated areas therefore pose a greater challenge for an 
intervener (see Krulak 1999).   
The greater the number of these factors trending toward infeasibility, the lower 
the president’s expectation of success in achieving the intervention goals.  This means 
that there is an additive component to an appreciation of the situation.  Like the demand 
signal above, the feasibility factor effect can be formalized in the following way:  
 
where Fo is the combined value of the negative feasibility factors for the intervention 
opportunity, and Co is the conflict type, Ro is the existence of a supportable regime, Eo is 
the enemy’s structure, Ao is the accessibility of the crisis environment, and Po is the 
population density for the area of expected force employment.  
 Now that we know the value of both the demand for intervention as well as the 
feasibility assessment for successful execution we can locate the feasibility threshold (h) 
within the decision space.  Ostrom and Job (1986) contend that there is a threshold 
within the environmental factors where a potential intervention situation transitions from 
unfavorable to favorable conditions (p. 551).  Borrowing from their work, I agree that 
such a threshold exists, but that it is not an unobservable element of the analysis as they 
contend (Ibid.).  Instead, the threshold is best understood as an interaction between the 
demand signal and the feasibility factors that trend negatively, expressed thus: 
 
 The threshold incorporates both demand and feasibility because they are linked.  
Fo = Co + Ro + Eo + Ao + Po 
h = Do ÷ Fo 
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Demand and feasibility affect one another in two directions.  First, and most obviously, 
infeasible characteristics of the environment undercut the effect of the demand signal on 
the probability of intervention.  When this is the case, it does not matter how strong the 
demand signal, enough infeasible factors can thwart a response (e.g., Rwanda 1994).  
Less obvious and working in the other direction, high demand can influence feasibility by 
causing the president to modify the preferred policy position until the mission associated 
with fulfilling it can be expected to succeed.  In other words, the mission is tailored or 
timed to increase feasibility.  The later chapters covering George H.W. Bush’s evolution 
on how to handle Somalia in 1992 or Clinton’s timing of the Bosnian intervention in 
1995 are good cases in point.  Acknowledging how this threshold affects the intervention 
decision, we can revise the previous demand-focused intervention graphic to incorporate 
the impact of feasibility (see Figure 2.4).    
 
 
Figure 2.4. Feasibility Explanation for Intervention Decisions 
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Return to Desirability: The Expected Utility of Intervention 
Now that we have articulated how feasibility factors influence the expectations of 
success, the final step in the causal chain is to return to the president's decision calculus.  
Just as Haass (1999) explained regarding intervention decisions, only after we have 
addressed both desirability and feasibility can a president then weigh the two given how 
they anticipate an intervention to unfold.  This lends itself to an expected utility 
consideration in the final step, set up here as a heuristic to explain the process.  The 
expected utility of intervention, weighing costs and benefits based on the likelihood of 
particular outcomes has been addressed in myriad ways.  An excellent theoretical 
depiction of intervention decisions comes from Regan (2002, pp. 44-45).  The two 
formulas here for intervention and nonintervention are nearly identical to his and can be 
expressed in the following way: 
 
where EUᵢ is the expected utility of intervening, Uₐ is the utility gained from a successful 
action, Uₓ is the utility gained from acting unsuccessfully, and Cᵢ is the costs, "reflecting 
human, material, and audience costs."  EUni is the expected utility of nonintervention, 
with Uₐₓ being the utility of their being an acceptable outcome without intervention, Uₓₒ 
being the utility of the crisis continuing without having intervened, and Cni is the costs 
accrued by nonintervention.  
 The key difference between this theory and Regan’s is that he maintains that it is 
whichever option, intervention or nonintervention, that holds the greatest utility that 
EUi = p(Ua) + (1-p)(Ux) - ∑Ci 
 
EUni = q(Uax) + (1-q)(Uxo) - ∑Cni 
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determines the outcome (Ibid.).  I maintain that that even if intervention is the preferred 
option (i.e., EUi > EUni), the utility for intervention still must clear the feasibility 
threshold (h) we established in the previous step for the president to intervene.  Based on 
this and recognizing that the president’s options are dichotomous, presidential actions for 
a given opportunity can be represented as Iₒ = 1 for intervention and Iₒ = 0 for 
nonintervention.  Blending Regan’s (2004) and Ostrom and Job's (1986) theories, I posit 
the following as the full expected utility calculation: 
 
 
This formula states that the probability of the president choosing to intervene does indeed 
rest on a sufficient demand signal, but demand alone is not enough.  While the demand 
must be positive to register a call to action, the strength of the demand signal is not the 
most important aspect in predicting intervention.  Instead, the expected utility of 
intervention must exceed a threshold (h) that incorporates the dynamic interaction 
between both demand (Dₒ) and feasibility (Fₒ), beyond which feasible military options 
are perceived to be possible (see Figure 2.4 above).  This calculation adds a great deal of 
weight to the feasibility assessment. This is the key difference between this study and 
previous works: my approach emphasizes the critical role of feasibility in decisions to 
intervene.   
The preceding discussion yields the following hypotheses:   
 
p(I = 1) = p[(EUi  - EUni) > h)] =  
p[(p(Ua) + (1-p)(Ux) - ∑Ci) –( q(Uax) + (1-q)(Uxo) - ∑Cni)] > (Do ÷ Fo) 
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Hypothesis 1 
As operational feasibility decreases, the probability of intervention decreases. 
Hypothesis 1 can – in turn – be broken down further into the specific dimensions 
of feasibility outlined above, and these are represented by Hypotheses 2 through 7.   
Hypothesis 2: Conflict Type 
2a. If the crisis is not the product of ethnic or religious cleavages and there is a positive 
demand signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention 
increases.   
2b. If the crisis stems from ethnic or religious cleavages, the likelihood of intervention 
decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.   
 
Hypothesis 3: Supportable Regime 
3a. If the U.S. has a clear leader or regime to support and there is a positive demand 
signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases. 
 
3b. If the U.S. does not have a clear leader or regime to support, the likelihood of 
intervention decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Enemy Structure 
4a. If the potential enemy is organized hierarchically (susceptible to strike) and there is a 
positive demand signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of 
intervention increases. 
 
4b. If the potential enemy is organized diffusely, the likelihood of intervention decreases 
regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Accessibility 
 
5a. If the target location is logistically accessible and there is a positive demand signal 
from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.   
 
5b. If the target location is logistically inaccessible, the likelihood of intervention 
decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.   
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Hypothesis 6: Population Density 
6a. If the target location is primarily rural and there is a positive demand signal from 
internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.   
 
6b. If the target location is highly urbanized, the likelihood of intervention decreases 
regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.   
 
Hypothesis 7: Too Complex 
The greater the number of feasibility factors that trend toward infeasibility, the lower the 
likelihood of intervention. 
 
In addition to the hypotheses representing the feasibility factors, we can represent past 
approaches to intervention with a hypothesis that focuses exclusively on demand signals. 
Hypothesis 8: Demand Alone 
Positive stimuli from both internal and external determinants combine to increase the 
probability of intervention, regardless of feasibility factors. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the literature covering military intervention decisions, 
exposing a gap in adequately addressing the types of considerations for developing 
expectations of success.  Based on an understanding of how military options are 
generated within the U.S. national security community, I developed a theory for how 
feasibility impacts the likelihood of intervention.  This work is grounded in expected 
utility theory and extends the scholarship of Regan (2002) to account for crisis 
environments such as civil wars or humanitarian disasters.  This approach offers a more 
complete measure of an expectation of intervention success using five feasibility factors.  
It is most important to note that the key theoretic premise of this work is the notion that 
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feasibility underpins the threshold (h) that separates an environment conducive to 
intervention from one that is not.  This unpacks an idea that other scholars identified as a 
key concern but had dismissed as unidentifiable - “relegated to a grey area of 
understanding” (Regan 2002, 46).   The research design and empirical chapters that 
follow evaluate the preceding hypotheses in explaining presidential intervention 
decisions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
 The preceding chapter provided an overview of the intervention literature and 
identified a gap in how scholars have addressed the idea of expectations of success in 
their analyses, a critical component in understanding decisional outcomes.  The 
underpinning factors that make presidents more or less confident in achieving their 
desired objectives have not been sufficiently addressed in the extant literature.  This is 
particularly true for the types of interventions most common in the post-Cold War era.  
To help explain these, I advance feasibility factors to operationalize these concerns and in 
doing so shed light on this heretofore uncharted area of the decision-making process.   
This purpose of this chapter is to articulate the research design for the remainder 
of the study and test the hypotheses I develop to incorporate operational feasibility 
through qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).  The results from the QCA inform the 
case selection and qualitative analyses in the subsequent chapters.    
 
Rationale for a Mixed Methods Approach 
As the literature review exposed, most intervention research has been quantitative.  
This is not necessarily due to the nature of the research problem.  Rather, scholars make 
methodological choices based on the ontological and epistemological frameworks they 
find compelling and applicable to their understanding of the subject matter.  To 
accomplish my goals, I employ a methodological approach incorporating quantitative and 
qualitative components that can contend with the complexity of the presidential decision-
making environment (Ragin 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009).   
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The analyses below account for competing and complementary aspects of the 
intervention opportunities stemming from domestic and international systemic demands 
as well as force employment considerations.  My choice to adopt an approach blending 
qualitative and quantitative aspects stems from the way I have identified the potential 
nature of the problem, situated on the presidents' deliberative processes and the meaning 
they may attach to certain confounding aspects of a crisis.   
This is not to say that this study embraces all the principles commonly associated 
with qualitative research.  In fact, because it is building off the extensive work of others 
in the field, it starts from ontological premises and assumptions that are usually 
associated with the use of quantitative methods.  However, because this research delves 
into and interprets the dialogues behind the decisions, the epistemological aspects are 
clearly linked to the qualitative tradition (Guba 1990; Crotty 1998; Creswell 2013).   
 
Research Design 
This is a three phase, mixed methods research design.  Phase I is contained in this 
chapter and uses a configurational comparative method – QCA – to identify unique 
combinations of determinants and feasibility factors that are associated with both 
intervention and nonintervention outcomes.  This phase is critical in identifying the 
factors that will be the subject of deeper scrutiny in the second and third phases, which 
are qualitative studies that build off the findings of the QCA.   
Phase II (Chapter 4) is a comparative historical analysis of two crises that 
occurred near simultaneously under the George H.W. Bush administration: the famine 
and civil war in Somalia and the breakup of Yugoslavia.  Here I use presidential library 
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archives to evaluate the extent to which the demands for action and the concerns over 
feasibility were explicitly discussed leading up to the final intervention decisions.  The 
goal, through process tracing, is to identify how feasibility concerns weigh on 
intervention decisions.  Is feasibility something implicit to the decisions and thus of little 
observable concern; or as I theorize above, that these factors are openly discussed and 
bear critically on presidential decisions?    
Similarly, in the Phase III (Chapter 5), I again conduct a paired comparison, this 
time of the William J. Clinton decisions concerning the same conflicts during his tenure.  
Here though, Clinton decides to withdraw from Somalia where Bush had intervened and 
intervene in Bosnia where Bush had decided it too complex of a problem to commit 
troops.  The aim is to extend the application of the theory, looking at what happens when 
the feasibility factors switch from favoring intervention to nonintervention, and vice 
versa.  Do Clinton’s decisions change when the factors reverse?  Here again, I rely on 
presidential archival materials to test the theory.  
In the remainder of this chapter I execute Phase I of the research design.  First, I 
explain my analytical framework, operationalizing the theory into observable criteria for 
analysis and explain why QCA is appropriate for this study.  Second, I lay out the 
method and design for the execution of the QCA.  Third, I analyze 19 intervention 
opportunities for the U.S. between 1980 and 2013 and present the QCA solutions that 
emerge for interventions and noninterventions.  Finally, I conduct an out-of-sample test 
of the solutions’ forecasting capability. The findings support my theoretical contention 
that feasibility concerns are fundamental to explain both intervention and nonintervention 
decisions.  For cases of intervention, three combinations of conditions account for all 
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cases of intervention in the sampled period.  Of the three combinatorial conditions, 
feasibility factors were an element of each. Similarly, two combinations of conditions 
(both including two feasibility factors) explain all nonintervention decisions.  In the end, 
the evidence strongly suggests that operational employment considerations are an 
important part of the presidential decision-making process and merit further scrutiny by 
the scholarly community. 
 
Analytical Framework 
This analysis is built on the theoretical proposition that intervention decisions are 
based on an interaction between the stimuli from the internal and external determinants 
and an expectation of success or failure based on operational feasibility factors.  It is not 
solely the magnitude of the demand for intervention, but instead a combination of those 
demands and advantageous force employment conditions that leads to military 
intervention.   
 
Demand Signals - Stimuli from Internal and/or External Determinants 
 In order to assess the importance of operational feasibility, we must understand 
what we expect to be a sufficient demand for action, wherein operational feasibility can 
then combine to either support an intervention decision, or thwart one.  Concerning 
decisions to intervene, we may find that either a key internal determinant or external 
determinant proves potent and combines with operational feasibility to produce an 
intervention.  For instance, the magnitude of the crisis or the fact that the crisis state is a 
significant trade partner may provide enough of a stimulus for action.  On the other 
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hand, domestic political concerns such as a high unemployment rate or a low presidential 
approval rating may be enough of a political reason to consider actions abroad.   
Alternatively, it could be that we only see an intervention when both types of 
determinants combine.  The important thing is that we consider the impact of operational 
feasibility in varied demand environments so that its relative importance, if any, can be 
revealed.  If this approach is well founded, we could potentially see the importance of 
feasibility with variance in the demands for action from both internal and external 
determinants.  
Intervention decisions are both a rare and complex phenomenon, making their 
study somewhat challenging.  The approach I take is different from the correlational 
arguments commonly put forward in the literature.  While these traditional large-N 
statistical studies can include interactive terms to attempt to capture some of the 
interactive qualities that are potentially at play, they are ill-suited to tackle complex 
problems such as these based on their underpinning assumptions (Rihoux and Ragin 
2009, 8).  For instance, the traditional statistical models are forced to assume causal 
symmetry.  This may not necessarily be the case.  “Causal asymmetry” may be a better 
epistemological stance, which is simply the idea that different conditional combinations 
may explain intervention and nonintervention decisions.  The theory put forward herein 
holds this latter position, allowing for an open investigation of the many possible 
combinations of key concerns that may serve to induce intervention or nonintervention.  
In addition, the study of modern U.S. foreign interventions suffers from the too many 
variables and too few cases problem, making it ill-suited for standard regression analysis.  
For both reasons, I have selected qualitative comparative analysis to help explain and 
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understand these decisions. 
 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
QCA is appropriate for this analysis because it is designed to deal with the causal 
complexity we are trying to untangle here.  QCA has been widely seen to be appropriate 
for tackling problems that pose the “small N, many variables” problem (Rihoux and 
Ragin 2009).  That is precisely the case here, where we are limited to an intermediate 
range of cases (19), and an array of potentially important conditions affecting 
intervention decisions (12).  Unlike correlational models that seek to identify the unique 
contributions of independent variables, QCA assumes that variables are not independent, 
but instead have varying influences on the outcome in question based on their synthetic 
effect through “multiple conjunctural causation” (Braumoeller 2003, 210-213).  Crisp-
set QCA (csQCA), the form of QCA used in this analysis, is a case-oriented method that 
employs Boolean logic to identify these combinations of conditions through a set-
theoretic approach.     
This methodological approach allows me to reformulate the assessment of U.S. 
presidential decisions around this interactive conception of the decision space.  My goal 
is to find out if there are unique combinations of conditions that exert causal influence on 
the decision-making process.  Uncovering these combinations requires an approach that 
does not look at the variables in competition to achieve the outcome in question with 
their own independent influence.  Instead, this study holds that causal complexity is at 
work and those unique combinations, or “causal recipes” of conditions will have 
demonstrable influence on the investigated outcomes (Ragin 2008, 8-9).   
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Method 
QCA has been employed in a wide array of fields where causal complexity is 
common, from violent ethnic conflict to public health policy (e.g., Bara 2014; Warren, 
Wistow, and Bambra 2013).  However, its use is not ubiquitous and requires some 
elaboration.  I will briefly describe the conduct of crisp set QCA (csQCA) to explain the 
process and demonstrate its suitability for the questions addressed here (Ragin 2008; 
Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Thiem and Dusa 2013).   
First, QCA begins with case-based research.  The researcher identifies the 
relevant conditions (variables) based on their theoretical and substantive fitness to the 
problem and then operationalizes these conditions and compiles them in raw data form 
(see Appendix A). The data used in this study come from existing data sets for some 
conditions (e.g., trade data or ethnic conflict classification); for others, cases are 
researched to find meaningful measures based on historical accounts or public records 
(e.g., enemy structure or target state accessibility).  
Second, in crisp-set QCA the researcher dichotomizes the data for analysis (“1” 
for the condition being present, “0” for absent).  Importantly, this part of the process 
requires that the conditions be “calibrated” based on “external standards or guidelines 
that have face validity” rather than just trivial or ambiguous criteria (Ragin 2008, 8).  I 
outline the concepts I use for each condition and their coding criteria in the following 
section where I fully explain the determinant conditions.   
Third, the researcher tests for necessity of conditions within the sample to identify 
those conditions that have such high consistency in their presence as to have no 
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meaningful part in the analysis (Ragin 2006, 43).  If a condition is identified with a high 
enough consistency (e.g., greater than .95 for quasi-necessary conditions) and coverage, 
they may be dropped from the analysis (Bara 2014, 6).  To accomplish this, I use fsQCA 
Software Version 2.5 (2014).   
Fourth, the researcher runs an analysis (called a “truth table algorithm” in QCA) 
to identify logically possible combinations of conditions that explain intervention.  This 
is where we begin to account for conjunctural causation. Checking for set-theoretic 
consistency, the researcher eliminates all sets of combinations that do not have a high 
consistency; less than .75 is considered highly inconsistent (Ragin 2006, 46).  Once I 
have identified the surviving combinations of conditions, I use standard analyses 
employing Boolean algebra (Quine-McCluskey algorithm) within the software to 
minimize the solutions for the outcome in question.  The analysis identifies the complex, 
intermediate, and parsimonious solutions that lead to intervention using Boolean 
multiplication (logical “and,” meaning a combination of conditions), addition (logical 
“or,” specifying when either condition or set of conditions is present when  
intervention/nonintervention occurs) and finally minimization (reduced to the specific 
combinations that explain intervention/nonintervention once extraneous conditions are 
removed) (Ragin 2006, 34-35).   
I conduct this analysis twice – once for intervention, and once for nonintervention 
(Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 57).  Just because the presence of certain conditions leads to a 
specific outcome does not mean an absence of those conditions will lead to the opposite 
outcome in a symmetrical way.  Therefore, the two separate analyses are required 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 112).  
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For each combinatorial solution produced, there are two parameters of fit 
estimated that can be used to evaluate their significance and explanatory power.  The 
first is consistency.  Consistency “gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given 
combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question” (Ragin 2008, 44).  
The second parameter is coverage.  Coverage “assesses the degree to which a cause or 
causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44).  These two 
parameters - while different since we are dealing with set-theoretic rather than 
correlational arguments - can be thought of as being similar to “significance” 
(consistency) and “correlation coefficients and total variance explained” (coverage) in 
regression analysis (Bara 2014, 4).  A meaningful analysis will establish set-theoretic 
consistency by properly selecting the combinations of conditions based on a high enough 
threshold for consistency (as close to 1.0 as possible) and then establish the empirical 
importance of that combination based on the coverage within the sample (Ragin 2008, 
56).   
 
Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable in this analysis is the selective use of force by presidents 
in external crises, or what was similarly termed “intervention” by Rosenau (1967, 168).  
The operationalization of this term has assumed different forms in previous literature.  
For the purposes of this study, I borrow my definition of military intervention from 
Elizabeth Saunders (2011, 21): “an overt, short-term deployment of at least one thousand 
combat-ready ground troops across international boundaries to influence an outcome in 
another state or an interstate dispute; it may or may not interfere in another state’s 
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domestic institutions.”  I have selected this definition purposively to rule out covert 
operations, those not employing land forces, or deployments that run a very low risk of 
combat.  My aim is to produce consistency in the types of risk the president must 
consider in the comparative cases.  An intervention where the U.S. only provides logistic 
support from afar via an airlift does not run the same material or political risks for the 
president as one in which troops are placed in proximity with adversarial forces.   
 
Sample Selection 
The unit of analysis for the study is an intervention opportunity.  To identify 
precisely when an intervention opportunity begins or ends is quite difficult.  However, 
following previous studies (e.g., Feste 2003; Seybolt 2007), here the opportunity 
encompasses the years in which the crisis exhibited violence and personnel displacement 
beyond the threshold used in the study (see discussion on Magnitude below in the 
external determinants section).  To identify these, I used the Center for Systemic Peace’s 
Major Episodes of Political Violence data set (MEPV 2014) and selected intervention 
opportunities that are alike in as many ways as possible (e.g., involving U.S. allies, key 
trading partners, strong appeals from both international and domestic audiences, etc.), but 
that also have variance in the dependent variable – intervention. 
To select a sample of manageable size, I restricted attention to 1980 to 2013.  
This focuses the inquiry on the post-Cold War era (almost two-thirds of the period) where 
the U.S. was largely hegemonic from a security perspective; and includes roughly a 
decade of the bipolar world, but a period in which the U.S. became resurgent following 
the Vietnam era.  A limited sampling is also required because of the technological 
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differences that occur that change the capabilities and limitations of military equipment in 
different time periods.  For instance, one of the reasons for selecting the Reagan era 
forward was in the shift in global airlift capabilities that corresponded to the Reagan 
administration’s military increases.  Reagan increased the C-5 Galaxy fleet by more than 
60%, significantly altering the power projection capabilities for the U.S. in the years to 
follow (Leland and Wilcoxson 2003).  The same logic holds when considering the 
advent of precision munitions and the potential for decapitation strikes against 
hierarchically organized enemies.   
  According to Grimmett’s (2011) report on the “Instances of the use of U.S. 
Armed Forces Abroad,” during this period there were nine U.S. interventions meeting the 
intervention criteria used here.  Using the literature on intervention as a guide, I 
identified ten other cases from the MEPV (2014) data set that demonstrated sufficient 
demand from the internal and external determinants.  For instance, I selected cases based 
on the total number of deaths or magnitude of the crisis, reasoning that greater demand 
from international and domestic audiences would coincide with larger-scale atrocities. 
This strategy produced 19 cases of intervention opportunities between 1980 and 2013 
(see Table 3.1).  To get an idea of how this sampling corresponds to the overall 
opportunities during the time period, the MEPV (2014) data set identifies 41 separate 
conflicts during the focal period that exhibited “serious political violence,” which 
includes those with deaths ten to 50,000 deaths, and population dislocations in the tens of 
thousands.  Using that as a guide, and assuming that the U.S. would have considered 
intervening in all of those locations (a liberal assumption), this sampling accounts for 
roughly 36% of all intervention opportunities during the period. 
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Table 3.1 Intervention Opportunities Sample: 1980-2013 
 
 
Determinant Conditions: Feasibility Factors 
This section explains how I operationalized the different determinant conditions 
and the coding criteria I used to dichotomize the data for analysis.  A table displaying the 
conceptual to empirical linkages is found in Appendix B (Conditions Analysis Matrix).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the first five conditions here are the feasibility 
factors developed for this study based on the U.S. Army and Joint doctrinal analysis (U.S. 
Army Doctrine 2012, 1-7).  I expect the presence of these conditions to increase the 
likelihood of intervention.  In other words, when present, they increase perceptions of 
feasibility.   
The first condition feasibility condition is CONFLICT.  The goal here is to 
determine if the crisis is the product of ethnic or religious cleavages.  Using the Ethnic 
Power Relations Dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009), I code “1” if the case is not an ethnic 
57 
 
 
conflict and “0” if it is.  I hypothesize that the presence of the “ethnic conflict” condition 
reduces the likelihood of intervention.  For conflicts not listed in this data set (e.g., post 
2010), I use the Wimmer et al. (2009, 5) definition of ethnic conflict as those that 
“typically involve conflicts over ethnonational self-determination, the ethnic balance of 
power in government, ethnoregional autonomy, ethnic and racial discrimination (whether 
alleged or real), and language and other cultural rights.”  All others are considered 
nonethnic.  
The second feasibility condition is REGIME.  The concept in question here is 
whether the U.S. has a clear regime to support or install within the target state prior to 
intervention.  This condition is coded “1” if there is an identifiable leader or regime to 
support and “0” otherwise. UN authorized multinational peacekeeping forces enforcing 
agreed upon ceasefires by warring parties are considered “regimes” in this analysis.  As 
displayed in Appendix A (Raw Data Matrix), I used a variety of sources as references to 
determine whether the U.S. had a supportable regime during the decisional period.  
Check the appendix for specific sources for each case.     
The third feasibility condition is ENEMY.  Does the enemy present a hierarchical 
organization that is vulnerable to defeat through strike (force employment not involving 
ground troops – e.g., air or missile attacks) that may shorten the conflict?  Alternatively, 
is the adversary organized as a diffuse network that is difficult to identify and 
discriminately engage? Or, is there no likely enemy to contend with, which is a 
possibility if the intervention mission is expected to be administrative?  These questions 
lead to three classifications, two of which are coded “1”: hierarchical and no adversary.  
I identify “hierarchical” organizations as those possessing an organized military typical 
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of the modern era involving hierarchical chains of command and communications.  
These are the common models of forces developed in most advanced countries and those 
trained and supplied by those countries.  I categorize a case as having “no adversary” 
when combat is possible but not expected, providing a presence and administrative 
function as a neutral party in support of a peace agreement.  The third category within 
this condition – diffuse – is coded “0” if the structure(s) warrants and if no peace 
agreement is in place, assuming the U.S. would have to impose peace on one or more 
parties to quell the violence.  Examples of diffuse organizations are terrorist networks or 
loosely affiliated militias, especially in conflicts where many different adversaries are 
present. Like REGIME above, I used a variety of sources to code for ENEMY; check 
Appendix A for specific references for each case.  For example, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi 
military structure is categorized as hierarchical (see Fontenot et al. 2012), whereas the 
adversary force in Darfur in 2003 – the Janjaweed – were diffuse based on there being a 
loosely organized, militia-like, tribal force (United Nations 2019). 
The fourth feasibility condition is ACCESS.  Are there adequate seaports and 
airfields to facilitate deployment of units and materiel?  To determine this, using the CIA 
World Factbook for the applicable year, I first identified how many airfields were capable 
of landing C-5 transport aircraft with full payload (min runway of 5000 ft/ 1524 m with 
hard surface) in the country during the crisis year (Globalsecurity.org 2015).  Second, 
using the same source, I answer the question: how many major ports were available?  
Next, I weighted the two types of access points prior to dichotomizing the data.  Seaports 
are weighted twice as much as the airports based on the ability to deliver greater 
quantities of troops, equipment, and materiel at lesser cost.  I then combine these 
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numbers to arrive at a composite access point score for each crisis.  To account for 
varying sizes of target states, I divide the area of the state by this access score to get an 
accessibility ratio.  This led to states falling on an accessibility ratio range from 44 
(highly accessible – Grenada), to 27,642 (highly inaccessible – Sudan).  I code the 
accessibility “1” if less than a 3000 access ratio and “0” if greater than 3000 based on a 
correspondence between a natural break in the data and knowledge of the cases.  Take 
Syria for example, which has three significant sea ports and 22 airports with modern road 
networks throughout most of the country (CIA World Factbook 2018).  Compare it to 
Liberia’s four sea ports and only nine airports, with antiquated road network that is 
among the most underdeveloped in Africa (Logistics Capacity Assessment 2018).  The 
break point used in this study is between these two countries. 
The final feasibility condition is POPULATION.  Based on the crisis 
environment, is the conflict likely to be fought among civilians?  Urban combat requires 
the greatest amount of discrimination of violence due to the potential for collateral 
damage.  Urban areas are seen by many military forces as the most restrictive terrain for 
the application of force (Smith 2007, 409-415).  Here, using the CIA World Factbook for 
the applicable year, I identify the population density of the country, or based on the case, 
a particular region in question during the given year.  For coding, less than 200 people 
per square kilometer is coded as unrestricted terrain – “1”, whereas greater than 200 is 
considered restricted – “0”.  I base this coding on a natural break in the data and an 
average population density of 107 people per square kilometer for the sample of 
intervention opportunities. 
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Determinant Conditions: Internal Determinants 
Next are the internal determinant conditions, starting with UNEMPLOY.  What 
is the unemployment rate in the United States prior to the decision?  Literature suggests 
that presidents may choose to intervene when unemployment levels are high (Fordham 
1998).  Here I use the monthly unemployment percentage taken from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  The average annual unemployment rate for the period inclusive of 
these cases is 6.4 percent.  Cases are coded “0” if less than 6.4% and “1” if greater than 
or equal to 6.4%.     
APPROVAL is the second internal determinant condition.  Does the president 
have a high or low approval rating?  Some literature might expect that the president 
would choose to intervene if he was experiencing high degrees of popular support (James 
and Oneal 1991). Others, using diversionary theory, expect to see presidential decisions 
to intervene at periods of low approval (Morgan and Bickers 1992).  These data are from 
the Gallup Presidential Job Approval Center (2014) and use the rating from the month 
prior to the intervention opportunity.  Based on the two different views on the role of 
presidential approval, cases are coded “1” if 55% or above and when less than 45% (see 
Appendix A for sourcing for presidential approval ratings for each case).  This accounts 
for both high political capital theories as well as diversionary war views.  My coding 
corresponds to Ostrom and Job’s (1986) empirical findings that presidents are more likely 
to use force when public support swings from the mean by a standard deviation in either 
direction (pg. 556).  I code the data “0” if between 46-54%, when the president is not 
incentivized to intervene, where they are unlikely to seek rally effects or have support 
sufficient enough to withstand a potential foreign policy failure.   
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The third internal determinant condition is PARTY.  Does the president's party 
control one or both houses of Congress, thereby lessening the amount of political 
opposition (Howell and Pevehouse 2007)?  I code the cases “1” if the president's party is 
in control of at least one house of Congress and “0” if not using historical records from 
the U.S. House and Senate (history.house.gov 2018; senate.gov 2018).  There are few 
periods when the full government has been united under a single party and this coding 
criterion resulted in nearly an even split of the cases having the condition present.   
 
Determinant Conditions: External Determinants 
There are four external determinant conditions included in the analysis, beginning 
with MAGNITUDE (MAG).  This condition captures the magnitude of the warfare and 
its impact on the societal systems.  The higher the level of magnitude, the higher the 
expectation that the U.S. will intervene.  This assessment includes the duration of the 
conflict, population dislocations and their degree, and the level of destruction as 
represented in the Center for Systemic Peace Major Episodes of Political Violence 
(MEPV) data set (2014).  Crises are coded “1” if the conflicts are categorized as at least 
“substantial and prolonged warfare,” which includes deaths ranging from 100,000-
500,000 with population dislocations exceeding 1 million.  They are coded “0” if less 
than this threshold, which includes “serious warfare” and all remaining forms of 
“political violence” (MEPV 2014).  
The next condition is TRADE.  This condition intends to capture the U.S. trade 
interests with the target state, assuming that economic interests could help spur an 
intervention (Fordham 2008).  This condition is operationalized by summing the inflows 
62 
 
 
and outflows of trade between the U.S. and the state in question for the year prior to the 
opportunity using the Correlates of War dyadic trade 3.0 data set (Barbieri 2012).  The 
average trade sum from the US to all countries over the period of the study is 209 million 
dollars.  Based on this, conditions are coded “1” for the state if their trade level is above 
this threshold and “0” if below.  
The third external determinant condition is ALLY.  Are there alliances of any 
kind between the U.S. and the state in question, or with other states that are involved in 
the conflict/intervention?  This includes alliances such as defense, nonaggression, and 
entente as cataloged in the Correlates of War Alliance Data 4.0 data set (Gibler 2009).  
Cases are coded “1” if there are alliances with the state or other intervening states, and 
“0” if no alliances influence the potential intervention.  The expectation here is that an 
existing alliance increases the likelihood that the U.S. would become involved (Walt 
1987).   
The final external determinant and last condition considered here is UN.  This 
seeks to capture international support for the intervention.  Specifically, did the United 
Nations (UN) produce a mandate for military intervention?  The indicator here is a UN 
resolution authorizing an intervention that specifically calls for military employment as 
an intervening force, fulfilling a role more than self-defense and monitoring.  This aspect 
is necessary to attain the level of risk involved to make the conditions analyzed here 
meaningful.  I used the UN Security Council Resolution search engine (unscr.com) to 
research these cases and their specific mandates.  Based on recent literature we would 
expect that presidents would respond to greater international outcries for action with 
higher frequencies of military response (Wheeler 2000; Finnemore 2004). Cases are 
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coded “1” if mandated by the UN and “0” otherwise.  The dichotomized data set used for 
the analysis are in Table 3.2 and the summary statistics are in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.2. Dichotomized Data Set 
 
 
Table 3.3. Summary Statistics 
 
Analysis 
This section explains the QCA results for both intervention and nonintervention 
using all the variables in Table 3.3.5  Before proceeding into the detailed outputs from 
                                                          
5 I note that all variables were used to arrive at the QCA solutions to point out that if the internal and 
external determinants prove useful via the Boolean minimization, they will be present in the outcomes.  
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the QCA, it is important to note up front that four of the five feasibility factors put 
forward in the theory emerged as important in the analyses.  Of those, accessibility and a 
supportable regime were important factors regardless of whether we are looking at 
intervention or nonintervention.   
The analysis will discuss all three of the different solutions: complex, 
parsimonious, and intermediate.  The complex solution is, as its name portends, the most 
complex combination since it does not attempt to simplify the results.  The parsimonious 
solution uses the computer algorithm to reduce the solutions via Boolean logic by 
identifying logical remainders, producing the most simplified solution set.  Finally, 
between these two is an intermediate solution based on “easy counterfactuals” that 
assesses “the plausibility of simplifying assumptions drawn from the pool of causal 
combinations lacking empirical cases” (Ragin and Sonnett 2005, 5-6).  This approach, 
common in case-oriented, comparative research with limited diversity, is a useful 
approach because it allows the researcher to employ theoretical knowledge in the 
treatment of the logical remainders, aiding in the identification of unique combinations of 
conditions (Ragin 2008).  In addition to these three approaches to the analysis, I take the 
resultants from both the parsimonious and intermediate solutions and test them for their 
predictive ability on similar intervention opportunities on a small out-of-sample test.  I 
randomly selected this subset of cases from the full sample, ensuring representation from 
across the entire period in question.  A more detailed description of the analysis 
                                                          
The goal is not just to identify the feasibility factors that survive.  That said, for readers rooted in the 
correlational world, the internal and external determinants can be considered akin to control variables 
because they are not the primary variables of interest.  To a certain extent, they are antecedent.  They must 
be present before feasibility is considered and are therefore necessary but insufficient.  As the study 
demonstrates, the feasibility factors have both independent and interactive effects (with demand) on the 
probability of intervention. 
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following each step is found in Appendix C.     
 
Necessary Conditions 
The first step in QCA is to check for necessary conditions separately from the 
question of sufficiency.  By examining the question of necessity first, we can identify 
those conditions whose presence is so common in cases with the outcome in question that 
they may lack explanatory power when we are looking for unique combinations.  That 
said, just because a condition is “necessary,” does not mean that it is impertinent to the 
discussion (Ragin 2008, 43).  Quite the opposite; it can be considered as a contributing 
factor to any of the combinations that are ultimately identified as having explanatory or 
predictive power.  The determination of the importance of the condition has more to do 
with the theoretical examination of the condition based on our understanding of the 
phenomenon.  The necessary conditions check here proves the point.   
A condition is “necessary” if it scores a 1.0 on consistency, present in every case 
where the outcome in question occurs, and is deemed quasi-sufficient if scores a .95 
(Bara 2014, 6).  The analysis here identifies the condition of ENEMY – an enemy 
organizational construct that is hierarchical and susceptible to strike – as necessary with a 
score of 1.0 for intervention decisions.  For the purposes of statistical analysis, therefore, 
the condition/variable is dropped.  However, it is important to note the presence of this 
factor in all cases of intervention and incorporate it into the findings of the study.    
For nonintervention decisions, there were no necessary or quasi-necessary 
conditions identified.  Therefore, all conditions are considered in the analysis. 
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Intervention Decisions 
Running the standard analyses with the eleven conditions (minus ENEMY) yields 
a complex solution with perfect coverage (1.0) and consistency (1.0) but requires eight 
unique combinatorial conditions to explain cases of intervention.  Therefore, this is not 
particularly useful for subsequent analyses. 
However, the parsimonious solution from this initial analysis is quite informative 
(see Table 3.4 below).  The QCA table below is a standard means of conveying the 
analysis (Bara 2014).  The specific formula used is presented following “Model” in the 
upper left, identifying the conditions analyzed.  The asterisk between the conditions 
means that the analytic outcomes to the right correspond to that combination of 
conditions, representing a logical “and.”  The plus sign between the combinations is a 
logical “or,” and is used to group the conditional combinations into a group for the 
solution, all of which when combined present the full causal formula.  Restating the 
parameters of fit used in QCA from above for clarity, “consistency gauges the degree to 
which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the 
outcome in question” (Ragin 2008, 44).  Coverage “assesses the degree to which a cause 
or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44).  The 
term “raw” refers to the outcomes that display that combination, and “unique” refers to 
those covered by that combination alone. 
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Table 3.4 QCA Solution for Military Intervention Decisions (all conditions) 
 
 
The parsimonious solution above identifies four combinations of two conditions 
that offer some explanatory power in this sample.  Foremost among these, the 
combination of two feasibility factors – having a leader or regime to support and having 
sufficient accessibility to the target region – is present in 88% of the cases of 
intervention.  The only case of intervention that did not exhibit this combination was 
Somalia in 1992, a case addressed in subsequent chapters.  The second combinatorial 
condition, a lower population density paired with not having one’s party in power (at 
least one house of Congress), is also high in its coverage (63% of cases).  However, the 
lack of the PARTY condition’s presence goes against the theoretical argument commonly 
associated with this internal determinant.  With a coverage of 63% of the sample, it 
could hint at the persuasiveness of a target environment that lacks the complexity 
concomitant with urban applications of force.  The third combination of no ethnic or 
religious cleavages at the core of the conflict and a sufficiently high or low approval 
rating for the U.S. president lends some support for the contention that domestic politics 
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hold sway, particularly when combined with a tractable crisis.  The last combination is 
between an internal and external determinant – high unemployment and international 
approval of the effort.  In total, these combinations demonstrate a number of useful 
insights.  They speak to the importance of the feasibility factors put forward here, as well 
as to the influence of both internal and external determinants, both in combination with 
the feasibility factors and with each other.  In particular, the combination of conditions 
represented by Hypothesis 3 (Supportable Regime) and Hypothesis 5 (Accessibility) 
proved to be extraordinarily powerful.  
The parsimonious analysis only yields limited insights, however.  To get the full 
benefit of the analysis on such a small sample, we need to incorporate in the use of “easy 
counterfactuals” and provide a theoretically consistent accounting of the logical 
remainders, which are configurations that had no or too few cases.  As noted above, this 
requires the use of the intermediate solution; it considers all theoretical possibilities 
including those combinations not represented in the sample and simplifies the 
combinations based on the theoretical assumptions consistent with the theory.  However, 
the intermediate solution for all eleven conditions proved unhelpful, producing eight 
separate combinations of conditions that are unique to a particular outcome.   
To arrive at pathways that are more meaningful to understanding the intervention 
decision, I test for combinations of conditions that exhibit higher consistencies and 
coverages when combined using the necessary conditions check within the fsQCA 
software (2014).  The goal is to drop conditions from the analysis that apparently lack 
explanatory power, while identifying conditions that are more influential when combined 
with one another.  This process initially identified seven conditions that had the greatest 
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synergistic effects to retain for the analysis: CONFLICT, REGIME, ACCESS, 
UNEMPLOY, MAG, TRADE, and ALLY. I then proceeded to extract a more 
parsimonious solution using Boolean minimization, which is displayed in Table 3.5.6  
By reducing to these seven conditions, we see a significant reduction in the most 
simplified solution set that still produces perfect consistency and coverage for the sample.  
Once again, we see the combination of a leader or regime to support with sufficient 
access to be highly important, present in 88% of the cases of intervention, and now 
uniquely so in 75% of the cases.  This makes an extraordinarily strong case for the 
determinant power of these two feasibility factors when combined (Hypotheses 3 and 5).  
The other combination, exemplified by the Somalia 1992 case, pairs a lack of ethnic or 
religious underpinning to the conflict with a high magnitude of violence and 
displacement to arrive at an intervention decision.  This lends some support to those 
touting the importance of external factors, especially when paired with operationally 
feasible conditions.   
Table 3.5 QCA Solution for Military Intervention Decisions (parsimonious) 
 
                                                          
6 This is not to say that the other conditions do not have a useful role in understanding these cases or those 
beyond the sample.  The conditions selected here just proved more useful in arriving at a clear causal 
linkage to the intervention decision in a parsimonious manner.  The parsimonious solution for intervention 
in Table 3.5 displays the results of the Boolean minimization.   
70 
 
 
The parsimonious solution clearly identifies important conditions, but it does not 
demonstrate the effect of more complicated causal recipes that address the other 
determinants put forward by scholars.  As a reminder, this examination is not intending 
to identify a superior determinant for intervention, but the intervening conditions that 
amplify or reduce the effects from the determinants most often posited by the scholarly 
community.  In order to do this, we need to look to the intermediate solution to 
incorporate the logical remainders based on the theoretical assumptions regarding the 
effect of the presence or absence of these conditions.  As a result, we arrive at a richer 
understanding of these combinations within this sample (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 QCA Solution for Military Intervention Decisions (intermediate) 
 
The intermediate solution for military intervention decisions in Table 3.6 explains 
all of the cases of intervention in the sample (1.00 coverage) without any outliers (1.00 
consistency) through only three paths.  Just as indicated in the parsimonious solution, the 
combination of accessibility and a leader/regime to support proves powerful, part of the 
first two combinatorial paths.  In the first path, these two conditions pair with the 
presence of allied involvement (ally in crisis or allies intervening to resolve the crisis).  
This path accounts for half of the intervention cases in the sample.  Two of these were 
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interventions in “America’s backyard” occurring in Panama and Haiti, while the other 
two (Bosnia and Kosovo) where directly affecting European allies (Jones 2000).  This is 
consistent with a recent treatment of allied behavior in the latter two cases, which found 
that “alliance obligations ultimately played a necessary role in compelling intervention” 
(Beckley 2015, 40). The second path combines the ACCESS and REGIME conditions 
with two different external determinants – trade concerns and the magnitude of the 
conflict.  This combination captures three of the interventions: Lebanon and both of the 
Iraq wars.  This is no surprise since many within the national security policy community 
identify the defense of economic interests to be a key circumstance that justifies the use 
of military force (Haass 1999, 252).  The first two causal paths reinforce the external 
determinants arguments, highlighting the strategic importance of the crisis.   
The third path provides a combination of all three determinant categories; it 
combines a crisis of significant magnitude (MAG), not based on ethnic or religious 
cleavages (CONFLICT), with an unfavorable unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY).  
Interestingly, this combination of all three only captures the Somalian intervention.  
Upon closer inspection of that case, the first two conditions seem to matter a great deal 
more than the third.  The communications of the G.H.W. Bush administration 
highlighted the humanitarian motivation behind the intervention, as well as the high 
expectations of success in a short time horizon (Wines 1992).  This seems plausible 
since Bush was a lame duck at that point within the election cycle with Clinton about to 
take office.  Therefore, in this case, the logic of intervention for the purposes of domestic 
political gain becomes a stretch. 
In total, the three paths that constitute this intervention solution demonstrate the 
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critical importance of feasibility, especially regarding the conditions in Hypotheses 2 
(Conflict Type), 3 (Supportable Regime), and 5 (Accessibility).  The solutions also call 
attention to the external determinants that provide the most pressing demands: ties to 
trade partners and a high magnitude conflict.  While an internal determinant did make it 
through the analysis (unemployment rate), further scrutiny revealed a weak argument for 
its inclusion as an important amplifier to the parsimonious solution above.   
 
Nonintervention Decisions 
Next, we address the opposite decision and the factors that influence it: When do 
presidents choose to forego intervention?  I follow the same process as above, but 
instead use a negated-set.  Here we are looking for conditions relating to nonintervention 
with the assumption that the absence of the conditions will lead to a decision not to 
intervene.   
As before, using all of the conditions proved futile in identifying lucrative and 
parsimonious pathways to nonintervention.  The analysis produces complex and unique 
combinations that provide little commonality.  Therefore, I again drop conditions for 
further analysis in order to identify combinations of conditions that can explain more than 
single instances.  This process yielded a new model for nonintervention that used the 
following conditions to arrive at parsimonious and intermediate solutions: ~REGIME, 
~ENEMY, ~CONFLICT, ~ACCESS, ~APPROVAL, ~TRADE (~ denotes the absence of 
the condition). 
The parsimonious solution for nonintervention in Table 3.7 again produces high 
consistency (1.0) and coverage (1.0) with very few configurations of conditions.  Similar 
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to interventions, the impact of feasibility on these decisions is pronounced.  Here, the 
noninterventions in the sample reduced to three feasibility factors with no surviving 
representation from the internal or external determinants.  Most notably, a lack of 
hierarchical enemy structure alone (Hypothesis 4) is the reducible factor in two-thirds of 
the cases.  Only Nicaragua (1981) and Syria (2013) were instances where presidents did 
not intervene when given a hierarchically organized enemy.  Interestingly, in both cases, 
the presidents in question did intervene to a more limited extent – covert action in 
Nicaragua and supporting the NATO operation in Libya with air and logistical support.  
The other path is the potent combination of a lack of a leader to support (Hypothesis 3) 
and a conflict stemming from ethnic or religious friction (Hypothesis 2).  This second 
combination accounts for 83% of the cases, and as with the first, perfect consistency.  
This analysis may be an even stronger indicator of the importance of feasibility than was 
evidenced in the decisions to act.  This is important to note because presidents often 
boldly proclaim their rationale for taking action in an effort to marshal support.  
However, the opposite is true for nonintervention, with presidents and their 
spokespersons remaining silent in the face of calls for action.  Acknowledging that, the 
decision not to intervene may be the one most important to understand. 
Table 3.7 QCA Solution for Military Nonintervention Decisions (parsimonious) 
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As in the analysis of interventions, we can look to the intermediate solution to 
help provide even greater explanatory power by identifying linkages to other 
determinants (See Table 3.8).  This solution, like the parsimonious, provides perfect 
coverage and consistency for the sample.  Interestingly, it still reduces to just two paths 
to explain all of the interventions.  The first path is the same unappealing blend of an 
ethnic crisis with no clear regime to support that proved troubling above, again 
accounting for 66% of the noninterventions.  This combination is exemplified by cases 
across Africa such as Rwanda, Liberia, Burundi, DRC, and the Darfur region of Sudan. 
Table 3.8 QCA Solution for Military Nonintervention Decisions (intermediate) 
 
 
 The second combinatorial path provides an informative combination of feasibility 
factors with both internal and external determinants.  Together with a lack of 
accessibility and diffuse enemy structure, a lack of sufficient trade interests and average 
presidential approval (not high enough to provide significant support for action and not 
low enough to support diversionary interests) are enough to account for half of the 
noninterventions in the sample.  When we look at the cases specifically, we find that the 
ones this second path captures are Uganda (1984) and Rwanda (1994).  If asked to write 
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a compelling narrative for why the president chose not to act in these cases, it seems 
these rationales would provide firm ground on which to base an argument.   
This intermediate solution for nonintervention demonstrates two things: First, 
accounting for feasibility is vitally important when understanding action and inaction 
since it plays a significant role in both combinatorial conditions.  Second, it validates the 
views of both the scholars focused on the role of domestic politics and those prizing the 
role of international strategic factors.  Even when an opportunity for intervention exists, 
if the political tides are not right (~APPROVAL) and there is not a sufficient U.S 
material interest at stake (~TRADE), the decision to act is highly unlikely.   
Predicting Intervention Decisions  
The results of the initial analysis suggest that the feasibility factors significantly 
influence the decision-making process.  All but one of the feasibility factor hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 6 concerning population density did not emerge) dominated the causal 
recipes.  Hypothesis 7 (Too Complex) was also supported because combinations of 
feasibility factors did appear to have an additive effect.  However, maybe this is true just 
for this, admittedly small, sample.  To determine if there is greater substance to the 
claims, I conducted in- and out-of-sample tests to see how many of the cases are 
predicted using the intervention and nonintervention solutions as appropriate for each 
case.  The process is relatively simple: intervention is predicted if any of the sufficient 
paths specified in the intervention solution are present.  The same is true for the 
nonintervention combinations of conditions. 
When evaluating these models for their predictive power, we are concerned with 
how many of the cases they predict correctly (true positives), as well as those that they 
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predict incorrectly (false positives) (Bara 2014, 11).  The latter occurs when the solution 
generates an expected outcome (intervention or nonintervention) and it does not occur.  
Therefore, the intervention solution may predict a case accurately, but at the same time, 
that case may also exhibit the requisite conditions for the nonintervention solution.  I 
follow Bara’s (2014) approach to account for both of these aspects with two measures: 
Sensitivity and Precision.  Sensitivity is the percentage of cases that the solution 
correctly predicted.  Precision takes into account the false positives and reports the 
percentage of predictions that are correct.         
I selected the cases for this subset of the sample across the range of years (marked 
by an asterisk in Table 3.1).  This means that I randomly selected five cases but did so 
by dividing the period up into five segments.  The weakness of this test is that it only 
produced one intervention by the standards used in this paper: Grenada.  All other U.S. 
military interventions during the period were included in the initial analysis.  However, 
within this subsample is a case that may be seen as a partial intervention - Libya 2011 - 
since the U.S. was actively involved with the NATO air campaign, intelligence, and 
support operations that facilitated the toppling of the Gaddafi regime.  This leads to a 
breakdown within the sample of three clear noninterventions (Croatia, Liberia, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo), one intervention (Grenada), and one that blurs the lines 
(Libya). 
The results using the parsimonious solution are positive (see Table 3.9).  The 
solution was perfect for the in-sample analysis, identifying all cases of intervention and 
nonintervention, as well as not identifying any false positives.   
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Table 3.9. QCA Model In-sample and Out-of-sample Predictions (parsimonious) 
 
For the out-of-sample test, the parsimonious solution did quite well in predicting 
onset for both intervention and nonintervention.  The solution predicted Grenada as an 
intervention based on the conditions of a supportable follow-on regime and operational 
accessibility.  However, it falsely identified Croatia as an intervention based on the 
presence of these same conditions.  Croatia did lack both of the other conditions 
(CONFLICT * MAG) that were in this solution set, exhibiting nonintervention conditions 
as well.   
The nonintervention solution captured three of the four cases.  The deviant case 
was Libya, which displayed every condition needing to be absent.  As expected, based 
on the initial look at the sample, Libya presents an odd case based on the high level of 
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involvement that the U.S. had in the NATO operation.  In fact, the Center for Systemic 
Peace data set (2014) codes this case as a U.S. intervention.  However, I have chosen to 
code it as a nonintervention based on the definition for intervention used here, borrowed 
from Saunders (2011), emphasizing the importance of greater than 1000 ground combat 
troops.  This is important because the concerns of troop employment (as it relates to 
assumed risk) were essential in the conceptual development of the feasibility factors.  If 
the definition were broadened to include airstrikes, the Libya case would be captured by 
the new solution but the logic behind the derivation of the feasibility factors would fall 
apart.   
It is important to note that Libya displayed two of the four conditions that were 
part of the intervention solution above (REGIME and ALLY); they were just not in a 
combination that Boolean minimization identified to trigger intervention.  While a 
capable and stable government has not followed the downfall of the Gaddafi, at the time 
of decision President Obama could identify the Transitional National Council (Libya) as 
the supportable successor, therefore meeting the REGIME condition.  The ALLY 
condition was satisfied by the involvement of NATO partners in the operation.  Based on 
this and considering the case-oriented stance of the qualitative comparative approach, it 
may be useful to consider Libya a “near-miss” case for intervention rather than a 
misidentified nonintervention.   
How does the intermediate solution fare when we look to its predictive 
capabilities?  It produces mixed results (See Table 3.10).  The sensitivity and precision 
for the in-sample test remains unchanged, capturing both the appropriate interventions 
and noninterventions and generating no false positives.  Again, we might expect a high 
79 
 
 
degree of fit since this is the data set used to generate the solution.   
Table 3.10 QCA Model In-sample and Out-of-sample Predictions (intermediate) 
 
Looking at the out-of-sample test, the intermediate solution for nonintervention 
achieved mixed results.  The intervention solution improved, capturing Grenada but 
without any false positives.  However, the nonintervention solution still failed to account 
for Libya, but also narrowly missed Croatia (1991) based on the presence of a 
supportable follow-on regime.   
In total, both the parsimonious and intermediate intervention and nonintervention 
solutions were able to explain and predict with a notable level of accuracy.  Between the 
two different solutions, the only case they consistently categorized incorrectly was Libya.  
Both the parsimonious and intermediate solutions failed to capture it as a 
nonintervention, but also did not claim it as an intervention either.  Again, the fact that 
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the U.S. was significantly involved in the NATO operation but not with significant 
ground troops is commensurate with the findings here that it is an “in-between” case. 
Conclusion 
The common approach within the field of IR to understand military intervention 
decisions has been to assign greater causal weight to either domestic factors or 
international systemic conditions.  This approach pits independent variables against one 
another and assumes additive effects on the dependent variable (Braumoller 2003).  Both 
camps have found empirical support for their positions given different samples and 
methods.  Looking through either the internal or the external determinant lens, we see 
apparent inconsistencies in presidential decision-making.  Cases that appear to be very 
similar produce different decisions regarding the committal of troops.   
This study addresses this problem through an alternative approach and makes 
three significant contributions.  First, I operationalized the concerns underpinning 
expectations of success associated with these decisions – feasibility factors.  Feasibility 
is a real concern for presidents and their advisors as evidenced by the military’s approach 
to framing these problems and anecdotally in recent narratives of key presidential 
decisions.  However, the scholarly treatment of intervention behavior to date has not 
incorporated this concept sufficiently into the analyses. Second, this study tests for the 
impact of the feasibility factors on the decisions through a different methodological 
assumption.  Instead of looking at the decision space as an arena of competing variables, 
this inquiry rests on the idea of causal complexity or “multiple conjunctural causation” 
where different combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome (Rihoux and 
Ragin 2009, 8).  Essentially, instead of asking whether one determinant is dominant, I 
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asked whether there are combinations of determinants, both internally and externally 
oriented, that have unique causal influences.7  This approach is appropriate because of 
the complexity of these decisions and the myriad influences on the outcome.  Finally, I 
incorporated an out-of-sample test to demonstrate the forecasting ability of these 
concepts for explaining and understanding intervention behavior in the future.     
Both the intervention and nonintervention solutions performed very well for the 
19 cases in the complete study.  The parsimonious and intermediate formulations for 
intervention predicted the actual decisions with 100% accuracy.  The nonintervention 
solutions scored 75% for the parsimonious and 50% for the intermediate, but without any 
false positives.  Accordingly, this study finds strong support for the explanatory and 
predictive power of this approach for understanding presidential decisions to intervene 
militarily.   
The analyses found support for many of the hypotheses relating to feasibility.  
Regarding intervention decisions, two conditions dominated the parsimonious solution, 
combining to account for 88% of the decisions to intervene from 1980 to 2013:  First, 
(Hypothesis 3) is there a supportable leader or regime to back? Second, (Hypothesis 5) is 
the target location logistically accessible?  In addition to these, the question of the 
enemy’s structure also figured prominently, present in all of the cases of intervention and 
absent in two-thirds of the cases where the president chose not to intervene.  This 
condition addresses whether or not the potential adversary’s military structure is 
                                                          
7 Regarding unique causal influences, some may hold endogeneity concerns.  If there is endogeneity 
between the feasibility factors and the other determinants, the overlap is all between X variables, not 
between X and Y (intervention or nonintervention).  Given endogeneity between X's, we ought to see 
greater and more consistent combinations between feasibility factors and the determinants than we do; 
instead, feasibility emerges as an independent factor, or in combination with other feasibility factors.  This 
finding is only reinforced in the qualitative studies that follow.   
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susceptible to strike (e.g., hierarchical and organized).  Finally, the origins of the conflict 
were also vitally important to the calculus.  When the conflict stemmed from ethnic or 
religious frictions and there was no clear regime to support, this combination accounted 
for 83% of the cases of nonintervention.  This also lends weight to hypothesis seven – 
“Too Complex” – which argued that there would be an additive quality to infeasible 
traits.  All three of the conditions in the parsimonious nonintervention solution were 
feasibility factors, and four of the six for the intermediate solution. It is easy to see how 
these factors would affect the presidential decision space because they address issues 
such as certainty, shorter time commitments, and costs.   
Beyond these, all the feasibility factors carried some weight in the analysis, 
except for population density (hypothesis six) which did not prove useful.  Clearly, the 
least substantiated hypothesis was number seven, which stated that internal and external 
determinant combinations would prove impactful without concern for feasibility.  These 
findings support the theory put forward here, that feasibility factors are an essential 
matter of concern when assessing intervention behavior.   
The non-feasibility conditions that played the most significant roles here were 
presidential approval, trade ties to the state in crisis, and a higher magnitude of conflict, 
reinforcing arguments that favor both domestic politics and international systemic 
influences on these decisions.  However, no combination of these determinants emerged 
as important without the addition of feasibility factors in the solution, undermining 
arguments in favor of Hypothesis 8 which posited that demand alone is determinant.    
This study produces two key findings.  First, we can explain, at least partially, 
the inconsistency within the literature concerning intervention behavior.  From this 
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analysis, a combination of both internal and external determinants (trade, presidential 
approval, conflict magnitude) with feasibility factors.  The intermediate QCA solutions 
prove informative here (see Tables 3.6 and 3.8).  Second, and more clearly, in both types 
of decision we see the importance of feasibility.  These factors predominate the internal 
and external determinants, and no combinatorial conditions emerged from the analysis 
that omitted feasibility as a necessary condition for action/inaction.     
Based on this research, scholars should not view operational employment factors 
as background noise that presidents view as dismissive with the right strategy.  Given the 
prominence of the feasibility factors within the combinations generated by these analyses, 
they may well be the most important aspect when presidents consider whether to act.  
This study provides a clear answer for a case such as Syria where there are numerous 
demand stimuli, yet still no overt intervention.  There is not a clear leader and regime to 
replace Assad; there are numerous and diffuse competing belligerents; and there are 
religious and ethnic roots to the conflict.  These are just a few of the factors that make 
this an unlikely target for intervention. 
In sum, this work supports the theoretical argument that explaining intervention 
and nonintervention decisions by the strength of demand alone may not be the best 
approach.  Instead, combinations of conditions, especially those incorporating feasibility, 
can help explain why seemingly less important interventions occur while other calls for 
action only reach deaf ears within the oval office.  Armed with knowledge of which 
conditions may best explain intervention behavior, the next chapter looks at the George 
H.W. Bush administration’s handling of the Somalian and Yugoslavian crises to ascertain 
whether the concerns exposed here are evident in the deliberative record.  
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CHAPTER 4 
GEORGE H.W. BUSH INTERVENTION DECISIONS:  
YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA  
 
Sometimes the decision not to use force, to stay our hand, I can tell you, it's 
just as difficult as the decision to send our soldiers into battle. The former 
Yugoslavia, well, it's been such a situation. There are, we all know, 
important humanitarian and strategic interests at stake there. But up to now 
it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force by the 
United States and its traditional friends and allies would have had the 
desired effect, given the nature and complexity of that situation.  
  -President George H.W. Bush, Remarks at West Point, January 5, 1993 
 
This chapter builds on the analysis of the last and aims to explicate the role of 
operational feasibility concerns on the decision to intervene as seen through dialogues 
among those influencing presidential decisions.  To accomplish this, I select two U.S. 
intervention opportunities for comparison sharing a number of key similarities – Bosnia 
and Somalia in 1992 – and analyze the minutes from National Security Council (NSC) 
and Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meetings along with previously published interview 
material.  These cases represent two of the most-documented instances of simultaneous 
crises being weighed for intervention by a single administration, and by holding the 
administration constant I am able to minimize the effect of rival explanations of 
intervention, the different predispositions of presidents to use military force, or changes 
in the international environment.  The purpose is to gain an appreciation for why the 
George H.W. Bush administration chose to intervene in Somalia but not in Bosnia and 
what factors exerted the greatest influence on the actual outcome. 
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 This analysis accomplishes three things.  First, it reinforces the work done by 
previous scholars that international systemic considerations and domestic politics weigh 
heavily on the decision to act.  Second, this case comparison demonstrates the key role 
that feasibility concerns play in the decision-making process when deciding where to act.  
Third, it demonstrates through within case analysis that feasibility factors are paramount 
in understanding intervention decisions because as they change over time, so too does the 
president’s will to act.  This is significant to the body of intervention literature because 
the scholarship explaining or predicting presidential behavior often pits domestic and 
international concerns against one another with mixed results.    
The mixed results of these studies, I argue, are due to a failure to account for 
differentiation in difficulty levels posed by the intervention opportunities.  While some 
studies have paid attention to the importance of a mission’s expectation of success or 
whether it is “doable,” they have not attempted to factor this into the analysis by 
operationalizing it into key variables (e.g., Regan 2002; Western 2002).  The feasibility 
discriminators put forward in this study have explanatory power heretofore unrecognized 
and may serve as a guide to operationalizing feasibility for further scholarship.  
 The chapter proceeds in five parts.  Part I describes the method of analysis and its 
appropriateness for this study.  Part II sets the context, providing a background 
discussion for these contemporaneous crises.  Part III discusses the prevailing theories 
for why interventions occur within the literature and what predictions they would have 
made for President George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) decisions given the situation at the 
time.  The principal contribution of this chapter is in Part IV, which explores declassified 
NSC documents and related materials to uncover feasibility concerns explicitly addressed 
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in the decision making process – What feasibility considerations predominated?  To 
what extent or impact?  Part V compares and concludes. 
Part I: Method 
 This chapter follows in the line of others who have employed the “comparative 
historical method” to try to better understand phenomena that are both complex and rare, 
two traits consistent with U.S. intervention decisions (Skocpol 1979; Moore 1993).  
What follows is a comparison of Bosnia and Somalia intervention opportunities for the 
George H.W. Bush administration in 1992.  I selected these cases based on Mill’s 
“method of difference,” wherein cases are selected based on their similar characteristics, 
ideally on key independent variables, but with different outcomes on the dependent 
variable, in this case the decision to intervene militarily (Mill 1884).  Both cases are 
similar in their independent variables that other scholars argue are important determinants 
(e.g., strategic import, economic interests, media coverage). The period of analytic focus 
is the Bush 41 decision space for when these options were being weighed.  This 
corresponds to the timeframe from the fall of 1991, when discussions on these two crises 
began within the NSC, up to December 4, 1992, the initiation date for Operation Restore 
Hope (the U.S.-led humanitarian effort in Somalia to enforce UN Security Council 
Resolution 794).  
Once familiarized with the background for these two intervention opportunities in 
Part II, the comparative analysis occurs over Parts III and IV.  Part III is a “disciplined 
configurative” approach employing the “congruence method” to test what leading 
theories would predict based on the conditions at the time (George and Bennett 2005, 
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Van Evera 1997).  This analysis is informed both by the literature to determine what 
conditions are expected to lead to what type of decision (i.e., intervene or not), but also 
by the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) outputs that yielded combinatorial 
solutions to the cases in the preceding chapter.  Part IV “process traces” discussions 
framing the decision for the president with emphasis on operational feasibility concerns, 
serving as a “plausibility probe” for theory development (George and Bennett 2005, 75).    
There are a couple of difficulties or limitations associated with this method and 
the cases selected.  First, the reason for highlighting the plausibility probe goal for this 
chapter is to call out explicitly the limitations of using only two cases, however similar, 
for controlled comparison to arrive as solid conclusions.  There are many elements of 
these situations that this study will not explore.  As a result, there could be any number 
of intervening factors that are unseen determinants for these decisions.  In addition, there 
is the problem of assuming a multivariate logic which is at the heart of historical 
comparative analysis (Skocpol 1979, 39).  This presumes that the units of comparison 
are independent of one another.  In the tethered crises of Bosnia and Somalia in 1992, 
this is clearly not the case; these opportunities were viewed in stark contrast and weighed 
against one another by those directly advising the president (Western 2002, 138).   
These methodological concerns are partially mitigated in a number of ways.  The 
unforeseen intervening factors are addressed by relying on the predominant theories from 
the rich intervention literature to inform the inquiry.  Also, as noted at the outset, these 
two cases are contemporaneous and well-documented, presenting an excellent test bed for 
research where variance is minimized as much as naturally possible.  The multivariate 
logic problem is addressed by the fact that this chapter builds on the feasibility factor 
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findings of the last; QCA does not employ multivariate logic, instead assuming that there 
are combinations of conditions at play.  This chapter uses those conditions both 
consistent with the literature as well as the QCA solutions from the preceding chapter to 
inform the research (i.e., the conditions found to be useful in the QCA are carried forward 
for this analysis).  Finally, the fact that these cases are not viewed by administration in 
isolation is actually beneficial to the central research question: why here but not there?  
This allows the study to get beyond the question of a demand for action and gets to the 
heart of what it is about a situation that causes an administration to either act or balk. 
Part II: Background to Crises 
 The years of the Bush 41 administration were a period of great tumult on the 
international stage.  This presidency was witness, and participant in many respects, to 
the end of the Cold War and in the transitions occurring as a result of the crumbling of 
the bipolar world.  Regimes were falling with new strong men vying for position and 
influence as power vacuums emerged across the periphery of former areas of Soviet 
influence.  As a result, the Bush presidency was rife with opportunities for engagement 
as the sole remaining superpower tried to make sense of the global landscape and hold 
together “a new world order” (Bush 1991).   
 Military engagement during the Bush 41 tenure was significant as one might 
imagine in a period of geostrategic transitions.  Most notable was the decision to eject 
Iraq from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, following their invasion in 
August 1990.  This was the largest military action undertaken by the U.S. government 
since the end of the Vietnam War.  At the same time, there were humanitarian demands 
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for increased use of force and castigation of the administration’s military advisors for 
having a “no-can-do” attitude (New York Times Editorial 1992).  In response to these 
allegations, Bush 41’s CJCS, General Colin Powell penned a response that demonstrated 
that the administration was not bashful about using force but used it selectively where it 
was likely to have “decisive” results (Powell 1992).  Powell noted that in the three 
preceding years the U.S. military had been used to remove Manuel Noriega from power 
in Panama, stop a coup attempt in the Philippines, rescue an embassy in Somalia and 
stranded personnel in Liberia, and assist in humanitarian relief operations in Iraq, 
Somalia, Bangladesh, Russia, and Bosnia.  In short, by the second half of 1992 the Bush 
administration had a long track record of employing the military toward limited ends, 
while at the same time it was experiencing significant pressure for even greater use of 
military means to achieve political ends.   
 The two most demanding intervention opportunities during the last year of the 
administration were the collapsing Yugoslavian state and the conflict-induced famine in 
Somalia.  Looking at the NSC/DC meetings starting in May 1992, we find that of the 88 
total meetings, 30 meetings were held on the topic of Yugoslavia or its former states, and 
28 for Somalia (See Appendix D for NSC and NSC/DC meetings).  This means that 66% 
of the national security decision making staff’s energies were fixated on these two topics, 
roughly in equal expenditure during the last half of 1992 when these intervention 
opportunities presented themselves.  What follows is a brief sketch of each of these 
crises and some of their key characteristics to paint a picture of what the Bush 41 
administration was considering as they discussed their options.   
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Breakup of Yugoslavia 
 The former Yugoslavia was a socialist state formed in the aftermath of World 
War II and a civil war, bringing together six separate republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.  Two things contributed to their 
ultimate fracture.  First, the suppressive influence of President Tito, which squelched the 
tensions among the groups for nearly three decades in various capacities, ended in 1980 
with his death, unleashing old animosities.  Second, the end of the Cold War brought 
significant change (BBC 2016).  The “Revolutions of 1989” and corresponding 
retraction of Soviet military presence across their former sphere invited upheaval (Kumar 
1992).  Beginning in 1990, political protest, and ultimately extraordinary levels of 
violence overtook the Yugoslav republics.  Yugoslavia was always diverse with its six 
republics divided along ethnic and historical lines.  The tensions among the ethnic 
minorities (Serbs, Croats, and Muslims) created uncertainty about what the geopolitical 
space would look like moving forward following the end of communism and waning 
Soviet influence.  With the loss of central state control came the opportunity for the 
republics to go their separate ways along status quo political boundaries; or in the mind 
of some, such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, an opportunity to reimagine those lines 
and consolidate power to greater advantage (Magas 1993).   
 The initial breakdown of Yugoslavia began with secessionist movements in 
Slovenia and Croatia.  Croatia ultimately declared independence on June 25, 1991 while 
under siege from an internal Serbian minority guerrilla movement.  This faction was 
operating in support of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) who actively 
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campaigned within Croatia’s borders to expand Serbian control.  The result of the 
conflict spanning over four years was more than 20,000 dead and over 250,000 displaced 
persons (BBC 2003).  The magnitude of the conflict as well as its proximity to European 
powers and key markets ensured that the situation garnered attention.  The violence in 
Croatia resulted in the deployment of the first United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping force 
(UN Protection Force) to secure safe havens and help enforce a negotiated ceasefire 
(United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, 1992).  With the precedent set for 
international intervention, additional UN mandates would look to contend with the even 
more heightened violence occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Table 4.1 Yugoslavia Key Events Timeline
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 Serbs were in opposition to independence among the former Yugoslav republics.  
They envisioned a new Serb state (Republika Srpska) that would consolidate ethnic Serbs 
under a common flag: the “Plan Ram.”  Toward this end, the policy included the use of 
ethnic cleansing and wholesale massacre of villages not submitting to Serbian “terms of 
allegiance” (Lukic and Lynch 1996, 204).  The results were stunning.  The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) produced casualty estimates for a period 
closely mirroring this study (April 1992 to July 1993) and found that just in that short 
time there were approximately 169,100 dead, including civilians and soldiers (Tabeau 
and Bijak 2003, 6).  In addition, SIPRI found that there were over 1,150,000 refugees 
and internally displaced persons as well (Ibid., 18).  In light of these realities and their 
growing prominence within public discourse, the Bosnian crisis elicited humanitarian 
calls for action on a scale heretofore unseen.    
Somalia Turmoil 
 During the Cold War, Somalia held significant strategic interests for the United 
States.  This was due not only to Somali proximity to oil transit routes, but also as a 
counter-balance to Soviet influence in neighboring Ethiopia (Western 2002).  Based on 
this, the United States looked to secure a partner in Somali President Mohammed Siad 
Barre.   President Barre took power via coup in 1969 and had relied heavily on Soviet 
support during the first decade of his rule.  Barre actively worked to consolidate power 
by deemphasizing the clan-based structures upon which Somali society was built and 
relied heavily on external support, initially from the Soviets and then the United States.  
In 1977 Barre initiated a turn to the United States after a failed attempt to regain the 
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Ogaden region from Ethiopia, with the Soviets siding with the Ethiopians (Hirsch and 
Oakley 1996).  U.S. administrations had overlooked many of the problems associated 
with Barre’s authoritarian rule because of the Horn of Africa’s importance in the broader 
Cold War context.   
The failure in the Ogaden campaign prompted a shift in Barre’s leadership.  In 
order to retain power he returned to emphasizing the clan structures as the fundamental 
political entities under the regime (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 8-12).  Barre manipulated 
these structures and fomented an environment that required personal insulation and 
wholesale oppression of opposing clans in order to retain control.  As a byproduct, these 
opposed clans turned to Ethiopia for backing and produced significant internal 
opposition.  Unfortunately for Barre, this period of unrest happened to coincide with the 
precipitous decline of Soviet influence at the end of the 1980’s, calling into question 
rationale for continued U.S. support (Western 2002, 119).   
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Table 4.2 Somalia Key Events Timeline
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Somalia, by the end of 1990, had devolved into chaos and full-scale civil war 
between rival clans and the Barre regime.  The United States chose not to risk its 
embassy staff in such an environment and pulled its personnel out to Nairobi, Kenya to 
observe from afar in January 1991 (Fox 2001).  Barre, too, was not long to remain; he 
left Mogadishu on January 27th under duress to relocate to his clan’s homeland to the 
south near the Kenyan border.  This movement was forced by the successful revolt 
against the regime by the rival clan alliances and their associated militias.  Most 
prominent of these was the United Somali Congress (USC) under General Mohammed 
Farah Aideed who was responsible for ejecting Barre from Mogadishu.   
General Aideed initially did not assume a dominating leadership role among the 
allied clans, allowing each to prosecute their fight against Barre’s forces in their 
respective areas.  However, when Barre was able to mount a series of counterstrikes and 
try to take back Mogadishu in early 1992, it was Aideed who exerted authority and 
adopted a “scorched earth” that devastated areas to the south, ultimately causing Barre to 
flee to Kenya and then Nigeria (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 10-13).  In the wake, Aideed 
saw himself as the great liberator while other clan leaders presumed their own right to the 
spoils of victory.  The result was a competitive environment of competing networks of 
alliances vying for supremacy along clan lines.   
Anarchy reigned in post-Said Barre Somalia.  Aideed and his principal rival, Ali 
Mahdi, were leading their allied clans against one another in an attempt to control the 
capital city.  At the same time, on a lower level, teenage gangs were running rampant, 
looting the aid supplies coming in and committing violence against the international 
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workers.  The aid materiel itself had become the currency in a collapsed state where 
violence represented the only authority to which to appeal (Talentino 2005, 103-105).  
The international aid coming in was principally food, which was necessary to combat the 
famine which was simultaneously having devastating effects on the population, putting 
nearly 4.5 million Somalis in danger of starvation by mid-1992.  The results were 
horrendous.  There were an estimated 40,000 killed or wounded in an around Mogadishu 
from November 1991 to February 1992, not including the uncounted deaths associated 
with starvation occurring in camps holding over 200,000 displaced persons (Human 
Rights Watch 1992).  Between the famine and civil war, it was estimated that 350,000 
Somalis had died leading up to Bush 41’s period of decision (Hogg 2008).  As a result, 
Somalia had captured the world’s attention and was seemingly a test for whether those 
presumably able would be willing to respond. 
Part III: Prevailing Theories and Predictions 
There is a wide array of competing theories that aim to explain why leaders 
choose to intervene or not.  As we look at the cases compared here, quite of few of the 
most prominent theories would have predicted the outcome incorrectly.  Some 
arguments have centered on the determinant role external factors such as geopolitical 
considerations and state interests play (Aydin 2012; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; 
Mearsheimer 2001), or the media’s coverage of the crisis based on its magnitude (Drury 
et. al. 2005).  Similar to media coverage, others argue for the role of humanitarian norms 
and pressure exerted by international organizations to address atrocities (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, Herrmann and Shannon 2001).  Still others posit that these decisions are 
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no different than any other political decision and that they are ultimately tied to the 
domestic politics, regardless of the president’s rhetoric (Baum 2004; Fordham 2002; 
Hildebrandt et. al. 2013; James and Oneal 1991).  This short section looks at a few of the 
most prominent scholarly theories to get an idea of what we might have expected Bush 
41 to do based on available knowledge at the time if he had acted in accordance with 
their assertions.   As will be seen, each of the following theories got it wrong.  Bush 
41, rather than intervene in Yugoslavia – which exhibited extraordinarily strong demand 
signals – instead chose to wait until after the U.S. presidential election and then intervene 
in Somalia, a place with minimal strategic importance, weaker ties to key allies, and less 
media coverage.   
Beginning with international systemic factors, Aydin (2012) argued persuasively 
that intervention decisions are driven by a combination of political and economic 
objectives; these include economic ties to belligerents or crucial allies, containment of 
conflicts from regions of concern, supporting international audiences, or supporting other 
democracies (p. 148).  Based on these considerations, we can evaluate the two 
intervention opportunities.  The fledgling states of the former Yugoslavia score on a 
much higher scale in the concerns listed above when compared to Somalia.  
Economically, the United States is much more tethered and subject to the market forces 
associated with European states and the large-scale disruption of their economies.  While 
Somalia once served a significant geopolitical role as a regional counter to Soviet 
influence in the Horn of Africa, that time had passed concomitantly with waning 
communist presence in the region (Western 2002, 119).  The perceived requirement to 
support the Barre regime was over.  Between these two cases, the geopolitical theory of 
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action would have predicted incorrectly, finding more utility in backing an intervention in 
the Yugoslavian republics.   
Maybe there is something else at play.  Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) 
found that international as well as domestic political factors were extraordinarily 
important in most intervention decisions, but strikingly call out the additive “impact of a 
disaster’s media salience,” noting that “one New York Times article being worth more 
disaster aid dollars than 1,500 casualties” (p. 470).  Perhaps there was a media coverage 
disparity that stoked the will of the masses making Somalia seem a better intervention 
candidate.  Jon Western (2002) compared these same two 1992 cases of possible U.S. 
military intervention and demonstrated the important role that rising political pressure 
exerts on the decision to act over time as a crisis persists.   Western’s work does an 
excellent job of process tracing the period of decision through interviews with key 
players in the Bush 41 administration, supporting his contention that what triggered the 
decision to act was the shift in public perception, as stoked by advocacy groups and an 
increasingly informed media as they become familiarized with the situations on the 
ground.8   However, what can we make of the so-called “CNN effect” when comparing 
the two cases?  It is often said that it was the news footage of starving Somalis that 
brought Bush 41 to intervene, but that does not hold up to scrutiny (Western 2002, 114).  
Strobel (1997) demonstrated that the media’s coverage of Somalia was virtually 
                                                          
8 Western’s (2002) study brings up two notable points in his findings that directly relate to this study and 
may explain the inconsistency: how “doable” is the mission and the importance of military assessment to 
the decision making process (pp. 140-141).  Western (2002) notes that this aspect of analysis for the 
decision making process is “highly subjective” and therefore leaves it as a consideration, but not 
necessarily a point of analysis (p. 140).  
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nonexistent until after Bush announced the decision to intervene.  The same was not true 
for Bosnia.  Coverage of the Yugoslavian break up and the onset of violence came early 
and was sustained.  The comparative coverage between the intervention opportunities 
was actually discussed publicly at the time, asking why the tragedies in the former 
Yugoslavia should warrant so much more media attention to similar calamities in 
Somalia (Richburg 1992).  The imbalance in coverage was chalked up to everything 
from the disparity in economic ramifications to notions of racism (Ibid.).  Regardless of 
why, the coverage was clearly weighted in favor of the crisis in Europe.  So, as for the 
impact of media pressure, it again seems as though Bosnia would have been the more 
likely intervention choice. 
 The magnitude of the atrocity is also thought to impact organizations such as the 
UN who figure prominently in organizing a response.  Are there disparities in how the 
UN dealt with these concurrent crises that may indicate which was the more likely choice 
for the U.S. to intervene?  Since the United Nations Security Council arguably serves as 
the bellwether for leading action in cases such as these, we can look to it to assess the 
relative demand of each crisis on the international stage.  During 1992, the UN Security 
Council adopted 73 resolutions.  Of these, six addressed Somalia while 24 dealt with the 
former Yugoslavia and its republics.  In addition, the UN established a United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in February 1992, designed to be a multinational 
peacekeeping force to stop the violence in the Yugoslav wars; the U.S. could have 
contributed troops to this established effort.  Alternatively, in Somalia the UN initially 
stood up the United Nations Operation in Somali I (UNOSOM I) in April 1992, 
consisting of only a small monitoring element; it was not until the end of 1992 when the 
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U.S. volunteered to lead the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a more robust ground force 
to facilitate humanitarian aid delivery. Therefore, with four times more resolutions than 
Somalia and 33% of the total resolutions, and a more strongly supported response 
capability, it can be argued that Bosnia elicited a stronger demand for U.S. action.  But 
the U.S. chose to intervene in Somalia instead of Bosnia. 
What happens when we look to domestic politics?  A common argument in this 
camp is that presidents choose to act to produce a “rally around the flag” effect to sway 
public opinion towards them at key moments (Baker and Oneal 2001; Heatherington and 
Nelson 2003).  Since 1992 was an election year, we might expect President Bush to 
choose to entertain a foreign venture for such purposes, especially considering the 
positive marks he gained at the beginning of his presidency with Desert Storm.  Bush 
41’s approval rating soared to 89% in March, 1991 following the conclusion of combat 
operations in Iraq (Kagay 1991).  Democratic Congressional members argued at the time 
that Bush’s support aid to Somalia was plain old election year politics since the initial 
announcement to provide an airlift for humanitarian relief came just three days before the 
Republican National Convention (Lofland 1992, 57).  Yet, there was a lack of public 
awareness of the crisis at that point, so such a ploy, if it were one, would not likely have 
resonated with the electorate.  Media coverage did not begin in earnest until after 
President Bush’s announcement of the impending airlift operation and scholars have 
shown the argument for a news-driven intervention to be exaggerated (Livingston and 
Eachus 1995; Robinson 2001).  Yet, if the administration had wished to act in 
accordance with this theory, the obvious choice would have been in the former 
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Yugoslavia where there was already an approved UN Security Council resolution in place 
and the establishment of a multinational peacekeeping force.   
The question, then, is why did Bush 41 intervene in Somalia rather than in the 
former Yugoslavia if so many of the prevailing theories point in that direction?  
Operational feasibility can provide some answers. 
Part IV: Operational Feasibility Considerations 
 This portion of the chapter exposes key points of differentiation between these 
seemingly similar cases.  Once these differences are factored in, we see that Somalia, 
from the perspective of Bush 41 at the time, presented a lower cost, less complex, quick 
win, when compared to the opportunity in Bosnia.  Not only that, in the Somalia case we 
see how the changing feasibility perceptions over time transformed the decision from a 
clear nonintervention to an intervention. 
To review, “operational feasibility” addresses the challenges of force employment 
to a crisis location and that military force’s potential efficacy given the situation and 
policy aims.  This definition and the search for criteria that influence it are an 
elaboration on what scholars have attributed to the vague notion of “expectations of 
success” (Regan 2002, 40).  In the previous chapter, I analyzed a subset of the 
intervention opportunities presented to U.S. presidents over the last three decades using 
QCA.  This method produces combinations of conditions that, when present, are highly 
likely to lead to certain outcomes – in this case, either intervention or nonintervention 
decisions. 
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 In the QCA outputs for intervention and nonintervention, there were four 
feasibility factors that emerged as meaningful elements to these causal recipes.  The first 
accounts for whether there is a clear leader or regime to support.  If there is a leader or 
an established regime to intervene on behalf of (including situations where there has 
already been a brokered ceasefire), then feasibility increases.  Alternatively, feasibility 
decreases if the intervention is between two or more antagonists where maintaining 
neutrality becomes problematic.  The second factor addresses the roots of conflict.  This 
factor looks at whether ethnic or religious cleavages are driving the violence.  If so, these 
are often intractable problems given the preference for short time commitments.  The 
third factor addresses the structure of the enemy or adversary with which the U.S. 
military force would contend.  Is the enemy hierarchical and therefore susceptible to 
strike, leading to short time estimates until conflict termination?  Or, alternatively, is the 
enemy diffuse in its organization or consisting of multiple organizations?  If it is the 
latter, longer operational time horizons should be expected because of the need to 
develop useful intelligence, ascertain vulnerabilities, and arrive at useful approaches to 
defeat the enemy.  Finally, there is accessibility: how logistically difficult will force 
employment and sustainment be given where the crisis is located?  While possibly 
considered mundane, accessibility problems such as those posed by austere or distant 
operating locales can make the difference between the possible and the improbable.    
 The following section probes the historical record of these two decisions and 
identifies two things: the explicit demands for the intervention and whether or not the 
operational feasibility considerations above, as well as the previously discussed 
determinants from the prevailing theories, were considered in the decision-making 
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process.  This research relies principally on two groups of material.  First, I place 
greatest emphasis on primary resources such as NSC records and the public papers from 
the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, as well as the public statements made by the 
president himself or his key advisors.  The presidential library documents, most of which 
were previously classified, were released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
and expose the dialogues behind the scenes of these decisions.9  Second, I augment these 
materials with secondary sources containing interviews with individuals involved in 
shaping Bush 41’s decisions based on their duty positions at the time.10  The goal is to 
confirm or deny the existence of these feasibility concerns, along with any of the 
previously discussed determinants, to assess their influence on the decision to intervene 
in Somalia vice Bosnia.    
                                                          
9 All available archival material for these two cases was used in this study.  In conducting the analysis, I 
searched for not only feasibility factors referenced in the conversations, but for the other demand signal 
determinants as well.  The fact that feasibility is more prominent in the findings and excerpts below is 
indicative of the evidence more broadly.  External determinants such as the role of the UN and the 
magnitude of the conflict and its effects were also replete in the dialogues.  Internal determinants were not 
as openly discussed, as might be expected.  That said, the research must rely on the historical record, and 
the fact that we find discussions concerning feasibility highlight that it plays a role.   
 
10 There are four key resources that fall into this category:  
1) Fox, John G. “Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia.” 
SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (2001): 147–158. (Winter-Spring 2001).  John Fox served as the key Foreign 
Service Officer working the crisis, first in Somalia, and then based out of the Nairobi U.S. Embassy.   
2) Hoar, Joseph P. “A CINC’s Perspective.” National Defense University, Washington DC Center 
for Counterproliferation Research, (January 1993).  General Hoar was the commander for Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF) and the principal commander in the development of the operational plan. 
3) Lofland, Valerie J. “Somalia: US Intervention and Operation Restore Hope.” Case Studies in 
Policy-Making and Implementation 6 (2002).  Lofland’s research is based on interviews of members of the 
NSC Staff and participants from the Department of State working the Somalia case during the crisis. 
4) Oberdorfer, Don. “The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy We Could Do Something 
About.” Washington Post 6 (1992).  Oberdorfer conducted interviews with key members of the NSC staff 
and cabinet following the Deputies Committee meetings in November, 1992, offering insights into the 
deliberation process prior to the declassification of the notes from the Somalia Deputies Committee 
meetings and the NSC 0065 meeting. 
4) Western, Jon. “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in 
the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia.” International Security 26, no. 4 (April 1, 2002): 112–42. 
Western conducts extensive interviews with individuals involved in the management of the crisis, including 
key advisors such as Brent Scrowcroft. 
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Yugoslavia – Intervention Demands and Feasibility Assessment 
 The Yugoslavian collapse and the violence that followed it presented significant 
pressures from both international and domestic audiences for something to be done.  Yet, 
Bush 41 chose not to weigh in militarily.  This can be argued to stem from the concerns 
expressed below regarding the feasibility of any intervention.  The dialogues within the 
administration are replete with concerns over the complex nature of the conflict, the 
challenge of maintaining neutrality between opposing armies in absence of a cease-fire, 
limited accessibility, and concerns over countering Serbian opposition forces waiting in 
the surrounds of the Sarajevo airport.  As the following analysis shows, these concerns 
were both evident and too much to warrant military intervention under Bush 41.  The 
section below identifies the most significant demands for an intervention in Yugoslavia 
and the feasibility concerns expressed for the presumed mission. 
Intervention Demands 
Initial NSC staff meetings on Yugoslavian fragmentation focused on identifying 
the strategic implications and developing planning guidance for how to implement 
approaches to counter the fallout.  To address this, the NSC staff developed a proposed 
strategy paper on Yugoslavia for consideration at the September 18, 1991 Deputies 
Committee meeting.  The impetus for this paper was the Croatian request for state 
recognition.  The paper, which provided a recommendation based on analysis of two 
possible options – a recognition strategy and an isolation strategy – highlights a number 
of key concerns within the decision calculus for the Yugoslavian situation more broadly. 
106 
 
 
 First, the strategy paper addresses what was seen at the time as the impulse for 
action: “With the collapse of the latest EC (European Commission)-brokered cease-fire, 
European, Yugoslav, and Congressional attention will turn to us to see what we are 
prepared to do.  This will come at the same time that the level of violence may become 
too much for the U.S. and European publics to act passively” (NSC/DC 1991a, 7).  What 
can we take from this?  There are political pressures -international as well as domestic - 
working in combination.  In this case, the principal concern expressed in the strategy 
paper and in the supporting documents is the spread of violence across the Balkans 
leading to broader destabilizing effect on Europe as a whole (NSC/DC 1991b, 13).  
Absent in the analysis are the merits of supporting the Croats or opposing the Serbs 
generally speaking, detached from the anticipated outcomes.  Instead, the emphasis is on 
what actions – diplomatic, economic, and military – are likely to be required to assist in 
stabilizing the situation if it worsens.  In fact, the strategy paper’s recommendation was 
to adopt a policy of “not recognizing Slovenian or Croatian independence” and to 
“actively discourage others from doing so” (NSC/DC 1991a, 26).  The reason for this is 
because the staff believed recognition would contribute greater instability by fostering 
downstream effects, regardless of its normative appeal (NSC/DC 1991b, 14).         
Understanding what characteristics of a crisis exhibits that place it on the NSC’s 
agenda is important because it speaks to what generates the perceived “intervention 
opportunities” that are the subject of this literature.  In this case, the way the intelligence 
community and the NSC characterized the crisis lends support to those who argue in 
favor of the power of international systemic factors such as concern over the impact on 
allies and whether the magnitude of the conflict will be enough to cause significant 
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repercussions.  The Yugoslavian collapse and the ethnic violence that followed created 
significant demands on both counts.  Yet, Bush decided to stay out of what his 
administration understood to be a complex, civil war.  Looking beyond the call for 
action and into questions of feasibility, we can see the aspects of the situation that gave 
the administration pause. 
Feasibility Assessment 
The most prominent theme in the NSC meeting notes is the concern over the 
drivers of the conflict and, in this case, their intractable nature.  The crisis in Yugoslavia 
centered on ethnic and religious cleavages, precisely the type posited here to appear as 
more infeasible for producing timely desired outcomes.  The NSC/DC notes are replete 
with references to the “historical and ethnic complexities of the region” and their 
propensity to lead to the “worst case outcome – an intensification and widening of the 
conflict” where the “peacekeeping force becomes embroiled in hostilities in its efforts to 
separate Yugoslav combatants” (NSC/DC 1991b, 16).  The staff knew that these 
situational characteristics lent themselves to a “prolonged crisis,” and as a result, they 
stated that “our approach toward Yugoslavia has shown that neither our Government nor 
our public is predisposed to involvement in ethnic-based local conflicts in Europe” 
(NSC/DC 1991c, 6).  This recognition over the challenges posed by ethnic conflict, 
expressed early in the situational analysis, framed the thinking for the decision makers 
throughout the crisis and persisted until the end of the Bush 41 administration.  General 
Colin Powell, the CJCS, argued in the New York Times in favor of selective inaction 
because, “the crisis in Bosnia is especially complex, …one with deep ethnic and religious 
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roots that go back a thousand years” (Powell 1992).  Similarly, President Bush (1992a) 
used this same rationale to explain the administration’s perceived impotence in dealing 
with the crisis in August 1992:  
Now, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is a complex, convoluted 
conflict that grows out of age-old animosities. The blood of innocents is being 
spilled over century-old feuds. The lines between enemies and even friends are 
jumbled and fragmented. Let no one think there is an easy or a simple solution to 
this tragedy. The violence will not end overnight, whatever pressure and means 
the international community brings to bear. Blood feuds are very difficult to 
resolve. Any lasting solution will only be found with the active cooperation and 
participation of the parties themselves. Those who understand the nature of this 
conflict understand that an enduring solution cannot be imposed by force from 
outside on unwilling participants (Emphasis added.). 
 
A second emergent theme from the early NSC meetings pertains to peacekeeping 
forces.  What role would peacekeeping forces play, when would they be employed, and 
what would their composition be (NSC/DC 1991a, 8)?  Perhaps most interesting is that 
the staff only saw a role for peace keeping and not peace enforcement.  The Deputies 
Committee strategy paper’s articulation of what conditions would warrant emplacement 
of a peacekeeping force is telling: “ceasefire and JNA consent” (Ibid.).  The thought of 
putting troops in an intervening position between combatants was not even considered.  
This is consistent with this paper’s operational feasibility factor regarding the preference 
for a leader or supportable regime to be in place at the outset.  Only when an approved 
regime is present (in this case a ceasefire agreement and a permissive posture from the 
would-be adversary) would the administration entertain the introduction of a 
peacekeeping force.     
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The NSC/DC meeting on Yugoslavia that occurred on January 16, 1992 looked 
specifically at the challenges of supporting a potential peacekeeping operation.  
Prominent in the discussion was the recognition that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had 
not received answers to the “operational questions posed at the last DC” and that these 
were needed in order to ascertain the United States’ preparedness in playing “a major 
supportive role in the planning and execution of a UN Peacekeeping operation” (NSC/DC 
1991c, 14).  The discussion that followed in this meeting demonstrated two things: one, 
there were many details missing to support a thorough analysis of the requirements; and 
two, the concerns over the possible trajectory of the violence led them to desire a visible 
but small footprint for U.S. forces if they were to be employed.  On the latter point, the 
staff remarks that “American presence would have considerable value, possibly through a 
visible role in logistical teams or in observer units in bordering states.  Presentation is 
key: we should shape a U.S. role that gets the U.S. prominently involved on the ground 
but short of troop presence” (Ibid. 68).  Candidly conveyed thinking such as this lays 
bare how significant the risk to troops figured into the analysis and possible U.S. 
contributions to a peacekeeping operation.     
Between January and June, two things happened in direct opposition to one 
another.  On one hand, the demand to respond to the crisis increased from both Congress 
and international leaders; on the other, the military was working to fill the knowledge 
gaps associated with the operational questions noted by the JCS above (Gellman 1992).  
The two most challenging aspects of the situation that defense planners noted were 
accessibility to the crisis environment and the structural composition and functionality of 
the JNA opposition.       
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Accessibility was a key concern for any potential peacekeeping mission because 
of the limited availability of nodes to support troop and materiel throughput with the 
closure of the Sarajevo airport.  Those concerns tempered the thinking of the 
administration leadership.  Even while the Senate had passed a non-binding resolution 
directing President Bush to call on the UN to develop a military intervention plan, then 
Secretary of State, James Baker III, was downplaying any notion of a forcible military 
entry.  Why was this?  Because “senior Pentagon officers and defense planners said that 
seizing the airport and distributing relief supplies would be far more complex and costly 
than is generally understood” (Ibid.).  Barton Gellman, conducting interviews with 
defense planners at the time for the Washington Post, writes that key situational 
characteristics were causing the administration to drag their feet: The Sarajevo airport has 
only a single runway, sits in a bowl, is over a mile and a half from the city center, and is 
surrounded by dominating hills holding significant amounts of opposition artillery and 
mortars, much “like Dien Bien Phu” (Gellman 1992).   
Beyond accessibility, the planners expressed concern over the Serb forces 
themselves.  They noted that the Serbs “do not operate under centralized control but 
rather in a loose alliance of roughly 40,000 former federal army troops and up to 50,000 
irregular in Bosnia” (Ibid.).  What does this mean to military estimates for the situation?  
According to General McCaffrey, a spokesman for the JCS at the time, he estimated that 
it would take 60,000 to 120,000 troops to “clear a 20-mile strip around the airport to 
prevent it from being hit by artillery and mortar fire and to deploy troops to guard the 
200-mile land corridor from the Croatian port of Split to Sarajevo” (Gordon 1992).  
Feasibility factors such as these - accessibility and the structure of enemy forces – are 
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precisely the considerations that I argue are most important in ascertaining whether a 
force can be employed efficiently, at acceptable risk, and produce results in a timely 
manner.   
It is one thing to note that these matters are discussed and part of the record 
among those framing the decisions for the president and his advisors.  But the question 
then becomes, do these considerations make their way from the analysts in the Pentagon 
up through the NSC staff structures to those that make the decisions?  The public record 
says, “yes.”  Just two months later in August 1992, when President Bush (1992b) was 
pressed on why the U.S. was not readying the military for the use of force, he responded 
with remarks that clearly display linkages between the NSC analysis and his public 
position.  Table 4.3 provides a few select remarks that demonstrate the point.  
Table 4.3 George H.W. Bush Bosnia Remarks
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Despite the administration’s appraisal of the situation as overly complex and 
holding the potential to become a quagmire, this did not lead them to ignore it.  Rather, it 
impacted the desire to contribute substantively to any military intervention directly, 
limiting the array of options considered.   
Bush (1992a) laid six steps the administration was willing to take to respond to 
these calls for action at a press briefing on August 6, 1992.  These steps ranged from 
diplomatic recognition of the governments of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
to strengthening economic sanctions on Serbia, to placing civilian monitors in adjacent 
states to help prevent spillover effects.  Notably absent in these “six initiatives,” as the 
NSC referred to them, was a clear commitment of U.S. service members into the cross 
fire (NSC Small Group 1992a).   
Bush’s first initiative of the six did call for the passage of a UN Security Council 
resolution authorizing the “international community” to use of force if necessary to 
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief (Bush 1992a).  However, Bush was 
balancing between calling for action and making it clear that it should not be a principally 
U.S. undertaking.  How do we know this?  The administration’s reluctance to commit 
forces to Yugoslavia but strong desire for a role for the UN and coalitions involving the 
post-Cold War application of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were 
explicit in NSC meetings leading up to these statements (NSC/DC 1992a).  Key in those 
discussions was the important but supporting role that the U.S. was anticipated to play in 
any multinational efforts.  An NSC Small Group discussion (1992b) on the subject made 
this point clear: “We need to consider every possible means of American support and 
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contribution – short of committing ground combat troops to Bosnia – to make this 
operation successful” (p. 13).  Viewing Bush’s public statements within the context of 
the meetings that supported the decision-making process illuminates a more hesitant 
stance for the administration instead of the active leadership posture they conveyed 
publicly.  Beyond that, Bush’s rationale to explain any perceived hesitancy in U.S. 
action is directly in line with the analysis expressed by the military planners and in the 
NSC/DC meetings.   
Upon review, Yugoslavia’s dissolution presented strong demand signals for U.S. 
action based on the impact the crisis had on European allies and from nascent norms 
calling for the alleviation of human suffering in high magnitude conflicts.  However, 
these demand signals were muffled by competing concerns over what would be required 
to actually achieve the humanitarian effects given the complex nature of the situation.  In 
fact, all four feasibility factors were aligned in opposition to intervention (see Table 4.4 
below).  The crisis was characterized as complex “blood feud” in which no quick 
solution was likely (Bush 1992a).  In addition, any intervention would be placed in 
between the three antagonists without an agreed upon ceasefire.  Finally, the Serb 
opposition was decentralized and numerous, requiring significant amounts of ground 
troops and thwarting access to the limited ports and logistics nodes required to support 
the operation. 
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Table 4.4 Bush 41 Yugoslavia Intervention Opportunity Feasibility Assessment 
 
Bush not only received these assessments, he put them on the public record in his 
statements on the matter.  The bottom line is that the anticipated costs were too high, and 
a viable military option just was not feasible.  Maybe the strongest indicator in support 
of this contention is the fact that President Bush did not hold an actual NSC principals 
meeting to consider supporting an intervention (See Annex B for NSC meetings).  The 
same is not true of Somalia.     
Somalia – Intervention Demands and Feasibility Assessment 
The Somalian civil war and famine and Yugoslavia’s violent breakup presented 
similar humanitarian demands when considering the magnitude of human suffering.  
Where Somalia differed sharply is in the fact that it was a collapsed state in the Horn of 
Africa, not having immediate impacts on allies, key markets, or geo-political competitors.  
So with arguably less demand, how is it that Somalia becomes an intervention 
opportunity seized upon by Bush 41 in his waning days in office?  The answer to that 
question is rooted in how the mission was framed, and from that, feasibility determined.   
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The discussions within the NSC and military planning staffs demonstrate that the 
administration’s appreciation of the situation in Somalia changes over time.  They 
initially treat the mission as a “quagmire” in the waiting, but a shift occurs in the thinking 
of both the NSC staffers as well as the Joint Staff, treating Somalia as a much more 
reasonable mission accomplishable within a shorter time horizon (Lofland 1992, 57).  
While the demand signal for action plays an important role – the notion in these cases 
that he U.S. should act somewhere (i.e., either Bosnia or Somalia) – it is the difference in 
perceived feasibility that weighs most heavily on where that intervention occurs.   
Initially, planners assumed that if the military ground forces were used, their 
purpose would be to end a civil war and restore order throughout the country (Hirsch and 
Oakley 1996, 37).  However, once a potential intervention has the backing of the 
President and the CJCS as evidenced by the directive to conduct such planning, the 
mission is redefined in a more limited fashion, focusing on the safeguarding of supplies 
to the famine belt (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 41).  This, more restricted appraisal of what 
was being asked from a policy perspective, influenced how the United States viewed the 
conflict broadly, what mission was required, and finally what the opposition to such a 
mission might look like.  As the subsequent analysis demonstrates, the end result is that 
Bush 41 seized the opportunity to use overwhelming military force in a mission that he 
saw as low risk and consistent with his view of the U.S. in a “new world order” (Bush 
1993).  The following section details the decision-making process for Somalia, starting 
with identification of the most operative demands for intervention, then the changes in 
anticipated mission over time, and finally addresses the feasibility concerns associated 
with the settled-upon mission. 
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Intervention Demands 
What was the driving force behind the intervention in Somalia?  Strong 
sentiments tied to the suffering in this crisis seem to be the most compelling demand 
signal for action.  It is clear from the deliberations among the NSC in the months 
preceding the decision that there was very little geopolitics at play, or motivations that 
expressed any U.S. interest at stake other than reputational (NSC/DC 1992).  There was 
a clear sense that something ought to be done and this had everything to do with the 
magnitude of the tragedy.  
The reports coming out of Somalia seemed to produce real anguish for Bush, who 
expressed as much both in public and behind closed doors (Bush 1992b; NSC0065 1992).    
For the President, the Somalian crisis resonated on two levels.  First, Bush 41 appeared 
to internalize the crisis, receiving pressure from those in his State Department, from 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and ultimately criticism for failing to alleviate 
the suffering from UN General Secretary Boutros-Ghali (Western 2002, 135).  These 
pressures coupled with his personal experience in Sudan with his wife in 1985 where they 
witnessed the Sahelian famine firsthand, an episode that he later professed to have 
influenced the decision (Lofland 1992, 60).  Second, with limited time left in his tenure, 
the Bush 41 legacy was in question and the President was outspoken about the leadership 
role he envisaged for the United States in the post-Cold War era (Bush 1993).  Based on 
this, the strongest demands for intervention come from the severe magnitude of the 
conflict and the emerging international norms for alleviating human suffering in such 
crises.  But these factors are consistent with the Bosnian case where Bush 41 chose to sit 
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out.  What was different here?  Much of the difference lies in the manner in which the 
anticipated mission was conceived. 
Presumed Mission – End Civil War 
Unlike the public in early to mid-1991, the Bush 41 administration was not as in 
the dark regarding the situation on the ground in Somalia.  By the time President Bush 
made the final decision in December 1992 to initiate Operation Restore Hope, the NSC 
had held 12 Deputies Committee meetings on Somalia (NSC/DC 1992).  It was during 
this process of NSC staff meetings supported by concurrent operational military analysis 
that the situation was framed and understood.  
Initially, when the unrest in Somalia first surfaced to NSC attention in the Spring 
and early Summer of 1992, the Joint Chiefs painted the picture as bleak, convoluted, and 
argued against any sort of military intervention.  This was based on the assumption that 
the military’s principal mission would be quelling the civil war and restoring order – the 
drivers of the instability that resulted in the famine and violence.  Their arguments for 
nonintervention were based largely on the type of feasibility factors mentioned above 
(e.g. intractable animosities between warring factions, difficulty in distinguishing 
combatants from civilians, and complicating terrain) (Western 2002, 116).  The result 
was a unified Pentagon position that an intervention would be ill-advised given the 
unenviable mission of ending a civil war. 
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Mission Change – Airlift 
However, the situation continued to deteriorate over the course of the summer, 
increasing the demand for action.  The interagency community deliberated on what to 
recommend in response to pleas for assistance – at this point mostly emanating from the 
State Department and NGOs involved in relief efforts – but they did not arrive at a 
consensus (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 38-39).  The breakthrough came with a similar 
concern for the use of force in support of a humanitarian mission elsewhere: Operation 
Provide Comfort, initiated to provide support to the Kurds in Northern Iraq and 
sanctioned by the UN Security Council.  With this recent case providing precedent, Bush 
ordered a similar level of limited support (i.e., airlift) to the Somalia famine on August 14 
with the decision to begin Operation Provide Relief (Ibid.).  This mission was clearly 
more feasible, only requiring the use of logistics assets without the risk of combat.   
Once on board with the humanitarian mission, even in the limited role undertaken 
with Operation Provide Relief, the challenges posed by warring clans for the NGOs and 
the airlift campaign supporting them took on greater importance.  The United States was 
committed to some semblance of success on the ground at that point.  Unfortunately, 
growing violence and starvation began to demonstrate that the indirect approach was 
likely untenable.  This, along with media attention and congressional pressure, increased 
the call for action.  As a result, CJCS Colin Powell requested that the Department of 
Defense develop options for a more robust military intervention, if one were to be 
required to achieve the policy goals (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 42).  From Central 
Command (CENTCOM)’s perspective, the military combatant command conducting the 
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planning, this directive served to provide an opportunity to re-scope the mission yet 
again.  No longer were they framing their mission as a full-scale civil-war intervention, 
nor was it a limited airlift operation; instead, it was the more refined problem of securing 
aid delivery (Hoar 1993). 
Mission Change – Secure Humanitarian Aid Delivery 
Military planning along these lines facilitated the higher-level analysis at the 
NSC/DC meetings leading up to the decision.  There were nine such meetings held 
between November 20 and December 3, 1992.  Don Oberdorfer (1992), reporting for the 
Washington Post at the time and citing sources at the meeting, said the November 21, 
Deputies Committee meeting “was the turning point in the deliberations that led to 
President Bush's order…to send thousands of American troops to Somalia.”  In that 
meeting, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(VCJCS) announced to stunned attendees that the “deployment of U.S. ground troops 
could end the violence in Somalia and see that its people were fed within a short period” 
(Ibid.).  The military had scoped the mission to such a degree that it was focused on 
securing key distribution sites to stop the famine and held the assumption that a follow-on 
UN force would be able to relieve them in short order (Hoar 1993, 62).   
Even with this limited mission and its accompanying newfound optimism, there 
was growing concern among those influencing the decision (Powell and Cheney in 
particular) that the operation may hold more dangers than were being conveyed 
(Oberdorfer 1992).  The subsequent NSC/DC meetings (November 23 and 24) addressed 
this concern and teased out the various options available to follow through on the 
120 
 
 
Admiral Jeremiah’s assertion that the military could do the job.  Ultimately, Bush 41 
was presented with three options: “1) U.S. air-power and sea-power in support of a 
strengthened UN force; 2) limited U.S. military intervention as a prelude to an expanded 
UN force; and 3) insertion of a U.S. division, plus allies, under UN auspices. To the 
surprise of the committee, which had formed a consensus around the second option, Bush 
selected the third, most aggressive approach” (Fox 2001, 149).   This was in keeping 
with the so-called “Weinberger-Powell Doctrine,” deploying overwhelming force in an 
attempt to achieve clearly defined objectives (here, the securing of aid workers and 
delivery of relief supplies) as rapidly as possible (Campbell 1998). 
In short, from the position of the administration evaluating the crisis, over the 
course of just a few months, the famine in Somalia went from presenting a hopeless case 
to a very “doable” mission.  The increasing intensity of the crisis, along with a precedent 
set in Iraq for supporting a humanitarian mission without ground troops, led to a small 
U.S. commitment to assist in the delivery of aid.  However, the situation on the ground 
proved too much for that same approach to work and if success were to be secured, it 
would require boots on the ground.  The commitment of those troops had everything to 
do with the reframing of the mission they would be conducting.  As a result of the more 
limited mission, the perceived feasibility of the operation was significantly altered.   
Seeing the progression of the decision calculus and how it concluded, it is now 
easier to see how Bush 41 viewed the feasibility factors for Operation Restore Hope.  
The remainder of this section analyzes the records of this decision-making process to 
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determine the degree to which feasibility factors were considered in the intervention 
decision.  As demonstrated below, feasibility was very much at the forefront. 
Feasibility Assessment – Secure Humanitarian Aid Delivery 
In the final NSC meeting before the decision (December 3, 1992), the president 
and his NSC principals met immediately following Bush 41’s military briefing where he 
had selected the third option.  The thrust of the President’s concerns at this meeting, the 
only one on record of the Bush 41 discussing Somalia with his NSC principals, are on the 
possible intervention’s legality and funding.  These two issues are subsequent to the 
determination of whether the mission can be done; he had already committed to the 
mission in concept following the military briefing, of which there are no notes.  
However, the minutes from the NSC meeting provide a clear impression of how Bush 41 
and his team had conceived of the intervention and how they anticipated it to unfold. 
In the December 3, 1992 NSC meeting, Bush 41 demonstrated how he viewed the 
conflict and what the U.S. was prepared to do.  First, in Figure 4.1 below, Bush 41 notes 
that “there could be 28-30,000 troops involved for an unknown period of time, although I 
expect that within 40 days troops can start coming out” (NSC 0065 1992, 1).   
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Figure 4.1 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 1 
In a later exchange (see Figure 4.2 below) Bush 41 asks Secretary of State 
Eagleburger, “If the operation, goes smoothly, why will we need many peacekeepers” 
(NSC 0065 1992, 4)?  These comments make plain that Bush 41 viewed this as a very 
limited mission focused on relief delivery, rather than on restoring order to a country 
suffering a civil war.  Even if history were to prove this as misconceived or naïve, the 
president saw this U.S.-led, multinational action with a limited mandate, both in scope as 
well as time.  This means that Bush 41 saw the type of conflict as largely irrelevant, and 
therefore advantageous, because they did not intend to weigh into it themselves.  In 
addition, while at the point of decision the UNSCR 794 had not passed, Bush 41’s team 
worked to get it passed prior to announcing the mission publicly (Bush 1992).   
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Figure 4.2 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 4  
Next, how had Bush 41 anticipated the enemy likely to oppose the U.S. forces?  
Under a standard military planning model, enemy actions are anticipated and planned 
against for both the most anticipated and worst-case scenarios (Joint Staff 2017).  In this 
case, it seems as though the most likely scenario was allowed to dominate the thinking.  
As General Hoar, the CENTCOM commander at the time noted, “Great care was taken to 
develop an approved, well-defined mission with attainable, measurable objectives prior to 
the operation commencing.  Disarmament was excluded from the mission because it was 
neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a 
secure environment for relief operations” (Hoar 1993, 58).  Why was the requirement for 
disarmament omitted or significant combat unexpected?  Because they assumed that 
rapid, overwhelming force would quell the violence and there would be little resistance.  
After all, they were not dealing with an actual “enemy;” instead the warring clansmen 
were viewed merely as “brigands” (NSC0065 1992).  This is a sentiment echoed up to 
the highest levels.  Bush 41 captures the thinking quite succinctly in the NSC meeting 
where he stated that the mission would “provide relief in a benign setting.  We may have 
to kill some people, but I do not expect any major resistance.  Right Colin [Powell]” 
(NSC0065 1992)?  From the President’s perspective, the feasibility consideration for 
124 
 
 
enemy composition was clear: the enemy was largely nonexistent and unlikely to 
interfere with delivery of aid given the arrival of prodigious U.S. forces.   
Lastly, I address the question of accessibility.  Here too we see a shift in how the 
facts of the situation are interpreted over time.  Initially, Somalia was seen to present 
significant challenges, operationally as well as logistically.  General Hoar remarked that 
“deploying to Somalia was like going to the moon” (Hoar 1993, 60).  In the CENTCOM 
commander’s retelling of the operation’s planning and execution, he was careful to note 
all of the challenges that had to be overcome, ranging from the extensive air-bridge that 
had to be established, the limitations of the harbor at Mogadishu, and the generally 
austere conditions that required enormous efforts on the part of engineers (Ibid.).  Yet, 
just because the problem presents difficulties or great expense does not make it 
infeasible.  Every decision is contextual.  
In this case, competing crises played a key role.  There was a sense that an action 
was going to take place, either in support of the humanitarian mission in Bosnia or in 
Somalia.  The Pentagon began to compare the two situations and look at them as an 
either-or proposition (Western 2002, 138).  With that, the Somalia problem appeared in a 
different light.  As Lofland (1992) notes from her interviews with staff members, “The 
brass began to believe Somalia was ‘doable’ on the ground and much less risky than 
Bosnia.  The terrain in Somalia was relatively flat, unlike Bosnia, where thick woods and 
mountains would cause new challenges” (p. 59).  In addition, the military could explore 
other options to support operations in Somalia that were sea-based, increasing 
accessibility without procuring additional infrastructure on the ground (Ohls 2009).   
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When compared to the Bosnia problem set, Somalia, for all its challenges, was 
clearly the simpler of the two (see Table 4.5 below).  In every feasibility factor category 
Somalia scored more positively, to include the supportable regime.  Even though neither 
crisis had a ceasefire or government to support, active opposition was not anticipated in 
Somalia, making even that category more favorable.  Given this, Bush 41, if compelled 
to intervene and demonstrate U.S. leadership in meeting humanitarian challenges, would 
clearly have viewed Somalia’s accessibility in a fairer light than Bosnia. 
Table 4.5 Bush 41 Intervention Opportunities Feasibility Assessment Comparison 
 
Part V: Comparison and Conclusion – Why Somalia and not Bosnia? 
The comparison of these two cases accomplishes a number of useful outcomes.  
First, the findings reinforce the previous chapter’s results where specific combinations of 
conditions are tied to respective intervention and nonintervention decisions.  Here, again, 
we see that demand signals for action need to be combined with advantageous feasibility 
factors for an intervention to occur.  This might seem overly obvious, but it is clearly an 
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underappreciated attribute of these situations based on a body of literature puzzled by 
inconsistent intervention outcomes.   
Second, we gain a better understanding of how the types of demand signal can 
influence the decisions.  These two cases were similar on their calls for action.  Both 
crises were of significant magnitude regarding deaths, refugees, and internally displaced 
persons.  Both were championed by international bodies as calamities warranting 
intervention citing the application of international norms.  The differences between the 
two were in favor of the Bosnian side of the ledger, with increased incentives from both 
media coverage and ties to significant allies and markets.  In this respect, the comparison 
adds some weight to those who argue on behalf of those determinants in common.  That 
said, it clearly shows that demand alone, no matter how strong, is not enough. 
Third, the comparison demonstrates how powerful differences in feasibility 
interpretations influence the decision.  These two cases varied greatly in how the 
administration viewed the type of conflict where the interventions would occur, whether 
there was an established regime to support, the composition and organization of the 
enemy, and the operating environment’s accessibility.  Not only did they differ on these 
counts, more importantly, these factors were candidly discussed among those influencing 
the decision.  The explication of how and at what point in the process these feasibility 
considerations were taken into account helps us better understand the “subjective” realm 
of expectations of success and the military’s role in shaping that notion that scholars like 
Western (2002) have labored to understand.   
Finally, the Somalia case’s shifting conceptions of mission requirements provided 
a valuable opportunity to assess how changing key aspects of the situation affect the 
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intervention outcome.  In this case, certainly there are those that can argue that media 
coverage of the atrocities increased over the months, along with associated political 
pressure from domestic and international audiences.  However, when we look at the 
discourse within the national security community, we see a much more important shift – 
the anticipated mission being used to assess operational feasibility.  As the mission 
changed, so did the feasibility, making Bush 41 more confident in a lower risk 
deployment of troops with a higher probability of success.   
The next chapter expands on the implication of changes in perceived feasibility 
over time.  Will cases that seemed too complex at the outset become ripe for 
intervention, or will interventions once undertaken become withdrawals once the 
appreciation of the situation shifts, and along with it, these same feasibility factors?  If 
so, greater weight will be added to the explanatory power of operational feasibility in 
explaining intervention decisions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
WILLIAM J. CLINTON INTERVENTION DECISIONS:  
SOMALIA AND BOSNIA 
 
This chapter expands on the theoretical application of feasibility factor analysis in 
understanding intervention decisions.  The previous chapters emphasized conditions at 
crisis onset, or near to it, and how they may have influenced the decision to intervene or 
not.  This analysis explores how presidential intervention decisions are affected by 
changes in the crisis environment over time, specifically focusing on the feasibility 
factors illuminated in the work heretofore.   
The Somalia case from Chapter 4 demonstrated that intervention may appear to be 
infeasible at one point, but subsequently changes based on different assessments of the 
situation.  In the George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) Somalia case, this stemmed from changes 
in how the mission was conceived based on different policy expectations, which 
themselves were tied to different sorts of demands (e.g., growing magnitude of the 
conflict and increased media coverage).  Ultimately, Bush 41 chose not to undertake the 
mission until the military provided realistic options based on policy goals that were 
amended to become more tenable.  What once was a likely quagmire becomes a 
probable success.  The same did not hold true for Bosnia, which like Somalia had 
increased pressure from both international and domestic audiences, emitting significant 
demands for action.  However, no reasonable policy goal with a feasible military option 
emerged, and therefore no intervention occurred. 
This chapter looks at whether decisional shifts like we saw in Somalia under Bush 
41 hold true in other cases based on the same changes in feasibility factors.  Specifically, 
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does it go the other way?  Does a case where a president decided not to intervene later 
become an intervention, and if so, what factors changed?  Alternatively, does a case 
where a president intervened become a withdrawal when those same factors shift in the 
opposite direction?  If they do, this adds explanatory weight to the notion that feasibility 
factor analysis is a central component to understanding presidential intervention 
behavior. 
In answering these questions, this chapter focuses on the same two crises from the 
previous chapter, Somalia and Bosnia, but in the period immediately following: the 
William (Bill) Clinton presidential decision space.  As depicted above, the Bush 41 
administration determined previously that one crisis was overly complex and unlikely to 
be improved by the introduction of military force (Bosnia), while the other was limited in 
scope, low in risk, and capable of rapidly achieving the mission goals (Somalia).  
Clinton reverses positions on both of these crises, precipitously withdrawing from 
Somalia before mission objectives were accomplished, and committing ground troops as 
part of a United Nations (UN) force in Bosnia.     
 This analysis finds that as the operational feasibility factors change, so too does 
the intervention decision.  In Somalia, the mission becomes more complex over time and 
draws more capable armed resistance than originally anticipated.  The cost of success 
and timeline to achieve it for Clinton becomes untenable.  Likewise, the Bosnian Civil 
War emits extraordinary demands for U.S. support through domestic politics, the UN, 
and later NATO, but Clinton balks…until the Dayton Accords provide a regime to 
support and lower the risks and expected duration for a U.S. troop deployment.  In both 
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cases the evidence strongly supports the contention that operational feasibility factors are 
a powerful tool in helping to understand presidential decision making. 
 The chapter is broken into five parts.  Part I describes the theory and method 
behind the analysis.  Part II provides a background to these crises from the perspective 
of the Clinton administration.  Parts III and IV address the Somalia and Bosnia crises 
respectively, covering two sections for each case: first, I provide a chronological 
overview of the crisis to illuminate key events that influence the president’s decisions 
space over time; and second, based on that changing environment, I explore how the 
presidents’ feasibility assessments change as a result.  Part V compares the cases and 
concludes.   
Part I: Theory and Method 
Theory 
 The theory in this chapter remains unchanged from the previous: operational 
feasibility affects military intervention decisions.  The last two chapters tested and 
illustrated this point.  This chapter pushes the causal illustration further by exploring if 
these same feasibility factors are useful in understanding reversal decisions: withdrawals 
or later interventions under different circumstances.  Think of feasibility factors as 
switches that are either “on” in favor of an intervention, or “off” for nonintervention.  
This chapter looks at what happens once those switches are flipped in the opposite 
direction as a crisis unfolds.   
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The insight behind this application of the theory is rooted in the epistemological 
observation regarding the causes of conflict and peace by the renowned author, Geoffrey 
Blainey; as he noted in Causes of War (1988, 293), 
War and peace are more than opposites.  They have so much in common 
that neither can be understood without the other.  War and peace appear to 
share the same framework of causes.  The same set of factors should 
appear in explanations of the outbreak of war…and the ending of peace. 
Blainey argued that the elements of the decisional context that lead one to be confident of 
success and therefore increase commitment when they are present are the same ones that 
give pause when found in absence.  Blainey’s insights can easily be extend to military 
interventions and the theory I propose, since this analysis is addressing these very same 
considerations, namely the risks associated with being unable to achieve a desired 
outcome by using force.  The differences are in degree rather than kind when 
considering limited military intervention instead of full-scale war.  Here, we are looking 
at the same type of factors – those increasing the probability of success within a given 
time horizon at acceptable risk – but suited to interventions that likely have lesser 
thresholds for risk and time commitment based on limited policy goals.   
 That being the case, we expect the following logic to hold true:  factors that help 
explain why presidents commit forces to the fray should also cause them to withdraw 
those forces when those conditions change in ways that are no longer supportive of 
intervention.   Likewise, when factors that arguably dissuade an intervention change, 
they should then persuade action.  This, of course, assumes a certain consistency in 
demand signal.  With that, case selection to minimize variance on these scores is 
essential.    
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Method 
This chapter, like the last, uses the “comparative historical method” to compare 
two interventions that occur in similar time periods under the same administration 
(Skocpol 1979; Moore 1993).  In this comparison, I again look at Somalia and Bosnia, 
but in the Clinton presidency.  As National Security Advisor at the time, Tony Lake 
explained in an interview with PBS in 2001, these were the two most important 
intervention considerations during President Clinton’s first term: the Somalia intervention 
already underway upon Clinton’s arrival in the White House and growing in importance 
as things trended downward; and Bosnia as a forefront issue based on Clinton making it 
an election issue during the campaign.   
Selecting these two cases for comparison has a couple of benefits.  First, by 
viewing this chapter as a continuation of the last, it is a longitudinal comparison since it 
compares the same crisis environments.  As a result, I hold certain things somewhat 
constant over the two administrations, such as the strategic importance of the crisis state, 
economic ties, and ally interests.  Second, in this chapter as in the last, by examining two 
crises that are occurring concurrently for a single administration, many other 
unintentionally omitted or unobserved factors are able to be held constant.   
However, what is gained in maximizing consistency through this case selection 
(e.g., minimizing effects from geostrategic shifts over time or crisis state characteristics) 
also serves to limit the broader applicability of the findings.  To mitigate these concerns, 
I employ a combination of “process tracing” and “congruence method” focusing 
primarily on the operational feasibility factors identified in the Qualitative Comparative 
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Analysis (QCA) and in the Bush 41 comparative case study (Van Evera 1997; Bennett 
and George 2005).  The coupling of process tracing with the congruence method allows 
for a deeper dive to ensure that the presence or absence of a feasibility factor is more than 
just a coincidence, that it is actually part of the considerations among those shaping the 
decision for the president.  The aim is to demonstrate how variance in feasibility factors 
over the course of each crisis contributes to the policy reversal decisions to withdraw 
from Somalia and commit ground forces to Bosnia.   
The operational feasibility factors referenced above refer to the elements of the 
crisis situation that pose challenges to the military force’s potential efficacy.  These 
factors elucidate the types of concerns that are at the heart of what other authors have 
hinted at with “expectations of success” or short expected time commitments (e.g., Regan 
2002, 40).  The previous chapters have lent support for the theoretical proposition put 
forward here that the presence of some conditions have a high degree of consistency with 
intervention outcomes, while their opposite holds true for nonintervention outcomes.  In 
this study, I explore what happens as they shift over time within an administration.  Does 
the policy change to match the shift in feasibility, or not? 
There are four feasibility factors this study will use based on their explanatory 
power in the previous chapters.  First, what type of conflict is it?  Is it ethnic or 
religiously based, and therefore likely intractable?  Or, is it based on material or political 
desires where middle ground may be found?  The former is infeasible while the latter is 
less so.  Second, is there a clear leader or regime to support (including situations where 
there has already been a brokered ceasefire)?  If so, then feasibility increases.  If not, 
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and the intervention requires the separation of multiple factions, some of whom oppose 
the intervention, then feasibility decreases.  Third, what is the structure of the enemy or 
adversary for the U.S. force?  Is it hierarchical and susceptible to strike, opening up the 
potential for quick conflict termination?  Or, is the enemy diffuse and nebulous?  If the 
latter, quick strike options prove difficult and more time and boots on the ground are 
likely required.  Finally, how accessible is the crisis environment?  Does it pose 
significant logistical challenges such as limited port infrastructure or vulnerable road 
networks?  Considerations such as these can make force deployment and sustainment 
much costlier, or in cases where infrastructure does not exist, near impossible.  These are 
the four feasibility factors that will be contrasted between Bush 41’s initial decision and 
Clinton’s final decision in Part’s III and IV.    
The time period for the analyses are not identical but are overlapping.  The 
Somalia decision space goes from the Clinton inauguration in January 1993 until his 
decision to withdraw troops in his address to the nation on October 7th of the same year.  
The Bosnian decision space begins with the inauguration but goes until November 27, 
1995 when Clinton announces the pending deployment of U.S. troops.  The next part 
provides a broad overview of these crises leading up to the Clinton presidency. 
Part II: Background to Crises 
 Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in 1993 at an inflection point in American 
foreign policy.  The Cold War had just ended with the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
previous administration had only scratched the surface on articulating the role the United 
States would play on the global stage moving forward.  Clinton did not campaign as an 
international adventurist, instead focusing on domestic politics and the economy.  
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However, his foreign policy advisors had differing designs and promoted the idea of 
“Assertive Multilateralism” in which the U.S. would assume a leadership role in 
interventions taken on by multilateral institutions aimed at alleviating suffering and 
injustice, often against the rules of the old order based on independent sovereignty (Boys 
2012).    
 As Clinton took the leadership reins, two crises were prominent.  First, Somalia, 
an intervention already underway, was endorsed by Clinton via consultation with Bush 
41 prior to assuming office (Wines 1992).  In this sense, while it was inherited, Clinton 
was part of the decision-making process that led to Bush 41’s decision to go into Somalia 
and the Clinton foreign policy team supported the mission.  By the time the 
administration had formed, the Somalia mission, Operation Restore Hope, was in mid-
stride and seemingly going well.  The mission sought to enforce UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 794 (3 December 1992), charged with providing “a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”  This multinational, UN-
sanctioned mission was in response to the international outcry to alleviate the suffering 
due to famine and violence that emerged in Somalia as a byproduct of the overthrow of 
President Siad Barre.  In the warlord-centric struggle for power that ensued, suffering 
increased greatly for the Somali public.  Reports coming out of Somalia indicated that 
there were potentially 4.5 million Somalis in danger of starvation in the months leading 
up to the intervention, with over 40,000 killed in the capital of Mogadishu, and over 
200,000 displaced persons (Human Rights Watch 1992).  Somalia was to be the test case 
for whether the international community could mobilize under its most esteemed 
institution at its own behest to end an atrocity.       
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Second, Bosnia was the administration’s primary concern.  While Clinton had 
tacitly supported Somalia, he openly campaigned on a stronger stance regarding Bosnia 
and doing more to deal with the ongoing atrocities in the former Yugoslavian states (Lake 
2001).  What began as secessionist movements on the part of Croatia and Slovenia in 
1991 in the wake of waning Soviet influence, had become full scale civil war by the early 
days of the Clinton administration.  The former Yugoslavia was comprised of six 
separate republics, primarily split along historical and ethnic lines.  Serbs, Croats, and 
Muslims were interspersed among these states and in the vacuum that formed following 
the collapse of the Yugoslav state, and competing goals among them emerged.  Croats 
and Muslims envisaged independent states and moved to consolidate along status quo 
lines; while Serbs sought to retain a Serbian state that redrew the lines to consolidate 
ethnic Serbs.  These political disagreements transformed into full scale atrocity as the 
Serbs set out to impose their will and were met with resistance.   
Bosnia voted for independence as well in March 1992, a vote boycotted by the 
Serb population.  Following recognition by the European Union in April, the Serbs 
moved to take the country by force under Radovan Karadzic.  War broke out among all 
parties, first between the Muslims and Croats aligned against the Serbs, and later between 
the Muslims and Croats themselves.  The scale of suffering was startling.  The 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated casualties from April 
1992 to July 1993 at approximately 169,100 dead, including civilians and soldiers, and 
over 1,150,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (Tabeau and Bijak 2003, 6-18).  
Here too, the UN organized to respond, deploying the UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) to secure safe havens, first in Croatia, and then expanded into Bosnia in 
137 
 
 
Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde (Reuters 2008).  It was this chaotic landscape that the 
Bush 41 administration observed as too complex and riddled with age-old animosities to 
warrant a commitment of U.S. forces to stop the killing (Bush 1992).    
This was the backdrop for these two crises as the Clinton White House assumed 
leadership in January 1993.  Parts III and IV that follow provide a chronological 
overview and feasibility factor assessment for each situation during the Clinton decision 
space, starting with Somalia.  
Part III: Somalia 
Chronological Overview 
The UN-sanctioned mission to Somalia beginning in 1992 aspired to alleviate the 
suffering of millions of people in a country ruptured by civil war and drought.  This 
mission fulfilled the desire of a nascent international conscience that sought to rewrite the 
rules on when, where, and by whom force should be applied to pursue humanitarian 
goals.  The United States, starting with the Bush 41 administration and carrying on into 
the Clinton presidency, was eager to lead this charge.  This mission, a test bed for such 
action for the international community, proved to be much more challenging than it was 
originally conceived.  Ultimately what was intended to set a precedent for UN-led 
humanitarian causes became a cautionary tale for this type of mission, at least from a 
U.S. perspective.  In many respects the shadow of Somalia cast a shadow over 
subsequent humanitarian missions in the same way that the Vietnam experience in the 
1960s and 1970s suppressed military adventurism more broadly in the decades that 
followed.   
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This section details the evolution of the mission in Somalia, explaining how a 
mission that was universally supported in the beginning became a vastly different 
problem, one from which the Clinton administration desperately tried to extricate itself 
less than a year later.  The mission in Somalia underwent five different transformations, 
shifting from (1) ending a civil war, to (2) limited humanitarian aid delivery, to (3) 
nation-building, to (4) offensive targeting, and finally back a focus on (5) aid delivery 
and withdrawal.  Appreciating the mission’s evolution, and along with it notions of 
operational feasibility, are key to understanding the president’s decision to withdraw 
from Somalia before all of the UN-directed goals were achieved.  
Mission 1: End Civil War   
As originally conceived, the intervention would be expected to squelch a civil 
war, and consequently no U.S. mission was implemented (Western 2002, 116).  The 
Joint Staff framed the mission in the extreme, not based on policy guidance from the 
White House, but on an understanding of the Somalian environment following Barre’s 
departure.  They assumed that if order were to be restored it would require not only a 
significant military intervention, but also a political solution to arrest the disintegration of 
the country (Ibid., 117).  This anticipated mission would change with a desire to do 
something, albeit with lower risk tolerance, as reports of starvation increased over the 
course of 1992. 
Mission 2: Humanitarian Aid Delivery 
Months of deliberation between early 1991 to the fall of 1992 on the part of the 
NSC and Joint Staffs, supported by military planning conducted by U.S. Central 
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Command (CENTCOM), redefined what success looked like, and thereby what was 
required to achieve it (Hoar 1993).  Reimagining the mission became a necessity as 
pressures grew for humanitarian action from both domestic and international audiences 
with the twin crises of Somalia and Bosnia (Lofland 1992).  Ultimately, the Bush 
administration was able to influence the UNSCR to restrict its mandate to providing a 
secure environment for the purposes of delivering humanitarian aid relief (UNSCR 794 
1992).  It was this narrowly focused mission that George H.W. Bush agreed to execute 
on December 3, 1992 (NSC 0065 1992).  In his small group NSC meeting, Bush 41 
anticipated little, if any resistance, minimal violence, and to have the mission completed 
within 40 days (Ibid., 1).  This is the mission as envisioned when launched in the waning 
days of the Bush 41 administration. 
This limited mission is the problem set that Admiral David E. Jeremiah, the Vice 
VCJCS said could be accomplished with the deployment of U.S. ground troops at the 
November 21, 1992 NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (Oberdorfer 1992).  This is 
important, because it was a complete reframing of the problem by the Pentagon.   
Mission 3: Nation-Building 
President Clinton inherited the humanitarian aid mission with its more than 
25,000 deployed troops upon assuming office in January 1993.  The limitations on the 
mission as conceived by Bush 41 were not to last, however.  Clinton named Madeleine 
Albright as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who proposed a new policy - what 
she called “Assertive Multilateralism.” Although a tactic more than a goal, Assertive 
Multilateralism focused on the U.S. leading coalitions in curing global ills (Boys 2012, 
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2).  Albright’s designs on broadening the mission in Somalia beyond securing the 
delivery of aid were echoed by key members of Clinton’s national security advisory 
team, including Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger.  The ideological predisposition within 
the administration for more expansive humanitarian goals found like minds in the UN as 
well.  As a result, the mission expanded, as evidenced by UNSCR 814 (26 March 1993). 
Table 5.1 UNSCR 814 Mission Excerpt 
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The aims expressed in blue italics in Table 5.1 above altered the mission significantly.  
The shift occurred in a period after the initial mission was met with relative success in 
terms of immediate relief of suffering.  But with success, came expanded goals.  It was 
clear that the root causes of the suffering were not going to be addressed simply by 
delivering aid.  The challenges for Somalia were institutional and systemic, requiring a 
full “nation-building” effort (UNSCR 865 1993).   
 The Clinton administration was fully behind this shift in the UN mission.  This is 
clear through the words of Ambassador Albright’s characterization of the change: “"With 
this resolution [UNSCR 814], we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at 
nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable 
member of the community of nations” (as quoted in Preston 1993).  With these changes 
came the broad recognition that the mission was not going to be accomplished within the 
same time horizon.  What was not accounted for was the increased difficulty in pursuing 
such goals. 
 Trying to orchestrate the efforts of over 28 troop contributing countries and staff 
members from over 70 nations in a single command structure proved extraordinarily 
difficult to manage (Clinton Library 1993a).  The administration openly acknowledged 
these challenges throughout the summer of 1993, being forced to account for longer than 
expected deployments and little progress as domestic political grumblings began to 
mount (Clinton Library 1993b).  These challenges were not anticipated by the 
administration and as a result, they appeared to be always reacting and underperforming.  
Clinton’s political opponents turned the handling of Somalia into a key issue, remarking 
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that, “under Clinton, U.S. foreign policy [was] marked by inconsistency, incoherence, 
lack of purpose, and a reluctance to lead” (Boys 2012, 10).  Criticism was not limited to 
Republicans.  Even members of the Clinton’s own party were reluctant to get on board 
with the expanded mission, calling into question presidential authorities under the War 
Powers Act (Clinton Library 1993b).  The mission was becoming unwieldly on the 
ground from an organizational standpoint, and a political liability on the home front with 
pushback from both sides of the political aisle.   
 Mission 4: Offensive Targeting 
 Pushback on the mission not only occurred at home in the U.S. as time wore on, 
in Somalia the warlords and their militias more aggressively opposed UN forces on the 
ground.  On June 5, 1993, Somali militiamen under General Mohammed Farah Aideed 
attacked Pakistani UN peacekeepers, killing 23.  This incident led directly to the UN 
again modifying the mandate, this time targeting Aideed and those responsible for the 
attack (Bolton 1994, 63).  UNSCR 837 (6 June 1993) authorized UNOSOM II (the force 
charged with this second phase of the Somalia intervention) to investigate, arrest, and to 
detain those conducting attacks against the UN forces for subsequent prosecution, trial, 
and punishment.   
 The expansion of the mission under UNOSOM II was supposed to coincide with a 
reduction of U.S. forces, shifting to a more multinational face but with the U.S. providing 
logistic and enabling support (Hoar 1993, 63).  However, with the need to actively target 
Aideed and other militia opposing UN efforts, the residual U.S. forces would continue to 
play key roles, even if reduced in number.  These residual forces included the types of 
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capabilities required to identify and pursue targets in accordance with the new policy: 
intelligence, air mobility, quick reaction infantry, and special forces.  What marks these 
as unique when compared to the other elements is their propensity for combat.  Their 
mission set within the broader nation-building effort was much more focused on 
offensive action.  With that came greater risk.     
 Aideed and his militia proved more problematic to target and dangerous than the 
U.S. had imagined.  On September 25, 1993 three U.S. soldiers were killed when a 
Black Hawk helicopter was shot down.  Immediately following this incident, political 
pressures increased with Congress passing a nonbinding resolution for the President to 
seek approval for U.S. forces to stay in Somalia by November 15 (Hirsch and Oakley 
1995, 127).  Clinton made his case for the continuance of the mission, not to Congress, 
but to the UN on September 27 to the General Assembly, attempting to outline more 
clearly what the actual peacekeeping policies were (Bolton 1994, 65).  However, the 
resolve would not last long. 
 On October 3, 1993 the U.S. Rangers led a raid to capture Aideed at the Olympia 
Hotel in downtown Mogadishu.  Resistance was greater than expected and the mission 
went awry when another Black Hawk was shot down and the Rangers became pinned 
down in the city.  This necessitated the launch of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and 
additional UNOSOM forces into the bloody fight that became known as the Battle of 
Mogadishu.  The result was 18 dead, 78 and wounded and one hostage among U.S. 
soldiers; and between 500 and 1,000 Somali casualties (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 127).  
Media coverage amplified the effects of the devastation by broadcasting the dragging of 
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an American soldier’s desecrated body through cheering throngs along the Mogadishu 
streets.    
 Mission 5: Back to Humanitarian Aid Delivery 
 How did Clinton react?  National Security Advisor Tony Lake (2001) recounted 
that Clinton did not make an immediate decision but was instead interested in the views 
of Congress and his advisors.  Senior members of the Senate were pushing to get out 
within a week or two while those close to the president were urging not to back out, 
worried that it would set a precedent that said, “you kill Americans, America withdraws 
from that situation,” effectively “putting a bullseye on every American around the world” 
(Ibid.).  Clinton chose to do the former while appearing to do the latter. 
 On October 6, just three days after the initial attack, Clinton convened a meeting 
with key officials to select a withdrawal date and ordered General Hoar to halt attempts 
to pursue Aideed or other Somalis and to only act in self-defense (Hirsch and Oakley 
1995, 128).  The next day, October 7, Clinton (1993) formerly addressed the nation, but 
cast the withdrawal in a way that appeared to be a doubling down – sending over 
additional forces (quick response forces with additional armor protection) – but in pursuit 
of a more narrowly defined mission.  
 President Clinton (1993) reversed the administration’s previous position and now 
held that it was “not our job to rebuild Somalia’s society or even to create a political 
process that can allow Somalia’s clans to live and work in peace.  Somalis must do that 
for themselves.”  Acknowledging this, Clinton reframed the mission in terms very close 
to the original mandate, as can be seen in Table 5.2 below. 
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Table 5.2 President Clinton Address to the Nation on Somalia Excerpt 
 
The humanitarian relief mission that took a turn toward nation-building as Clinton’s team 
took charge, and then took on a more offensive tone in light of increased resistance, had 
now returned to its original form.   
 Both in the presidential address, and subsequently in correspondence to Congress, 
President Clinton recommitted the U.S. to a limited and short duration mission 
undertaken with the addition of 1,700 Army personnel and 104 armored vehicles, along 
with 3,600 Marines stationed offshore (Clinton 1993; Clinton Library 1994).  The 
addition of combat capability in the short term created the impression of doing more, but 
clearly the newly arriving forces were more focused on facilitating the safe withdrawal of 
U.S. troops than on supporting the mission more broadly.  Clinton (1993) made his main 
point clear: “All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st, 
except for a few hundred support personnel in noncombat roles.”  
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 In total, once committed to the intervention, the U.S. role in Somalia took on four 
different missions over the course of nine months: securing the delivery of aid; nation-
building; and targeting of militia leaders; and finally, a return to restricted humanitarian 
relief.  The last conception of the U.S. role was quickly deemed a success and paired 
with a precipitous withdrawal.  What was it that caused the change?  Was it political 
pressures?  No, both Republicans and Democrats had been openly questioning the 
continued presence in Somalia since March (Clinton Library 1993b; Boys 2012).  Was it 
the so-called “CNN effect” associated with a humiliating loss to a militia and unexpected 
U.S. casualties?  If that was the case, Clinton would have not attempted to make the case 
for perseverance at the UN General Assembly in light of the September 25, 1993 loss of 
three soldiers in the helicopter ambush.  As established in the preceding chapters, we can 
look to differences in operational feasibility factors to see how changes in the situation 
alter the decision calculus.  Here the analysis demonstrates that changes in feasibility can 
work in the opposite direction as well, changing an intervention into a withdrawal once 
the situation proves too problematic.  
Feasibility Factors  
 This section provides two feasibility assessments for the Somalia intervention.  
The first is the initial assessment associated with the time of Bush 41’s decision and the 
conclusion that the mission was achievable within a short time horizon.  The subsequent 
assessment pertains to Clinton’s decision window and his choice to withdraw.  As 
discussed previously, the four feasibility factors addressed here are the type of conflict 
(e.g., ethnic, religious, or social), whether or not there is a leader or regime to support, the 
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structure of the enemy or enemies (e.g. diffuse or hierarchical), and the accessibility of 
the crisis environment.   
 Initial Assessment (Bush 41)  
First, what was the type of conflict in which Bush 41 anticipated U.S. forces to be 
involved?  The administration’s appreciation of this factor is based on the tightly 
circumscribed view of the mission that emerged:  facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid 
for a limited time – “40 days” or less (NSC 0065, 1).  While certainly true that initial 
assessments earlier in the spring of 1992 had a clear-eyed view of Somalia as an ongoing 
civil war, those assessments faded under executive pressure to find a way to arrive at a 
mission that was within the bounds of the possible (Western 2002).  As a result, the 
military and the NSC reframed the problem around the very specific mission of securing 
aid delivery.  Instead of saddling themselves with dealing with the drivers of the conflict 
(e.g., inter-clan rivalry, weak governance, limited resources) that could quickly turn into 
a quagmire, the administration chose to focus on the minimum actions required to 
alleviate immediate suffering.  The residual challenges would be left for whatever 
capability the UN could muster as a follow-on operation.  As a result, what was 
originally recognized as a civil war came to be seen as a route and logistics node security 
problem.  As discussed by the President in his NSC Small Group Meeting on October 3, 
1992, there was no intention of attempting to solve the crisis at its core (see Figure 5.1 
below.).  U.S. forces would be protecting lives of relief workers by setting up enclaves in 
a “benign setting” (NSC 0065, 1).  Based on this, the feasibility factor for type of 
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conflict would be viewed as favorable since the administration had no intention of 
grappling directly with the myriad challenges posed by the Somalian crisis.     
 
Figure 5.1 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 1  
Second, there was no supportable regime.  A ceasefire was initially brokered on 
January 31, 1992, including key warlords, Al Mahdi and Aideed; but enforcement for this 
regime was lacking and therefore largely ignored (United Nations 2018).  By the time 
Bush 41 was at the decision point at the end of the year, it was obvious that no 
meaningful ceasefire was acknowledged by the powers on the ground.  However, the 
importance of this fact as a feasibility concern was lessened in this case based on mission 
expectations.  The administration anticipated UNSCR 794 to be forthcoming within days 
based on their significant involvement in its crafting at the UNSC.  Confidence in this 
eventuality is demonstrated by Attorney General Ball in Figure 5.2 as he speaks of the 
resolution during deliberations with the President as if it already had passed.  This 
resolution would have added legitimacy and clarity on the role of the various troop 
contributing countries, easing some of the concerns over having a supportable regime and 
ensuring the U.S. forces could hand over responsibility in short order. 
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Figure 5.2 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 2 
However, the situation with the UN was not yet firm.  There was subsequent 
consternation about the composition of the peacekeeping force and which countries 
would be providing what capabilities, all of which still needed to be worked out (NSC 
0065, 4-5).  In addition, Vice President Quayle’s remark that the President should brief 
Congress even if the UN has not passed the resolution (see Figure 5.3 below) indicates a 
desire on the part of the administration to conduct the mission regardless of a UN 
mandate at the outset.  With or without the resolution, Bush 41 was confident that there 
would be “pretty broad support when the people see the picture” and was preparing to 
move forward (NSC 0065, 5).  Therefore, at the initial decision, Bush 41 did not have a 
regime to intervene on behalf of but did anticipate a mandate from the UN that would 
ultimately provide the follow-on peacekeepers to relieve the U.S. forces.  Perhaps more 
important, Bush 41 had restricted the mission for the American initial entry forces to the 
point that it almost precluded conflict.  Any concerns over how the force would be 
perceived by antagonists over time would largely be the problem for the follow-on 
peacekeeping element, not the limited intervention to which Bush 41 was committing. 
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Figure 5.3 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 5 
 Third, as noted in Figure 5.1 above, Bush 41 did not expect significant opposition, 
especially since they would be arriving with overwhelming military force and be focused 
on aid delivery at isolated “enclaves,” not inflicting violence against the warlords or their 
militias.  The U.S. forces would not be a third party intervening in between warring 
factions, attempting to be neutral but in essence fighting against all; instead they saw 
themselves as a security force on the periphery.  In addition, the limited opposing forces 
that were envisioned by Bush 41’s advisors were not viewed as professional, competent 
military elements that would pose a significant martial challenge.  The national security 
team referred to the warlord’s militias as “brigands” and “juvenile delinquents” (NSC 
0065, 3).  Therefore, the feasibility factor for anticipated enemy’s structure would have 
been viewed positively because Bush 41 did not anticipate a significant enemy at all. 
Fourth, accessibility for the Somalia crisis environment was first seen as 
problematic, with limited port facilities, road networks, and infrastructure (Hoar 1993).  
However, this improved as the military conducted further analysis that explored more 
sea-based options that mitigated some of the traditional shortcomings (e.g., lack of 
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airfields and port space) (Ohls 2009).  Therefore, while certainly not easy logistically, 
the mission was supportable, albeit with extraordinary and unconventional measures that 
were more costly than conventional approaches (Hoar 1993).  However, costs would be 
minimized based on a short, expected deployment.   
The administration based the limited expected deployment duration on their 
anticipation that the UN would be able to rapidly build a peacekeeping force to replace 
the U.S. ground troops, eliminating the need for U.S. boots on the ground past the first 30 
days (see Figure 5.4 below.).  This reinforced the positive feasibility factor attributes 
above because Bush 41 and his team expected to rapidly get in and out.  Therefore, the 
team paid little concern to complications that could emerge over the longer-term mission.     
 
Figure 5.4 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 4 
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 Finally, on December 3, 1992 at the point of initial decision, the feasibility factors 
were aligned largely in support of intervention.  While there was no brokered ceasefire 
with the warlords, the administration believed a U.S. force could secure the aid 
distribution network with little resistance and the administration was confident a UN 
peacekeeping force would form in short order to facilitate a rapid redeployment.    
Subsequent Assessment (Clinton) 
This section characterizes the four operational feasibility factors in October 1993 
when Clinton arrived at his decision to withdraw forces, closely following on the heels of 
the Battle of Mogadishu and its fallout.  The type of conflict, existence of a supportable 
regime, enemy structure, and logistical accessibility all change in significant ways in the 
infeasible direction, calling mission success at acceptable costs into question. 
Concern over the type of conflict changed significantly between the Bush 41 and 
Clinton administrations.  As detailed above, the roots of the conflict were of only limited 
concern for Bush 41 because they saw their role as restricted in both time and scope, 
anticipating a rapid handover to a follow-on UN peacekeeping force.  However, 
Clinton’s team treated the problem more extensively, recasting Somalia not as a limited 
application of force but instead as a wholesale nation-building effort.  This included 
everything from refugee resettlement, to establishing a Somali police force, to efforts to 
rebuild civil society (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 81-99; Clinton 1994).  As a result, this led 
to a completely different assessment of what would be required, for how long, and at 
what risk.  In effect, the Clinton administration had returned to arrive at the initial 
assessment from the spring of 1992 where Somalia was properly understood as an 
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anarchic collapsed state in the midst of a civil war with societal fissures rooted in ancient 
clan rivalries (Fox 2001, 155).  Expanding the mission to engage with the drivers of 
conflict began in collaboration with others on the UNSC, leading to additional resolutions 
(UNSCRs 815, 837, 865) over the course of 1993 that added more requirements to the 
mission.  The shifts in focus, or mission creep, acknowledged the challenges on the 
ground that the warlords’ incentives were at odds with the goals of the UN and the 
peacekeeping forces were going to have to adopt more offensive roles.  In the end, the 
type of conflict adapted from an anticipated non-conflict under Bush 41 to an attempt to 
change social, political, and security conditions in Somalia as a neutral party in the midst 
of a civil war with competing militias opposed to the UN’s presence.   
A second feasibility factor that influenced the Clinton administration was the 
existence of a supportable regime.  Here again, we are looking at either if there is a clear 
side that the U.S. is backing in a conflict, or if there is a ceasefire agreement in place that 
the U.S. intervention would support.  In this case the focus was on the latter with the UN 
attempting to maintain neutrality.  Like the first attempt at establishing a ceasefire under 
Bush 41, subsequent attempts during the Clinton administration also failed.  Starting 
early in 1993 when the UN attempted a multi-prong approach to reestablish a supportable 
ceasefire agreement, acknowledging the urge to place intervenors in a position accepted 
by the warring parties.  First, the UN attempted a negotiated ceasefire and disarmament 
at the Addis Ababa Accords in January, a conference attended by both Aideed and Ali 
Mahdi (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 93-95).  This effort was paired with a subsequent 
Humanitarian and National Reconciliation Conferences, aimed at solving infrastructure, 
economic, and political challenges.  While there was general agreement reached at these 
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events in theory, challenges came in implementation.  Warlords feared that by ceding 
power or position they would ultimately be left in a vulnerable position when these 
measures failed or if the peacekeepers were to depart (Ibid., 99).  Therefore, no 
supportable regime ever came to pass.  The U.S. role as part of the UN force remained as 
an intervening force throughout, unable to back any leader or enforce an agreed upon 
ceasefire agreement.   
The characterization of the enemy forces is perhaps the most notable change in 
the four feasibility factors.  Initially discounted as “juvenile delinquents” and not 
expected to mount significant opposition by Bush 41’s team, events on the ground 
indicated otherwise as the U.S. presence continued through the spring (NSC 0065, 3).  
The most notable was the June 5 ambush of the Pakistani peacekeepers that resulted in 23 
killed and many more wounded (Bolton 1994).  Perceptions were shifting.  Warlords, 
and in particular Aideed, posed significant challenges to UN military forces in 1993 that 
led the U.S. Intelligence Community to reevaluate their capabilities and overall strategy.  
The Central Intelligence Agency assessed that Aideed posed a significant threat even 
though his forces and capability were relatively small (see Figure 5.5 below).  This 
conclusion was based on the supposition that Aideed’s diffuse militia (approximately 
300-500 fighters) would continue to be difficult to target and that through “hit-and-run 
tactics” they would be able to wear down the UN resolve, ultimately leading to a 
withdrawal and the elevation of him as the dominant warlord (Clinton Library 1993c, 1-
5).  These traits of Aideed’s militia are precisely those that, according to the theory put 
forward here, should dissuade intervention.  The enemy is difficult to locate and target 
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because of its small, nebulous structure, and their success is based on the ability to inflict 
minimal but persistent losses on those that did not anticipate them.   
 
Figure 5.5 CIA Intelligence Memorandum Excerpt on Aideed 
Finally, the accessibility of the crisis environment also became a point of concern.  
Initially seen as presenting challenges that could be overcome through ingenuity in off-
shore basing and unprecedented strategic lift networks, these modes became costly.  
Near the end of 1993 the administration was exploring more traditional options, trying to 
find ports (e.g., Chisimayu and Boosaaso) that presented lower cost options for the 
continuation of a mission that was not originally thought to last that long (Clinton Library 
1993c, 8-9).  While not viewed as a matter that contributed greatly to the decision to 
withdraw, the economic strain of the mission was a bone of contention between Congress 
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and the administration going back to as early as March 1992 (Clinton Library 1993b).  
This continued up until after the Battle of Mogadishu (October 3-4), when legislators 
opposed to the continuation of the mission used threats to cut the funding as a lever to 
influence Clinton’s decision (see Figure 5.6 below).   
 
Figure 5.6 Email from White House Military Office Director (Maldon) to Liaison to 
Congress (Paster) 
 
 Therefore, on October 7, 1993, when President Clinton announced the 
forthcoming departure of the U.S. military from the Somalia intervention, feasibility 
concerns had moved markedly in a negative direction.  The conflict was largely viewed 
as intractable and requiring systemic gains in political, economic, and social institutions 
than in security, greatly extending the anticipated time horizon.  After a year of laboring 
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to achieve a ceasefire, none materialized, leaving the intervention force in the unenviable 
position of trying to maintain neutrality among competing factions.  As the situation 
deteriorated in the summer, the intelligence community had the opportunity to reassess 
the enemy forces that were thwarting UN efforts.  They came to the two-part conclusion 
that the militias were both difficult to target because of their small numbers and nebulous 
organization, and that the warlords could achieve their aims with minimal effort because 
of the limited will among intervening countries to sustain casualties.  Lastly, the growing 
costs of the intervention, tied in large measure to logistics funding requirements, 
increased the sense of burden and became a political liability.      
Somalia Summary  
Bush 41 foresaw a limited intervention that would have the majority of U.S. 
forces successfully redeployed within a month with whatever problems that would 
emerge to be dealt with by a UN peacekeeping force.  Clinton’s team reimagined this 
role, seeing Somalia as a testbed for Assertive Multilateralism, acknowledging that the 
problems undergirding the crisis would not be alleviated by delivery of aid alone.  Not 
only that, they envisioned the U.S. as a leading agent to facilitate the needed change.  As 
a result, the Clinton administration, along with the rest of the UN troop contributing 
countries, actively contributed to the morphing of the crisis over the course of 1993.  The 
mission focus shifted from delivering aid, to nation-building, to offensive targeting, and 
following tactical failure and unexpected losses, a quick pivot to claim victory on the 
initial goal before departing.   
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Previous scholarship on the Somalian intervention points to the power of the 
media (e.g. Baum 2004) as the key determinant influencing Clinton’s decision to 
withdraw.  However, the research presented demonstrates that alternative explanations 
deserve consideration.  While certainly true that the media coverage of the Battle of 
Mogadishu’s aftermath was powerful and shocking, it would be a mistake to look at the 
media as the solitary agent eliciting a decision to withdraw.  The media after all is 
reacting to a change in the situation in the same way that the president is.  With this in 
mind, and as demonstrated here, more than just media coverage and public opinion 
changed from the beginning of the crisis to its conclusion.  Notably, the expectations of 
success for the operation had changed significantly, particularly when achieved at the 
costs the American public had implicitly supported when Bush 41 articulated the 
intervention’s scope in 1992.   
Table 5.3 Somalia Intervention Feasibility Assessment Comparison 
 
Ultimately all of the feasibility factors for the Somalia intervention shifted in a 
downward direction (See Table 5.3 above).  When Bush 41 evaluated the decision to 
intervene he viewed the type of conflict, enemy structure, and the accessibility of the 
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environment all favorably.  Only the absence of a supportable regime worked in the 
opposite direction, and then only slightly so since Bush 41 was not expecting opposition 
to such a limited intervention.  When Clinton evaluated the situation in 1993 it was a 
different story.  Along with the administration’s expanded goals to achieve the nation-
building outcomes came a far different assessment of the four feasibility factors.  The 
intervention, if it were to achieve the stated aims, would have to contend with a civil war 
against diffusely organized militias over a longer time horizon, increasing sustainment 
costs.  In addition, there was still no supportable regime, but the situation worsened due 
to the recognition that the intervention was opposed.  Therefore, at least in this case, the 
contention that feasibility factor changes in the direction of infeasibility should produce a 
withdrawal is borne out in the historical record.     
Part IV: Bosnia 
All I can tell you is that, at this point, I would not rule out any option 
except the option that I have never ruled in, which was the question of 
American ground troops. 
- President Clinton (April 16, 1993) 
Chronological Overview 
 The breakup of the former Yugoslavia resulted in violence and atrocities not seen 
since World War II.  The Serb “ethnic cleansing” campaign dislocated Muslims and 
Croats and employed systemic rape, concentration camps, and unrelenting sieges of 
major cities, resulting in tens of thousands killed and over a million refugees (Daalder 
2000). Like Somalia at the time, there was significant international outcry for a response.  
The UN generated a peacekeeping force to secure safe zones (UNPROFOR), but it 
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largely proved futile because its mandate was for peacekeeping, not peacemaking.  
UNPROFOR were ill-equipped to deal with the aggression posed by the Bosnian Serb 
Army (Army of Republika Srpska (VRS)) and the associated counterviolence in an 
ethnically fractured state comprised of 44 percent Bosniak Muslims, 31 percent Orthodox 
Serbs, and 17 percent Catholic Croats (Reimann 2017).  If an international intervention 
was to succeed it would require a more significant presence with a different mandate.   
 From 1993 to 1995 the Clinton administration wrestled with this thorny problem, 
moving from being firmly resolved to refrain from putting troops on the ground to finally 
providing leadership (both diplomatically as well as militarily) that brought about a stable 
peace.  To assist in understanding how Clinton’s decision to intervene changed over 
time, the evolution of the Bosnian crisis and the political landscape during the decision 
space can be divided into three periods.  First, from the end of 1992 through 1994 was a 
period of expanding crisis and failed peace.  Second, significant change came with the 
Bosnian Serb offensive of 1995 and its aftermath, altering the willingness of the Clinton 
administration to respond.  And finally, the period leading to the Dayton Accords, where 
a combination of political pressures, diplomatic maneuvers, and military victories proved 
to change the conditions to support a U.S.-led intervention.  The following section 
details these three periods. 
 Expanding Crisis and Failed Peace 
 Upon assuming office, Clinton was poised to take a more active role in the 
Bosnian crisis based on campaign criticism of Bush 41’s ineffectiveness (Kempster 
1992).  That does not mean that Clinton came into office with a complete reversal in 
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mind, wanting to put U.S. troops in UNPROFOR and assume leadership on the ground.  
To the contrary, the administration had clearly thought through what they were prepared 
to do and under what circumstances.   
Clinton immediately had his staff conduct analyses of key issues, producing 
Presidential Review Directives (PRDs).  The first of these was PRD 1 covering the 
situation in Bosnia (Lake 1993).  At the end of the interagency process that framed the 
issue, Clinton held a Principal’s Committee (PC) meeting on February 5, 1993 that 
recommended a range of different policy positions, including enforcement of the no-fly 
zone, increased sanctions on Serbia, and supporting political discourse with both allies 
and Russia.  What was also made plainly clear by Secretary of State Christopher (1993) 
following that review was that the U.S. would not commit ground troops until there was a 
“viable agreement containing enforcement provisions” agreed to by all parties.  
Clinton’s team thought that peace could be achieved by manipulating some of the key 
factors of the situation from a distance: increasing the defensive capability of the 
Muslims and Croats and reducing the offensive capability of the Serbs.     
In May 1993 Clinton and his team offered a new strategy that they thought could 
relieve the pressure being applied to the Bosniaks and Croats by the Serbs.  It hinged on 
air power.  Called “lift and strike,” the strategy proposed ending the 1991 UN arms 
embargo on the former Yugoslav states because it limited the U.S.’s ability to supply 
Bosnian Muslims with arms, putting them at a disadvantage compared to the Bosnian 
Serbs being supplied directly from Serbia (Brune 1999, 99).  As Clinton’s National 
Security Advisor Tony Lake (2001) explained, the “strike” aspect of the strategy was in 
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relation to the Serbs, whom the proposal called for striking if they “tried to take 
advantage of the situation before we [the U.S.] could build up the Muslims.”  The intent 
was to try to produce military parity, thereby giving leverage to the Muslims and 
incentivizing the Serbs to negotiate a peace.   
The administration tried to persuade allies to employ the “lift and strike” strategy 
in various forms for the first year and a half, but to no avail.  This approach failed for a 
variety of reasons.  First, the French and British opposed the strategy because they 
believed the addition of more military capability to the crisis would prolong the war, not 
shorten it, and that the air strikes would put their forces on the ground at risk (Barthe and 
David 2004, 6).  There was also no consensus among Clinton’s own staff.  Vice 
President Gore, Lake, and Albright argued for air strikes, while Secretary of State 
Christopher and Secretary of Defense Aspin wanted to strictly pursue diplomatic options; 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (first General Powell and subsequently General 
Shalikashvili) argued that the air strikes would be ineffective without a ground offensive 
(NSC Principals Committee 1993; Daalder 1998).  Important to note, there were strong 
voices inside the principals who openly advocated for action early in the administration 
(see discussion from NSC Principals meeting in Figure 5.7 below).  The demand for 
action was ever-present; it was not something that sprang up in the final days before the 
decision to intervene. 
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Figure 5.7 Excerpt from NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, FEB 5, 1993 
Finally, domestic politics were also at play, thwarting any support that Clinton 
might have been able to muster.  Republicans characterized the president’s handling of 
the situation as ineffectual and indicative of the overall foreign policy, using Bosnia as an 
angle of attack approaching the next election cycle (Lake 2001).  As a result, the 
splintering of positions among key advisors, and a dearth of support from Congress and 
key allies who resented the fact that the U.S. was unwilling to put troops on the ground, 
ensured that Clinton’s strategy would not be tried.   
Throughout this period Clinton continued to cede leadership to the UN and 
European Union (EU) while fostering peace-seeking efforts through U.S. diplomatic 
support.  But without any change in the dynamics between the opposing sides on the 
ground, and without a viable deterrent force, no change came.  Two peace proposals 
faltered, first the Vance-Owen plan and then one devised by Norway’s Thorvald 
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Stoltenberg (Brune 1999, 100).  All the while, the VRS laid siege to Sarajevo, starving 
thousands, and carried out ethnic cleansing throughout the countryside.  As the crisis 
expanded throughout 1993 and 1994, the demand for action increased both 
internationally and domestically without meaningful change in the U.S. response, which 
at this point supported the defense of the six UN-designated “safe areas” serving as 
Muslim enclaves.     
The Clinton administration struggled to make positive impacts on the ground 
during this period, yet two diplomatic initiatives were vitally important to the longer-term 
success.  First in February 1994, the Washington Framework Agreement established the 
Bosnian Federation of Muslims and Croats.  The framework began from the recognition 
that fighting between the two parties benefitted the Serbs, an idea proposed by U.S. State 
Department negotiators following yet another violent disaster in Sarajevo (Daalder 2000, 
26-27).  Ultimately this effort led to a cease-fire agreement between the Bosniaks and 
Croats in March 1994, allying the Republic of Croatia and the newly Federated Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in common cause against the Serbs.  This development led directly to 
military cooperation among the two groups, significantly altering the dynamics of the 
crisis. 
Second, the “Contact Group” formed in April 1994 consisting of the United 
States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany.  The impetus behind the formation of the 
group was a Serb artillery shell that exploded in Sarajevo killing 68 and wounding more 
than 100, increasing recognition of the escalating nature of the problem (Brune 1999, 
101).  This brought the main states with vested interests to a small group setting, 
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removed from the perceived ineffectiveness of both the UN and EU systems.  Most 
notably, it brought in the Russians who were important because of the leverage and 
influence they had over Serbia.  The Contact Group devised a plan that proposed a 
geographic breakdown that split Bosnia-Herzegovina between a Muslim-Croat federation 
and the Bosnian Serbs, providing a foundation for the peace talks to follow in the next 
year. 
 Bosnian Serb Offensive and Aftermath 
 The first two stagnant years of the crisis under Clinton’s watch were far different 
than 1995.  This was the year in which everything shifted.  Extraordinary levels of 
violence, faltering allies losing their resolve, and rising criticism among political 
opponents heading into an election year increased the demand for action and for the U.S. 
to assume a greater leadership role. 
 During the five-month ceasefire brokered by former President Jimmy Carter in 
December 1994, the Bosnian Serb leadership decided to adopt a much bolder strategy in 
1995, making it the final year of the war.  Following the cessation of the ceasefire in 
April, they planned to swiftly attack three lightly protected safe areas in the east – 
Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde; then shift to take Bihac in the northwest before finally 
taking Sarajevo to force final capitulation (Daalder 1998).  However, they overstepped 
in the execution of their plan. 
 The Serb attack on Srebrenica on July 11, 1995 significantly altered all that 
followed.  The UNPROFOR element under Dutch command requested air attacks to 
fend off the assault but was denied for the sake of maintaining neutrality, leaving the UN 
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force ill-equipped and unsupported in any attempt to stop the Serbs.  As a result, General 
Mladic’s unopposed Bosnian Serb force gathered over 23,000 Muslim women and 
children from the surrounding areas and subjected them to torture and rape.  The men 
and boys, totaling almost 8,000 were summarily executed (Rohde 2012).  The magnitude 
of the conflict escalated significantly in light of this attack, not only in sheer numbers, but 
in its impact on the psyche of world leaders who believed they were uniquely situated to 
prevent occurrences like this in the modern world.  This is evident in reversals made by 
Britain and France regarding the use of air power that result from growing awareness of 
the Serbian atrocities. 
 Another concerning part of the fallout over Srebrenica was the glaring recognition 
of the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR.  The offensive had exposed the reality that the 
peacekeeping force was positioned where there was no peace to keep.  Based on that 
recognition, Clinton was forced to deal with the real possibility that UNPROFOR would 
be withdrawn, or worse, require extraction.  Either way, the U.S. would be an essential 
provider of the needed troops and logistics to facilitate that withdrawal, putting 
Americans into danger (Lake 1995).  This led to a reconsideration on the part of the 
administration for what ought to be done.  Previous thinking had supported maintaining 
the status quo and the European position of working through UNPROFOR, but now the 
U.S. was potentially committed to facilitating a withdrawal or coming up with an 
alternative course on their own terms that would employ U.S. troops under more 
favorable circumstances.  This was yet more pressure to assume greater leadership.      
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 Finally, the international crisis scene is not divorced from domestic politics.  
Republicans had been critical of the Clinton administration’s handling of Bosnia since the 
inauguration.  One of the key points of contention was the arms embargo.  Republicans 
wanted to end it and provide military aid the Bosnian Muslims, but the British and French 
opposed this, not wanting to exacerbate the violence.  Clinton was not keen to act 
unilaterally in opposition to those he was attempting to leverage.  However, the 
Republicans retook both houses of Congress in 1994 and prepared the “Dole bill,” named 
after would-be 1996 presidential challenger, Senator Bob Dole, preparing to force the 
president’s hand.  While Congress had initially agreed to sit on the legislation over the 
winter with the ceasefire in place, the 1995 Serb offensive pushed the Republicans off the 
fence.  The Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995 (Dole, 1995), approved 
by Congress on August 1 with numbers capable of overriding presidential veto, 
authorized the termination of the 1991 arms embargo in conjunction with the withdrawal 
of UNPROFOR.  It was clear the approach of the last two years was about to change, 
and the U.S. would be assuming much more responsibility in either the success or failure 
that followed. 
 Leading to the Dayton Accords 
In the fall of 1995, building off of the tremors of the Serb offensive, three things 
transpired to bring about a supportable solution, as agreed to in December at the Dayton 
Accords.  Military victories by the Bosnian Federation of Muslims and Croats and a 
more assertive NATO bombing campaign changed the situation on the ground.  
Diplomatic maneuvers brought Serbian President Milosevic to the bargaining table on 
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behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, altering the incentive structure and space for agreement.  
And finally, the political pressures at home were realigned with the agreements specified 
in the Dayton Accords, bringing bipartisan consensus in support of a limited mission.   
 
Figure 5.8 Bosnian Map following the Dayton Accords (CIA World Factbook) 
Part of the reason the Bosnian Serbs had not earnestly negotiated a peace prior to 
the fall of 1995 was because they had made all of the gains (approximately 70% of the 
Bosnian territory was controlled by Serb forces) and therefore were not willing to make 
concessions (Daalder 2000). That changed in August 1995 with a three-prong offensive 
against Serb forces in Krajina (the area surrounding Banja Luka above in Figure 5.8.)  
The offensive was first initiated by the Croatian Army, then the Bosnian Army attacked 
out of the Bihac pocket in the northwest, and then their forces united to recapture 
approximately 51% of the country (Ibid.).  This turned the tide on the ground, making it 
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such that the area held on the ground much more closely resembled the proposition put 
forward earlier from the Contact Group Plan.  That same plan would serve as the 
foundation for the negotiations at the Dayton Accords.   
At the same time, NATO’s air power was finally unleashed to much broader 
effect.  Within just a few weeks, Britain and France finally pledged with the United 
States to undertake an air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs press their attack east to 
Gorazde, the next “safe area” slated for cleansing.  As Secretary of State Christopher 
warned, “The Bosnian Serb leaders are now on notice…There will be no more pinprick 
strikes” (Darnton 1995).  This marked a change in the allies’ willingness to support 
significant air strikes.  UN troop contributing countries had been in opposition to NATO 
air strikes previously because of the Serb tactic of taking hostages, as had occurred in 
May when almost 400 peacekeepers were captured.  However, Srebrenica changed that 
concern.  The result was NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force that went from August 30 
through September 14, totaling 3,515 aircraft sorties that attacked 338 aim points and 48 
Bosnian Serb targets with 1,026 strikes (Daalder 2000, 131).  This combination of the 
ground forces from the Croat-Muslim Federation and the NATO airstrikes was enough to 
bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table.   
 That seat at the table would not be taken by the Bosnian Serbs, but instead by 
Serbian President Milosevic.  This shift moved Bosnian Serb “president” Karadzic and 
their military’s commander, Mladic to the periphery.  This was achieved through both 
the pressure of sanctions over time on Milosevic as he grew more and more isolated, but 
also through political maneuverings.  Clinton had made outreach to Russia a key part of 
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his negotiations with the Croatians and Bosniaks, ensuring that they included President 
Yeltsin in the process, even if at a cursory level (Clinton Library 1993d).  This 
diplomatic maneuver increased the room for agreement with a negotiating partner that 
was more than willing to concede territory that was not going to be part of his state in the 
end.   
 Finally, before committing to an agreement, Clinton looked for bipartisan support 
because public polling was far from supportive for risking American lives in the Balkans 
at the end of November – only 37% support (Sobel 1998, 275).  Clinton stated early on 
in a conversation with the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina that he had two preconditions 
before he would consider using Americans to enforce an agreement: that NATO rather 
than the UN execute the mission, and that Congress would approve the mission and fund 
it (see Figure 5.9 below) (Transcript of conversation between President Clinton and 
President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Clinton Library 1993d).  NATO, already 
expanding the bombing campaign was preparing to take over for UNPROFOR in the 
event an agreement could be reached had taken care of the first part.  But Republicans 
had been using Bosnia’s mishandling as a wedge heading into the 1996 election, 
preventing action.  That changed when Senator Dole reversed his position on December 
1, seeing that an agreement was likely and that the U.S. would need to support NATO in 
this endeavor.  Dole thought that division on this issue would cut into troop morale and 
work at counter-purposes with the national interests, ultimately throwing his support to 
the president (Sciolino 1995).  
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Figure 5.9 Excerpt of President Clinton conversation with President Alija Izetbegovic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  
  
The combination of these factors paved the way for a peace agreement – the 
Dayton Accords – signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris.  The Accords were in basic 
agreement with the Contact Group Plan developed in September.  Bosnia-Herzegovina 
would continue within existing boundaries and consist of two entities, the Muslim-Croat 
Federation and Republika Srpska, occupying 51% and 49% of the country respectively 
(Daalder 2000, 138).  The UNPROFOR would be replaced by an Implementation Force 
(IFOR) that had a very specific mandate and limited mission that, as the Secretary of 
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs explained in a joint hearing before the Senate 
(1995), would “not include reconstruction, resettlement, humanitarian relief, election 
monitoring, and other non-security efforts.”  This was the limited mission required to 
enforce the Dayton accords that Clinton used to arrive at a decision of whether the U.S. 
should take part in the intervention.  Obviously the more tightly scoped mission 
significantly altered the expectations (what required, how long, at what risk) for the 
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intervention.  More foundationally, that agreement provided an enforceable ceasefire 
that all parties agreed to, producing an environment with less anticipated hostility.  This 
is the most notable change in conditions from what had existed over the previous three 
years.  While Clinton called out NATO and Congressional support in his discussion with 
the Bosnian president, these were not Clinton’s most important preconditions; it was the 
“if you reach an agreement” comment in the previous sentence (see Figure 5.9 above).  
An agreement, as I will demonstrate in the next section, changes the feasibility factors 
and explains why ground troops “were never ruled in” prior to its existence. 
Feasibility Factors  
 As with the prior Somalia case, this section provides a feasibility assessment 
comparison of two periods.  Here though, the initial assessment corresponds to the 
beginning of the Clinton administration in early 1993 rather than the period of the Bush 
41 decision not to intervene.  President Clinton could have easily chosen to intervene in 
Bosnia upon assuming the office, especially since he had campaigned on tackling the 
issues there in a way that his predecessor had not (Lake 2001).  The second feasibility 
assessment corresponds to the period around the decision to send U.S. ground troops in 
December 1995.  Again, the four feasibility factors addressed here are the type of 
conflict, whether the U.S. has a regime to support, the structure of the enemy, and the 
crisis environment’s accessibility.   
 Initial Assessment (Clinton 1993)  
First, did the Clinton team view the conflict in Bosnia as an ethnic civil war in 
same way the Bush 41 administration did?  The evidence clearly supports that they did.  
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The ethnic tensions at the root of the conflict were obvious in the ethnic cleansing stories 
regularly published in the New York Times at the time (Sudetic 1992).  Not only that, 
the broader complexity of the situation was also apparent to the Clinton team as 
evidenced by the specific questions resident in PRD 1 that the NSC was using to develop 
their policy (Clinton Library 1993e) (see excerpt below in Figure 5.10).  The conflict 
region’s ethnic and historical ties to the surrounding states and key international actors 
such as Russia and prominent Islamic countries all figured into the assessment of the 
situation.  Facts such as these are at the heart of the logic behind concerns over the type 
of war.  The more complex the crisis, the more intractable it appears and the greater the 
uncertainty regarding how an intervention might unfold.  Therefore, for Clinton in 1993 
just as it was for his predecessor, the type of conflict was dissuading for a potential 
intervention. 
 
Figure 5.10 Excerpt from Presidential Review Directive/NSC-1: U.S. Policy Regarding 
the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia 
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Regarding whether there was a supportable regime in 1993, there was not.  In the 
early stages of the war there were three distinct groups in conflict: the Bosnian Serbs 
(supported by Serbia) against the Bosniak Muslims and Croats independently, and the 
Muslims and Croats against one another to a more limited extent (Brune 1999).  An 
intervenor would have been placed in the unenviable position of attempting to be neutral 
protector of relief supplies amid these conflicts.  This is precisely the position in which 
UNPROFOR found itself that contributed to its inability to stop the massacres as the 
violence increased (Daalder 1998).  Here too then, the feasibility factor for a supportable 
regime was not favorable.     
Next, what type of enemy formations would a U.S. intervention face?  There is a 
clear answer to this question from the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) response to 
the Clinton Transition Team’s questions regarding the Balkans.  The Transition Team 
posed questions to the NIC to prepare the incoming president and his team for the 
decisions they would face in the administration’s opening days and months.  The NIC’s 
December 28, 1992 report provides a thorough record of the assessment the Clinton 
national security team received as they prepared to take the reins of power (Clinton 
Library 1992).  The excerpt below (Figure 5.11) paints a vivid picture of what threat 
they anticipated in the event of a “large-scale international military intervention,” the 
type of operation they believed would be required to end the crisis.  The report 
specifically calls out that the “Bosnian Serb forces are doctrinally disposed to protracted, 
decentralized defense” and that they would be “widely deployed in rough terrain with 
good concealment that favors defense” (Clinton Library 1992, 38).  The estimate is that 
guerrilla warfare would predominate and result in a lengthy occupation, precisely the 
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concern this feasibility factor is meant to address.  Clearly the Clinton team would not 
have viewed the enemy structure in a positive light.   
 
Figure 5.11 Excerpt from Response to Clinton Transition Team Questions on the Balkans  
Lastly, the Clinton administration, like Bush 41, viewed the region as inaccessible 
in 1993.  This is predominantly because of the necessity of using the Sarajevo airport to 
employ forces and protect the humanitarian supplies (Gellman 1992).  In the early 
months of the Clinton presidency more and more graphic images poured illuminating the 
horror of the tragedy in Bosnia.  Ivo Daalder (2000), who conducted interviews with 
administration officials on the subject and subsequently served on the NSC from 2005 
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and 2006 working the Bosnia issue, notes that this caused Clinton to ask National 
Security Advisor Tony Lake to revisit the options, including deploying American troops 
(19).  The Pentagon conducted their analysis and the CJCS Admiral Jeremiah assessed 
that it would take 70,000 troops to halt the siege of Sarajevo, primarily “due to the fact 
that the airport’s closure meant that the troops would have to traverse hostile territory to 
get to the city” (Ibid., 20).  Therefore, the inaccessibility of the Sarajevo airport and the 
high costs in troops and equipment to secure long and hostile alternative routes proved 
prohibitive.  These limitations and restrictions put this feasibility factor firmly in the 
negative as well.     
These four feasibility factors in early 1993 were not conducive to intervention.  
Clearly the demand for action was already there.  As noted before, members of the 
national security team, most notably Albright and Lake were openly advocating for 
intervention options that included the deployment of the U.S. military as early as 
February (NSC Principals Committee 5 February 1993).  In addition, President Clinton 
himself was swayed by the reports coming in on CNN while on his Group of Seven (G-7) 
trip to Tokyo, causing him to have his staff relook at what could be done, including the 
possibility of using troops (Daalder 2000, 19).  Yet still, there was no decision to change 
course on the question of U.S. boots on the ground until the end of 1995.   
Subsequent Assessment (Clinton 1995) 
This section assesses the four operational feasibility factors in December 1995 
when Clinton decides to deploy troops to Bosnia as part of IFOR.  Here we see a 
significant change in all four factors stemming from one key event – the signing of the 
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Dayton Accords.  The expectations for the military intervention change significantly 
with all sides agreeing to the ceasefire and its concomitant conditions.  Everything from 
the appreciation of the conflict type, to there being a supportable regime, to the 
anticipated enemy the intervention would face, and even the logistical accessibility is 
altered with the agreement in place.  It is important to note that the ceasefire agreement 
was always the lynchpin for President Clinton, making it the principal condition that 
would warrant U.S. involvement in the peacekeeping effort (Clinton Library 1993d, 11).  
This was blatantly clear in Clinton’s conversations from the beginning of his handling of 
the crisis to the very end (See Figures 5.9 above and 5.12 below from his conversations 
with the presidents of Bosnia and Croatia).  Seeing how that agreement changes the 
following feasibility factor assessments, it is easy to understand why. 
 
Figure 5.12 Excerpt from President Clinton Meeting with Presidents Izetgebovic (Bosnia-
Herzegovian) and Tudjman (Croatia), October 24, 1995 
  
Beginning with the appreciation of the type of conflict, Clinton still recognized 
that it was an ethnically-divided civil war.  However, the war itself ended with the 
signing of the Dayton Accords.  Clear provisions to avoid conflict between the ethnic 
groups were emplaced and IFOR was given authority over the forces of the previously 
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warring factions, reducing the risk of significant combat (Brune 1999, 110).  In addition, 
the IFOR mission was restricted to prevent “mission creep,” something the administration 
might have learned from the Somalia experience.  Here, as noted before, senior Pentagon 
officials made it clear that the Bosnian intervention would not be about nation-building 
(Daalder 2000, 142-143).  IFOR would monitor and enforce a zone of separation 
between the newly established territories.  Therefore, the type of conflict moved from an 
ethnically-based civil war to a tenuous peace.  The situation was still not certain to 
remain stable, but at least provisions limited contact among the groups through agreed 
upon lines of demarcation.   
 Next, the factor addressing a supportable regime changed over time.  Initially, the 
conflict was waged among all three parties – Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.  The first 
intervening force, UNPROFOR, had to maintain neutrality while trying to separate the 
parties and facilitate the delivery of aid.  However, a key shift occurred in February 1994 
when the Washington Framework Agreement established the Bosnian Federation of 
Muslims and Croats.  As Clinton conveyed to both Bosnian and Croatian leaders in 
1995, the cooperation between them marked a significant shift in the conflict, providing a 
level of parity between the opposing forces that could help induce negotiation (Clinton 
Library 1993d, 38) (See statement by President Clinton in Figure 5.13 below). 
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Figure 5.13 Statement by President Clinton in meeting with President Izetgebovic 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina) and President Tudjman (Croatia), October 24, 1995 
 
Even though the partnership between the Croats and Muslims altered the balance 
of power positively, it did not provide a supportable regime in 1994.  This is because the 
mandate authorizing an intervention, one that the U.S. supported, was UNSCR 743, 
which created UNPROFOR (United Nations Security Council 1992).  If the U.S. had 
advocated intervention at this point it would have been blatantly taking one side over the 
other, in direct opposition to the neutral peacekeeping character outlined in Resolution 
743.  Therefore, the advent of the Washington Agreement was well received and paved 
the way for a sustainable peace, but it still did not provide a supportable regime given the 
nature of the conflict and the fact that he U.S. had committed to a multinational response.  
That would not come until all parties agreed at Dayton and subsequently signed in Paris. 
The “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” or 
simply the Dayton Accords, ultimately served as the “supportable regime” in and of 
itself.  IFOR, as agreed to in the accords, was not intervening on behalf of one of the 
parties as I have maintained is preferable to neutrality; instead it had the most preferred 
situation.  The regime was a clearly articulated set of rules that all the belligerents agreed 
to abide by, including ceasing hostilities, relocating and restricting the movement of their 
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forces, and most importantly the empowering of IFOR to use force against them if found 
in violation (United Nations 1995).  Beyond that, the U.S. forces were limited in their 
scope to enforcing the military aspects of the agreement, providing separation between 
the parties and monitoring compliance (Daalder 2000, 145).  Like the change it induced 
for the type of conflict, the Dayton Accords provided a clear side on which to act, one 
that was agreed to by those being acted upon.   
The last two feasibility factors, enemy structure and accessibility, are closely 
linked in this case because the latter is primarily influenced by the change in the former.  
First, with the Dayton Accords in place, the concern over the decentralized Bosnian Serb 
forces and their potential to wage a long-term guerrilla war is significantly reduced.  In 
fact, the President was most concerned about forces beyond the control of either the 
Serbs, Croats, or Bosniaks once the peace agreement was in place.  Clinton conveyed 
this point in conversation with Bosnian President Izetbegovic, expressing concern that 
Iranian-backed Mujahedin forces that had come into fight against the Serbs could 
potentially fight on in opposition against U.S. forces (see Figure 5.14 below).  This 
passage also demonstrates that Clinton did not anticipate losses to enemy fire as a result 
of the agreement being in place since losing “a couple of soldiers to forces connected to 
Iran…could wreck this whole thing” (Clinton Library 1993d, 56).   
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Figure 5.14 Conversation between President Clinton and President Izetgebovic (Bosnia-
Herzegovina), December 14, 1995 
 
 With the concern over armed opposition largely gone, the accessibility challenges 
of using the Sarajevo airport or the long routes for logistic support changed as well.  
Access limitations were always a great concern.  Following the bombing campaign in 
the fall of 1995, General Mladic came to bargain with NATO over what he was willing to 
concede if the attacks halted.  NATO rejected Mladic’s proposal and made three specific 
demands, one of which was “complete freedom of movement for UN forces and 
personnel and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and unrestricted use of Sarajevo 
airport (Daalder 2000, 132).  With the Dayton Accords these concerns were finally 
alleviated.  The main airport and all road networks became accessible and their use 
unopposed.     
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Bosnia Summary 
 The Clinton administration’s appraisal of the Bosnia situation in 1993 was not 
that different from the Bush 41 perspective (See Table 4 below).  All four of the 
feasibility factors dissuaded Clinton from committing troops.  In line with this 
assessment, the incoming administration saw the prospects of a military intervention 
being able to solve the crisis without a peace agreement as remote, at least not within 
acceptable timelines and costs.  Clinton maintained from his earliest days in office that 
an agreement would be a precondition for U.S. troop contributions to the effort.  
Fortunately, the series of advantageous developments in 1995 made an agreement 
possible (i.e. Bosniak and Croat ground offensive, NATO bombing campaign, Milosevic 
negotiating on behalf of Bosnian Serbs). 
Table 5.4 Bosnia Intervention Feasibility Assessment Comparison 
 
 When the Dayton Accords were signed in December, all of the feasibility factors 
shifted significantly in a positive direction (See Table 5.4 above).  The conflict, while 
still ethnically-based, was a more positive environment for intervention due to the 
separation of the opposing forces and willing halt to the hostilities.  Next, there was a 
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regime to support, namely the Dayton Accords and its provisions.  Third, the expectation 
of enemy opposition was significantly reduced based on the ceasefire agreement.  And 
finally, the accessibility to the region was vastly improved because of the agreement to 
allow unfettered access to the Sarajevo airport and all main routes.  In short, the mission, 
once scoped to limit expected conflict and anticipated time commitments for IFOR, 
displayed the characteristics supporting intervention. 
Part V: Comparison and Conclusion 
The Somalian and Bosnian interventions provide useful cases to test the utility of 
operational feasibility factors in understanding more than just an initial decision to 
intervene or not.  In theory, if an appreciation of an intervention’s feasibility factors 
changes from positive to negative, this should be accompanied by a decision to withdraw 
forces.  Likewise, if conditions initially stifle demands to intervene but later are 
conducive to intervention, we ought to expect a decision reversal.  The Bush 41 and 
Clinton White House’s perceptions of the Somalian and Bosnian crises provided a unique 
opportunity to assess this notion.   
The four feasibility factors considered in this study – the type of conflict, whether 
there is a supportable regime, the structure and capability of the enemy, and the 
accessibility of the crisis environment – all trended from favoring intervention in some 
degree under Bush 41 to supporting withdrawal under Clinton in the Somalian case.  
Therefore, the decision to withdraw given the change in these conditions supports the 
theory posited here that operational feasibility affects intervention decisions.  Similarly, 
while both Bush 41 and Clinton agreed that putting boots on the ground in 1992/1993 
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was ill-advised, the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995 changed the feasibility factors 
in the direction to promote intervention.   
One might argue that these cases exhibit a great deal of covariance between the 
feasibility factors and the internal or external determinants, harkening back to the idea 
that the media drove the U.S. out of Somalia or the increased magnitude of the conflict of 
Bosnia finally warranted U.S. involvement.  Covariance can most certainly take place, as 
the process tracing of these cases identifies.  Just as in the last chapter, as conditions 
shift, so to do the options generated for presidential consideration.  However, the 
question at the heart of the study focuses on explaining both action and inaction in the 
face of similar demand signals.  What this research has shown is that it is not until the 
options presented for decision are considered feasible do we see intervention.  And, 
likewise, when the feasibility assessments become increasingly negative, we see 
withdrawal.  It is certainly important to note the demands that sway and tailor the types 
of options being considered, but the operative element of the decision calculus is 
feasibility.   
More than that, building upon the findings of the previous chapters and the 
explicit reference to operational feasibility considerations in the historical record, the 
results are striking.  There is remarkable consistency of these factors with their 
corresponding theoretical prediction in outcome.  This is true whether supporting 
intervention outcomes, or in this case, nonintervention/withdrawal.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This work focused on answering why U.S. presidents choose to intervene 
militarily in some foreign crises but not in others.  Specifically, why do we find 
seemingly inconsistent intervention decisions when the situations in question exhibit 
similar qualities, particularly with respect to those variables argued by other scholars as 
being determinant?  Throughout, I have argued that there was an important element 
missing from these analyses:  a way of operationalizing the concepts surrounding 
“expectations of success,” an element often cited as an important part of the decision-
making process (Baum 2004; Regan 1998 and 2002; Seybolt 2007).  Toward this end I 
have provided operational feasibility factors as a way of identifying observable and 
measurable aspects of situations that presidents use to arrive at their expectation of 
success.  Using a mixed methods approach and primary sources that included the 
minutes from presidential and NSC dialogues, this study was able to explore the degree 
to which these feasibility factors influenced the decisions.  When these feasibility factors 
align favorably, the prospects of intervention increase given that there is enough demand 
for action.  Alternatively, when the factors exhibit unfavorable qualities, the president is 
unlikely to commit ground forces regardless of the demand signal’s strength.   
Answering this question is important.  Presidential policy positions are the 
subject of much debate, especially when those decisions involve the expenditure of 
America’s blood and treasure.  The results of these analyses not only help us explain 
perplexing outcomes, they pass knowledge from the realm of practice to the world of 
political analysis, filling in gaps that offer more consistent and, in some cases, more 
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parsimonious answers to perennial questions.  This study has sought to do just that.  By 
employing the analytic concepts used by military planners to develop assessments and 
options as part of the national security apparatus, this work identified factors that explain 
intervention and nonintervention decisions with a high degree of consistency. 
This concluding chapter proceeds in four parts.  First, I revisit the theoretical 
argument upon which the analysis is built.  Second, I summarize the empirical findings 
from the previous three chapters.  Third, I explore the implications for the research and 
policy communities, as well as for the public more generally.  Finally, I acknowledge the 
limitations of this study and recommend future research opportunities to test and improve 
upon this theoretical framework.   
Argument 
The main contention is that operational feasibility plays a significant role in 
determining whether U.S. presidents are willing to intervene with boots on the ground in 
foreign crises.  It does not matter what the impetus is for the intervention – humanitarian, 
security, or economic interests.  Feasibility factors can explain why instances that seem 
to be very compelling are still not acted upon; and at the same time, why opportunities 
that were once deemed unsupportable can shift to become interventions.   
The scholarly community has largely overlooked these concerns to date, instead 
focusing on the relative importance of the source of the demand signals that create an 
intervention opportunity to explain why or why not presidents choose to intervene.  The 
debate has been between those arguing in favor of external determinants such as 
geopolitical pressures and alliances (Smith 1996), global economics (Fordham 2008), or 
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international norms (Walling 2013), and those arguing on behalf of internal determinants 
such as public opinion (Baum 2004), domestic economic conditions (DeRouen 1995), or 
congressional support and ideology (Hildebrandt et al. 2013).  In this work I charted a 
third course that opens up a new range of considerations to help explain presidential 
decision-making. 
This approach is based on a three-part causal chain. First, presidents respond to 
the demand signals discussed by previous scholars, identifying an opportunity for 
potential military intervention.  Then, with the assistance of their national security team, 
they assess the likelihood of success for the use of force given the unique characteristics 
of the crisis environment.  Finally, taking into account the potential efficacy of the 
mission, they determine whether to go forward with the intervention.  This theoretical 
proposition places a great deal of importance on the estimation of a successful outcome.   
Other authors have understood the importance of the expectations of success, 
using measures such as relative power comparisons in order to account for this factor 
(e.g., Buena de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).  This technique was most useful in the 
bipolar Cold War era where interventions were often associated with proxy wars between 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R.  However, more recent works have not adequately operationalized 
this concept to account for the changing strategic landscape following the fall of the 
Soviet Union.  Over the last few decades multilateral institutions such as the UN have 
more frequently taken a leading role in initiating interventions, morphing traditional 
views of sovereignty and state responsibilities with concepts such as the “right to protect” 
(Bellamy 2008).  Also, nongovernmental institutions have been instrumental, calling 
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attention to humanitarian crises and generating demand for intervention (Chandler 2001).  
Finally, civil conflicts and irregular warfare have continued apace absent the proxy wars 
commonly associated with the Cold War, seeing new players such as diasporas and 
smaller external state sponsors play more significant roles in starting or supporting 
guerrilla and civil wars (Byman et al., 2001).  These changes influence not only the 
prevalence of intervention opportunities, but the rationales that either support or argue 
against a potential military intervention.  In light of these changes, the expectation of 
success must account for something beyond relative power differentials between would-
be adversaries.  The question is what types of considerations make sense?  
This issue – clearly articulating under what circumstances the U.S. should 
commit to a military intervention – has been a concern for administrations dating back to 
Reagan.  The famous “Weinberger Doctrine,” presented by then Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger in response to concern of growing commitments in the Middle East 
on the heels of the killing of 241 Americans in Lebanon, laid out six tests that should be 
met before the U.S. would commit ground troops (Weinberger 1984; Record 2007; 
LaFeber 2009): 
1. First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless 
the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest 
or that of our allies…. 
2. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given 
situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of 
winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to 
achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all…. 
3. Third, if we do decide to commit to combat overseas, we should have clearly 
defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how 
our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should 
have and send the forces needed to do just that…. 
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4. Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have 
committed---their size, composition and disposition—must be continually 
reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably 
change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, so must our 
combat requirements…. 
5. Fifth, before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some 
reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people 
and their elected representatives in Congress…. 
6. Finally, the commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort. 
 
Five of the six tests above relate in some way to whether an action should be 
taken.  These concerns are based on what an intervention would accomplish (1); how it 
should be undertaken (2 and 4); and under what political and diplomatic circumstances (5 
and 6).  Of note for this study is number three, which addresses clearly defined and 
achievable military objectives.  This is the criterion that deals with whether military 
force can be applied to achieve the desired effect.  To answer that concern requires the 
articulation of the aims of the intervention and the subsequent development of military 
options that could achieve them.  In other words, in order to determine the answer to 
number three, a feasibility assessment must be undertaken to develop an understanding of 
what could be done and at what cost.  Only then can the president determine whether a 
reasonable option is even available.       
This same doctrine was reinforced by then CJCS Colin Powell (1992) during 
deliberations over a potential Bosnian intervention during the George H.W. Bush 
administration, stressing the importance of assessing key factors before assuming the 
risks involved with sending in combat troops.  Similarly, Clinton also struggled to 
circumscribe the instances where it is appropriate to intervene with ground forces, 
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something he found necessary early in his administration following the Somalia 
withdrawal and as he deliberated over the ongoing challenges in the former Yugoslavia.  
Like Bush 41 before him, he sought to add clarity for those in the national security 
establishment when developing recommendations in a period of increased pressure for 
U.S. involvement.  Toward that end, Clinton developed Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD) / NSC-25 (Clinton 1994).  In it, Clinton calls for the same clearly defined 
objectives and an expectation of being able to achieve them decisively (read quickly) that 
Powell had conveyed in the previous administration (see Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1 Clinton PDD-25 Excerpt on Considerations for Significant U.S. Involvement 
in Peace Enforcement Operations 
 
Based on the above, this study looked to identify what elements of these crises 
might either lead to more achievable military aims in short order, or alternatively make 
them more difficult and protracted.  By looking to how the presidents’ national security 
teams conduct their assessment of these crises and develop their military options in the 
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modern era, I have developed a useful set of conditions to indicate whether a crisis 
environment is conducive to intervention or if it is likely to dissuade involvement: 
feasibility factors.   
There were four feasibility factors that proved most useful in this analysis: 
1. CONFLICT - What type of conflict is it?  If it is based on ethnic or religious 
fault lines, then the violence is unlikely to be quelled quickly and will 
contribute to persistent instability.  
2. REGIME - Does the U.S. have a clear regime to support or install within the 
state where the intervention would occur?   
3. ENEMY - How is the enemy/adversary organized?  Is the structure 
hierarchical and susceptible to strike, or diffuse and difficult to target?   
4. ACCESS - How accessible is the crisis environment?  This addresses the 
logistic concerns of supporting an intervention through existing port and 
transportations networks, elements that are often lacking in the underdeveloped 
locales where intervention opportunities arise.   
These four feasibility factors are meant to tease out the most important aspects that 
determine whether military options that have clear objectives, attainable within a short 
amount of time, are even possible.   
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Empirical Findings 
Study Design 
This study employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods research design to 
assess the ability of feasibility factors to explain intervention decisions, while at the same 
time comparing their explanatory power against, as well in combination with, the extant 
scholarship’s more common determinants (Creswell 2013).  First, I employ Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) to test for unique combinations of feasibility factors with 
the internal and external determinants that are most associated with intervention and 
nonintervention decisions.  This methodological choice is based on the theory above that 
the internal and external determinant conditions expressed by other authors emit a 
demand signal that results in an opportunity, but that opportunity is only acted upon when 
the feasibility factors are advantageously aligned.  QCA was able to identify the 
combinations of conditions that yielded the most consistent results.  Building on those 
findings, I then conducted two paired comparison case studies, each within a single 
administration to attempt to control for unobserved variables.  The first looked at the 
George H.W. Bush administration’s intervention decisions regarding Somalia and Bosnia 
– the former resulting in an intervention and the latter nonintervention.  By using the 
QCA findings to guide the research into the presidential dialogues and NSC 
deliberations, I was able to demonstrate the degree to which feasibility factors were 
explicitly evident in the decision-making process.  In the second paired comparison, the 
same two crises were explored under the Clinton administration.  The aim here was to 
extend the theory, looking at whether changes in decisions (intervention to withdrawal in 
193 
 
 
Somalia and nonintervention to intervention in Bosnia) were associated with concomitant 
changes in feasibility factors, bolstering the argument for their inclusion in intervention 
analyses.   I discuss each of these research contributions – QCA and the cases studies – 
in turn. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
The QCA portion of the study used 19 intervention opportunities to identify 
unique combinatorial condition solutions – causal recipes of the feasibility factors mixed 
with the internal and external determinants – associated with both intervention and 
nonintervention and used those solutions for a predictive analysis with an out-of-sample 
test.  The parsimonious and intermediate solutions for intervention predicted the actual 
decisions with 100% accuracy and the nonintervention solutions at 75%.    
Specifically, the analysis looked at eight different hypotheses built around the 
theoretical expectations associated with the feasibility factors above, and one for the null 
hypothesis where the factors would be expected to have no effect.  Only the null 
hypothesis had no support.   
Feasibility factors performed very well in the analyses.  Of them, two were most 
significant for intervention decisions: 1) Is there a supportable regime? and 2) Is the crisis 
environment logistically accessible? In the parsimonious QCA solution these two 
conditions account for 88% of the decisions to intervene from 1980 to 2013.  The 
enemy’s structure was also important.  A hierarchical enemy structure was present in 
every case of intervention and absent in two-thirds of the nonintervention cases.  Lastly, 
the conflict type also proved useful.  The combination of an ethnically- or religiously-
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based conflict with no regime to support accounted for 83% of the cases of 
nonintervention.  This solution also supported the “Too Complex” hypothesis which 
argued that there would be an additive quality to infeasible traits that would cause 
presidents to balk. 
The non-feasibility conditions that emerged to help explain the decisions were 
presidential approval, trade ties, and conflict magnitude.  The inclusion of these 
conditions reinforces the position that both domestic and international systemic concerns 
influence intervention decisions.  Yet, alone they did not produce the outcomes in 
question; they always required the addition of at least one feasibility factor in the 
solution.  This finding reinforces the theory put forward that the internal and external 
determinants emit a demand signal, but that there is a feasibility threshold that must also 
be crossed before troops are deployed.  Demand alone is not enough.        
Case Studies 
 The paired comparison of the Bush 41 intervention decisions in Chapter 4 for the 
Somalia and the Yugoslavia/Bosnia crises reinforced the QCA findings.  The two cases 
were similar in that the conflicts had significant magnitude regarding deaths, refugees, 
and internally displaced persons.  Both garnered the support of multinational institutions 
like the UN that cited international norms as a rationale to intervene.  However, the 
among the factors unrelated to feasibility, Bosnia clearly had a stronger case for 
intervention.  The crisis in the Balkans had drawn much more media coverage and could 
tout much more important economic and political ties to allies.  Yet, Bush 41 went in the 
opposite direction and intervened in Somalia instead.   
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 As demonstrated, the key difference between the cases was in the feasibility 
assessment.  Yugoslavia was characterized by the Bush 41 administration as overly 
complex; there was no established ceasefire in place that the intervention could enforce; 
the opposing forces were primarily irregulars and decentralized; and logistical access to 
the region was very limited.  Compare this to the anticipated mission in Somalia which 
did not seek to resolve the conflict, but instead only safeguard delivery of aid from the 
administration thought were “juvenile delinquents” and “brigands” (NSC 0065, 3).  In 
addition, while Somalia was expected to be costly based on the need to support the 
mission via sea and air, Bush 41 did not anticipate the mission lasting longer than 30 
days, therefore making accessibility a minor concern (NSC 0065, 5).   
This chapter also discovered an additional phenomenon that underscores the 
importance of feasibility.  Under Bush 41 the assessment of the Somalian intervention 
opportunity underwent a series of transitions, highlighting how intervention decisions 
may shift given changes in the mission requirements, and therefore the feasibility of 
executing that mission.  This fed directly into the next chapter which sought to address 
this principle head on, looking at whether feasibility factor assessments changed under 
the Clinton administration as they dealt with the same crises, and whether perhaps this 
led to the reversal of decisions – getting out of Somalia and supporting intervention in 
Bosnia.  
In Chapter 5, when the feasibility factors changed from positive to negative, that 
resulted in Clinton’s decision to withdraw.  Likewise, when the initial conditions were 
not supportive of intervention but then changed to promote a feasible mission, Clinton 
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chose to accept the risk and put boots on the ground in Bosnia.  In effect, what this 
chapter accomplished was to extend the application of the theory.  The results also add 
greater weight to the argument put forward here because they demonstrated that changes 
to the feasibility factors were in accordance with the theoretically anticipated outcomes.   
Concerning Somalia, all four of the feasibility factors addressed in this study went 
from favoring intervention under Bush 41 to supporting withdrawal under Clinton.  
While Clinton’s initial assessment was basically the same as Bush 41’s above, that 
changed over time as the mission grew in scope and was met with greater resistance.  
Clinton’s team then recognized they were embroiled in a civil war with no regime to 
support, facing multiple diffusely organized militias, with a much longer time horizon for 
success, thereby greatly increasing the costs associated with logistically supporting the 
operation.   This, in turn, led to withdrawal. 
The assessment for Bosnia under Clinton likewise changed, most fundamentally 
with the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995.  This significantly altered the 
parameters of the mission and resulted in meaningful shifts in the feasibility factors.  The 
conflict was still ethnically-based, but now there was an agreed upon cease fire and a 
separation of combatants.  In addition, there was then no expected opposition, either 
preventing the use of the Sarajevo airport or limiting the access across the region.   As a 
result, the change in feasibility led to intervention. 
In total, the two previous chapters furthered the understanding of how important 
feasibility factors are to the decision-making process.  The primary sources were able to 
expose the deliberations occurring within the NSC and its supporting subcommittees, 
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shedding further light on what it is that truly tilts the scales in one direction or the other.  
This included the notes of meetings with the presidents and their most t rusted 
advisors, holding conversations that they knew would not be available for immediate 
public consumption.  At least in the cases explored here, concerns over operational 
feasibility were quite evident and linked in a theoretically consistent way to ultimate 
decisions. 
Implications 
Research 
This study demonstrates that we can explain, at least partially, the inconsistencies 
within the literature concerning intervention behavior.  The variables that the previous 
scholarship suggests are determinants, whether internally or externally oriented, really 
serve as the demand signals that create an intervention opportunity.  Those demands 
must be paired with a combination of positively aligned feasibility factors in order to 
cross the threshold that results in an intervention decision.   
What this research does is operationalize the concept of “expectations of success” 
that other authors have identified as an important element to be considered, but not 
adequately accounted for in empirical analysis, particularly in the modern era (e.g., Baum 
2004; Regan 1998 and 2002; Seybolt 2007).  Therefore, this work builds on the 
contributions of these authors by taking the factors that the military planning community 
actually uses to develop options for consideration and translates these into concepts for 
use in academia.   
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Moving forward, scholars should view operational feasibility as a portion of the 
decisional calculus that can be operationalized and included in future analyses.  Based 
on the findings here, these considerations may be much more appropriate for explaining 
intervention decisions than any previous alternative, and therefore should be included and 
expanded upon.   
Beyond intervention-focused scholarship, the findings also reinforce work done in 
studies focused on conflict and leader behavior more broadly.  For instance, those that 
have argued strongly that leaders will not go to war unless they are likely to win find 
common ground here (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Morrow, and Siverson 2005).  
This has been especially important for democratic leaders, who place a high value on the 
probability of success, causing them to carefully pick their conflicts. 
Policy  
 The theoretical premise that this study proposes is based on an understanding of 
how decisions are made in the current national security apparatus.  As such, the notion 
that feasibility affects decisions is not novel; what is, is the elucidation of what factors 
carry the most weight.  Therefore, for the policy community, the primary contribution of 
this study is in its shedding light on the most prominent feasibility concerns as 
demonstrated through the systematic analysis of 19 cases.  Beyond that, the additional 
qualitative research of the paired case comparisons illuminates to an even greater degree 
how decisions are made and the importance that feasibility assessments play.    
 Often the people that participate in the formulation of military options – military 
planners, civilian employees within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and on the 
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Joint Staff, and on the various layers of the NSC and its supporting staffs – are unaware 
of what specific concerns are addressed in the small group sessions when the presidents 
meet with their key advisors.  This study, through material released via the Freedom of 
Information Act, was able to shed light on those discussions.  Through those records we 
can see that the decisions are indeed complex, factoring in a number of concerns that all 
bear on potential risk, repercussions of both action and inaction, and most importantly for 
this study, a clear explication that feasibility concerns actually matter.  Based on that, it 
is important that those developing potential intervention options in the future ensure that 
they clearly address these feasibility factors since they will likely be seminal to 
discussions at the highest levels. 
 Lastly, for those in the policy realm, this study exhibits that intervention decisions 
rest firmly in the practical concerns of the possible, not as popularly conceived to be at 
the whims of political fancy.  This should be somewhat vindicating for those who work 
behind the scenes to support these missions, either in the conceptualization or in the 
conduct of the missions themselves. 
Public Awareness 
 More generally, this dissertation militates in a certain sense against unwarranted 
blame.  Often, we see presidents chastised for their inaction in the face of horrific 
atrocities, such as the Rwandan genocide (e.g., New York Times 1994; Reuters 1998).  
When charges that presidents are insensitive to the plight of those suffering in conflicts 
around the world are levied, it is most commonly assumed that something can and should 
be done.   
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Most studies have emphasized the driving forces behind the should in their 
analysis of why presidents choose to get involved.  In other words, we as a scholarly 
community constructed our assessment of why a president has intervened or not based on 
whether the demand for action was enough.  This study explored whether the 
intervention can have the desire effect.  By doing so, it opens more space in the debate 
and criticism that surround these decisions in the public sphere. 
Potential Adversaries 
 Knowledge of the importance of these factors will also prove informative for 
regimes that would seek to deter U.S. involvement in their regional conflicts.  If a 
perpetrator wishes to dissuade U.S. intervention into their affairs, they could take actions 
early that limit the logistic access to their region such as making air or sea ports unusable.  
Or, they might purposefully organize their command and control structure in ways that 
make it difficult to target or pursue more guerrilla tactics from the outset that make 
targeting of larger formations challenging.  Clearly, these concerns might be prudent for 
an adversary of the U.S. regardless of the situation, but the study lays bare how important 
these concerns are for the U.S. and the intervention decision-making process. 
Limitations and Future Research Recommendations 
 Although this research has succeeded in providing an answer to why we have 
witnessed apparently inconsistent intervention behavior by presidents in recent decades, 
it is nonetheless limited.  This is based primarily on the methodological choices I made 
in the development of the research design.  Those choices have a defensible logic that 
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supports their use, but at the same time they present challenges to the validity of the 
study, begging further examination. 
The universe of potential cases that could be considered in this study was 
relatively small for three main reasons.  First, intervention decisions are complex in that 
they are made in an environment where a number of contributing factors are in interplay, 
constantly shifting up until the point of decision.  This realization that the combination 
of certain conditions may hold greater explanations than individual variables led to the 
choice to use QCA rather than more traditional statistical methods.  This decision 
required in-depth analysis of cases to gain knowledge of all the pertinent conditions used 
in the analysis, much of which did not exist in current databases.  The second reason is 
tied to the first.  Intervention decisions are rooted in the realities of an external world 
that is constantly shifting, in its power relations, its economic interdependencies, and its 
cultural norms.  This presents problems in making comparisons across extensive time 
periods.  For this reason, I chose to limit the time frame to the previous three decades.  
capturing the post-Cold War era plus the period of Soviet decline; this produced enough 
instances of intervention to have a meaningful analysis using QCA.  In addition, the case 
studies were selected with the goal of minimizing unaccounted for variance in key 
variables.  Based on that, I chose to conduct two paired comparisons within single 
administrations, which the second building upon the first.  By using this design I was 
able to demonstrate substantively through primary source material that the findings of the 
QCA portion of the design had merit, and then extend the application of the theory to 
include conditional shifts that generate decisional reversals.   
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However, the case selection for the qualitative analyses using this approach could 
be seen by some as problematic because of the dominant influence of the “Weinberger 
Doctrine” discussed above on the administrations in question (Campbell 1998).  As 
noted previously, this doctrine emphasized the importance of clearly achievable goals and 
exit strategies, obviously prizing feasibility concerns in the analysis.  However, if these 
concerns were peculiar to the Weinberger and Powell era, why do we see the same 
feasibility concerns present in the broader systematic analysis when other leaders with 
different advisors were at the helm?  Still, future research should tackle this concern and 
seek to validate or challenge the findings here as new materials become declassified for 
the most recent administrations. 
Even with the mitigating measures discussed above, this study carries some 
validity challenges.  First, concerning external validity, or the extent to which these 
findings can be generalized to a broader universe, the few cases poses a problem.  QCA, 
like other forms of statistical analyses, is just as susceptible to the problems associated 
with small sample sizes.  Therefore, future research should look to expand on the 
application of this design to larger sample sizes.  However, as noted above, caution 
should be taken in operationalizing the feasibility factors generally across time.  
Temporal shifts can change the makeup of meaningful alliances or technological 
advancements can overcome access challenges.  Therefore, I recommend that studies 
undertaken in this vein moving forward maintain the case-based research orientation used 
here and purposively scope the studies to ensure there is logical consistency with the time 
period in question and the factors being evaluated.  In addition, research should extend 
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beyond the U.S. to see if feasibility considerations are present elsewhere, particularly if 
the same logic holds in different regime types. 
Regarding internal validity, or the extent to which the study was executed in 
manner that lends credibility to the findings, I have made every attempt at being 
transparent in both the research and the analytic process.  The raw data for the QCA is 
found in Appendix A, along with sourcing references.  For each data type, I have 
provided the reasoning behind the dates used or judgements made, as well as maintained 
consistency with previous scholars where appropriate.  In the execution of the QCA I 
have provided a step-by-step accounting of the analysis in Appendix C.  However, 
regardless of the transparency, it is still individual analysis.  Therefore, future research 
should delve deeper into the coding and validate or refine the choices I made in these 
analyses, adding to the credibility of the findings. 
 
Closing 
 This dissertation set out to understand why presidents seemingly made 
inconsistent intervention decisions when evaluating foreign crises.  Evidence has been 
marshalled to support the contention that international systemic forces and international 
norms are most persuasive in generating a response; and likewise, others have argued to 
great effect for the impact of domestic concerns.  However, all of these arguments 
hinged on the role of demand.  If the demand is high enough, the logic goes, an 
intervention should occur.  This study uncovered a third way of viewing these situations 
that looked at the threshold for action as not tied to demand, but to the feasibility that the 
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intervention could produce the desired effect within acceptable costs and time constraints.  
The feasibility factors presented here gave meaning to what is really behind an 
expectation of success.  Demand may be present in the extreme, but without feasible 
options it is unlikely that the U.S. will get involved.  This realization should improve 
future research of military intervention decisions and generate a richer understanding of 
the attributes of a crisis that weigh most heavily on the choice to intervene. 
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 APPENDIX C: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF QCA ANALYSIS 
 
The csQCA process begins with identifying the necessary conditions for 
intervention.  If a condition scores a high consistency rate here (greater than .95 for 
“quasi-necessity”) it can be dropped from the analysis since it is too common to be of 
substantive interest (Bara 2014, 6).  The analysis identified STRUCTURE, the 
hierarchical organization of the adversary, as a necessary condition for intervention, but 
not its absence for noninterventions.  Therefore, I drop it from the analysis for 
interventions, but retain it for noninterventions.   This does not mean that the structure 
of the enemy is unimportant to consider as a feasibility factor.  To the contrary, it 
provides substantive support for its consideration is perhaps the most important data point 
when analyzing these intervention opportunities since it has such a high degree of 
consistency with actual uses of force.  Further discussion of this is in the main body of 
the chapter. 
  
 
From here, we turn attention to combinations of conditions that are sufficient for 
intervention decisions.  The first step is creating a spreadsheet for the analysis using a 
truth table algorithm.  The software generates all logical combinations of the conditions 
and displays each of them in their own row with the number of cases exhibiting that 
specific combination (Ragin and Davey, 2014).  In addition, it also identifies the 
proportion of the cases in that row that are part of the set displaying the outcome in 
question - intervention.  From this spreadsheet, the analyst must select those cases that 
are relevant for further analysis. Since I have a small sample, I set the threshold for 
selection to one case exhibiting that combination and a consistency score of greater than 
.75 (Ragin 2008, 46).  
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Next, I ran the standard analyses.  This yielded the following complex and 
parsimonious solutions. 
Complex solution: 
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Parsimonious solution:
 
 
The analysis of these outputs is in the main body of the chapter.  Of note, using the 
intermediate solution, I identified the UN condition as problematic based on its ubiquity 
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across the solution set.  The concern is that a security council approval for action already 
accounts for the issues of feasibility addressed here.  Therefore, I omit it from the further 
analyses. 
In an effort to arrive at pathways that are more meaningful to understanding the 
intervention/nonintervention decisions, I test each for combinations of conditions that 
exhibit higher consistencies and coverages when combined.  The goal is to drop 
conditions from the analysis that apparently lack explanatory power, while identifying 
conditions that have synergistic effects with one another.  The selection criteria I used 
were a consistency > .75 and coverage >.70 (select simplest form to achieve that among 
and between types of determinants) 
 
Dropping structure and the UN condition, the new analysis of necessary 
conditions identified seven conditions to retain for the analysis: ally, trade, mag, 
unemploy, access, social, leader.  The truth table reduces thus: 
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This produced the following analyses. 
Parsimonious solution: 
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Intermediate Solution: 
 
 
I then did the same process for the nonintervention set.  The analysis of necessary 
conditions did not result in any to eliminate from further analysis, although I did choose 
to omit the UN based on the concern of multicollinearity.  Using all of the conditions 
proved futile in identifying lucrative and parsimonious pathways to nonintervention.  
The analysis produces complex and unique combinations that provided little 
commonality.  Therefore, I again need to drop conditions for further analysis in order to 
identify combinations of conditions that can explain more than single instances.  To do 
this, I again run a necessity test on combinations of conditions to find those most likely to 
yield explanatory power. 
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This process yielded a new model for nonintervention that included the following 
conditions based on a .75 consistency threshold and a .70 coverage: ~leader, ~structure, 
~social, ~access, ~approval, ~trade (~ denotes the absence of the condition).  This 
produced the following truth table: 
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This produced the following parsimonious solution: 
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This is the intermediate solution: 
 
 
While I conducted other analyses using these conditions, these were the two sets 
that I used for the arguments put forward in the main body.  This concludes the detailed 
analysis.  The output files for these analyses are available upon request. 
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Annex B: NSC Meetings (AUG 1990-DEC 1992) – George H.W. Bush Library 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
